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POWER VERSUS PLENTY AS OBJECTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

By JACOB VINER

IN the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries economic thought and practice were predominantly carried on within the framework of that body of ideas which was later to be called "mercantilism." Although there has been almost no systematic investigation of the relationship in mercantilist thought between economic and political objectives or ends in the field of foreign policy, certain stereotypes have become so prevalent that few scholars have seriously questioned or examined their validity. One of these stereotypes is that mercantilism was a "system of power," that is, that "power" was for mercantilists the sole or overwhelmingly preponderant end of foreign policy, and that wealth, or "plenty," was valued solely or mainly as a necessary means to attaining or retaining or exercising power. It is the purpose of this paper to examine in the light of the available evidence the validity of this interpretation of mercantilist thought and practice. Tracing the history of ideas, however, always runs to many words, and limitations of space force me to confine myself, even with respect to bibliographical references, to samples of the various types of relevant evidence. That the samples are fair ones I can only attest by my readiness in most cases to expand them indefinitely.

The pioneer historians of mercantilism were nineteenth-century German scholars, predominantly Prussians sympathetic to its economic and political philosophy, and especially to its emphasis on state interests as opposed to the private interests of citizens. The interpretation of mercantilism by Schmoller as primarily a system of state-building is familiar, and com-

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monly accepted by economic historians.[1] A similar stress on the political aspects of mercantilist commercial policy is common in the German writings. The proposition that the mercantilists sought a favorable balance of trade, wealth, and the indefinite accumulation of the precious metals solely as means to power seems first to have been launched by Baron von Heyking, who indeed claims priority for his interpretation.[2] Schmoller similarly interpreted the uncorrupted mercantilism of Prussia and of the non-maritime countries in general, but he maintained that the "imperialism" of the maritime powers was a debased mercantilism, characterized by an unscrupulous use of military power to promote ultimate commercial ends, and half-condemned it on that ground.[3]

This distinction between "pure" mercantilism, a "Staatsmerkantilismus," which can obtain its full development only in an absolute monarchy, and the mercantilism of countries where the commercial classes are influential and the state has to serve and to reconcile private economic interests, is also made much of by a later German writer, Georg Herzog zu Mecklenburg Graf von Carlow. For "pure" mercantilism, the ruling principle is not economic but the promotion of the power of the state.[4] In general, however, the historians have not distinguished between the mercantilism of the absolute and the constitutional

[1] I suspect, nevertheless, that it is highly questionable. The economic unification of the nation-state appears mostly to have occurred before the advent of mercantilism, as in England, or after its decay, as in France, Spain, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, or the British Dominions, if the national unification of tariffs or other significant criteria are applied. Even Colbert promoted regional as well as national self-sufficiency. As Moritz Bonn has commented (*Journal of Political Economy*, LIV [1946], 474), "A parochialist like Gustav Schmoller naturally deduced his impressions of mercantilism from the policies of primitive Prussia."

[2] *Zur Geschichte der Handelsbilanztheorie*, Berlin, 1880, Ch. 2, "Die Beziehungen der Theorie der Handelsbilanz zur Theorie des politischen Gleichgewichtes." The claim for priority is on p. 43. This chapter is a pioneer and valid demonstration of the existence of a close relationship between mercantilist balance-of-trade and balance-of-power theorizing and policy, but there is not a trace of valid demonstration in it that wealth considerations were made wholly subservient to power considerations.

[3] See his *Umrisse und Untersuchungen*, Leipzig, 1898, especially Ch. I, "Das Merkantilsystem in seiner historischen Bedeutung," pp. 42-60; see also "Die englische Handelspolitik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft*, XX (1899), 1211-1241. F. Brie, *Imperidlistische Strömungen in der Englischen Literatur*, 2nd ed., Halle, 1928, p. 68, characterizes English mercantilism of the eighteenth century, along Schmollerian lines, as "kaufmännisch gefärbte Imperialismus."

[4] *Richelieu als merkantilistischer Wirtschaftspolitiker und der Begriff des Staatsmerkantilismus*, Jena, 1929, pp. 198ff..

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states, and where they have dealt at all with the questions of the ultimate aims of mercantilism they have almost invariably asserted that these were solely or preponderantly political, although only too often with ambiguity or even outright self-contradiction, and almost invariably without presentation of substantial evidence.

A case in point is William Cunningham, the English economic historian. His predominant interpretation of English mercantilism was that it sought power rather than or much more than plenty, and that it valued plenty solely or mainly as an instrument or support of power, although he easily slipped, in this as in other analytical issues, into ambiguity if not hopeless contradiction.[5] An English economic historian sympathetic to mercantilism, W. A. S. Hewins, regarded this interpretation as unfair to the mercantilists, and offered the following rendition of Cunningham's position to indicate its inacceptability:

> . . . one might almost imagine him [i.e., Cunningham] saying: "The mercantile system is concerned with man solely as a being who pursues national power, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means to that end. It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive, except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the pursuit of national power—viz., neglect of shipping and aversion to a fish diet. The mercantile system considers mankind as occupied solely in pursuing and acquiring national power."[6]

[5] Cf., for contradiction with the view that power was the predominant objective, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, Vol. II, *In Modern Times, Part I*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 459: "From the Revolution till the revolt of the colonies, the regulation of commerce was considered, not so much with reference to other elements of national power, or even in its bearing on revenue, but chiefly with a view to the promotion of industry." Cf. also, *The Wisdom of the Wise*, Cambridge, 1906: "In the pre-scientific days the end which men of affairs kept in view, when debating economic affairs, was clearly understood; the political power of the realm was the object they put before them, . . ." (p.21) "We recognize [today] that the defense of the realm is essential to welfare, but we are no longer so much concerned about building up the power of the country, or so ready to engage in aggressive wars *for the sake of commercial advantages*, as Englishmen were in the eighteenth century." (p. 22) The italics are mine. The contradiction the italicized words seem to indicate may not be real, since Cunningham may have had in mind that the "commercial advantages" were sought for the sake of their contribution to British power, but such exposition, ambiguous, if not contradictory, is so common in the literature that it provides of itself a justification for an article such as the present one.

[6] In a review of Cunningham's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* in *The Economic Journal*, II (1892), 696. Cunningham, in a reply to Hewins and other reviewers, *ibid.*, IV (1894), 508-16, permitted this interpretation of his position to pass without comment, although it must have been obvious to him that Hewins regarded it as a *reductio ad absurdum*.

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All the German and English economic historians who found in mercantilism the complete subordination of economic to political considerations seem to have been themselves sympathetic to the subordination of the individual to the state and to the exaltation of vigorous nationalism characteristic of mercantilism, and to have been hostile to nineteenth century liberalism and its revolt against the residues of mercantilist legislation. Where this was combined, as in Schmoller and Cunningham, with a dislike of the rise of the bourgeois and his values to dominance over politics, to attribute to the mercantilists the conception of power as the sole or preponderant end of national policy was to praise rather than to blame them.

Eli Heckscher, the great Swedish economic historian and the outstanding authority on mercantilism today, follows the standard interpretation of the mercantilist objectives, but clearly to add to their shame rather than to praise them. Heckscher is an outstanding liberal, an individualist, a free-trader, and clearly anti-chauvinist. When to the section of his great work dealing with the foreign policy of the mercantilists he gives the heading "Mercantilism as a System of Power,"[7] and applies it to mercantilism in general and not only to the mercantilism of the absolute monarchies or of the non-maritime countries, he is reinforcing the indictment of it which he makes on other grounds, for to him "power" is clearly an ugly name for an ugly fact. More systematically, more learnedly, and more competently than anyone else, he supports his thesis that the mercantilists subordinated plenty to power. His argument calls therefore for detailed examination if this proposition is to be questioned.

Heckscher really presents an assortment of theses, ranging from the proposition (1) that for mercantilists—whether for most, or many, or only some, not being made very clear—power was the *sole* ultimate end of state policy with wealth merely one of the means to the attainment of power through the "eclectic" thesis (2) that power and plenty were parallel ends for the mercantilists but with much greater emphasis placed on power than was common before or later, to the concession (3) that mercantilists occasionally reversed the usual position and regarded power as a means for securing plenty and treated purely com-

[7] *Mercantilism*, translated by Mendel Shapiro, 2 vols., London, 1935, II, 13-52.

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mercial considerations as more important than considerations of power. His central position, however, and to this he returns again and again, is that the mercantilists expounded a doctrine under which all considerations were subordinated to considerations of power as an end in itself, and that in doing so they were logically and in their distribution of emphasis unlike their predecessors and unlike the economists of the nineteenth century.

It is difficult to support this account of Heckscher's position by direct quotation from his text, since he presents it more by implication and inference from mercantilist statements than by clear-cut and explicit formulation in his own words. That mercantilists according to Heckscher tended to regard power as the *sole* end is to be inferred by the contrasts he draws between the position he attributes to Adam Smith—wrongly, I am sure—that "power was certainly only a means to the end . . . of opulence," and the "reverse" position of the mercantilists,[8] the "reverse," I take it, being the proposition that wealth was only a means to power. That there is something special and peculiar to mercantilism in conceiving power as an end in itself underlies all of Heckscher's exposition, but the following passages come nearest to being explicit. "The most vital aspect of the problem is whether power is conceived as an end in itself, or only as a means for gaining something else, such as the well-being of the nation in this world or its everlasting salvation in the next."[9] This leaves out of account, as an alternative, Heckscher's "eclectic" version, where both power and plenty are ends in themselves. On John Locke's emphasis on the significance for power of monetary policy, Heckscher comments, with the clear implication that the injection into economic analysis of considerations of power is not "rational," that it is "interesting as a proof of how important considerations of power in money policy appeared even to so advanced a rationalist as Locke."[10]

Heckscher later restated his position in response to criticisms, but it seems to me that he made no important concession and

[8] *Ibid.*, II.
[9] *Ibid.*, II, 16.
[10] *Ibid.*, II, 47.

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indeed ended up with a more extreme position than at times he had taken in his original exposition.

> The second of the aims of mercantilist policy . . . —that of power—has met with a great deal of criticism from reviewers of my book . . . I agree with my critics on that point to the extent of admitting that both "power" and "opulence" . . . have been, and must be, of importance to economic policy of every description. But I do not think there can be any doubt that these two aims changed places in the transition from mercantilism to *laissez-faire*. All countries in the nineteenth century made the creation of wealth their lode-star, with small regard to its effects upon the power of the State, while the opposite had been the case previously.[11]

The evidence which Heckscher presents that the mercantilists considered power as an end in itself and as an important end, and that they considered wealth to be a means of power need not be examined here, since there is no ground for disputing these propositions and, as far as I know, no one has ever disputed them. That the mercantilists overemphasized these propositions I would also not question. Nor will I enter here into extended discussion of the rationality of these concepts beyond stating a few points. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial and other overseas markets, the fisheries, the carrying trade, the slave trade, and open trade routes over the high seas, were all regarded, and rightly, as important sources of national wealth, but were available, or at least assuredly available, only to countries with the ability to acquire or retain them by means of the possession and readiness to use military strength.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also, "power" meant not only power to conquer and attack, and the prestige and influence which its possession gave, but also power to maintain national security against external attack. "Power as an end in itself" must, therefore, be interpreted to include considerations of national security against external aggression on the nation's territory and its political and religious freedom. Given the nature of human nature, recognition of power as an end in

[11] "Revisions in Economic History, V, Mercantilism," *The Economic History Review*, VII (1936), 48. The foreign policy implications of the nineteenth century economics, I believe, need investigation as much as do the aims of mercantilism. Until such investigation is systematically made, comparisons with mercantilism are liable to be misleading with respect to the true position of both bodies of doctrine.

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itself was therefore then neither peculiar nor obviously irrational unless there is rational ground for holding that the promotion of economic welfare is the sole sensible objective of national policy to which every other consideration must be completely subordinated.

There remains, therefore, to be examined only whether Heckscher has demonstrated that mercantilists *ever* regarded power as the *sole* end of foreign policy, or ever held that considerations of plenty were *wholly* to be subordinated to considerations of power, or even whether they ever held that a choice has to be made in long-run national policy between power and plenty.

Despite his wide knowledge of the mercantilist literature, Heckscher fails to cite a single passage in which it is asserted that power is or should be the *sole* end of national policy, or that wealth matters *only* as it serves power. I doubt whether any such passage can be cited, or that anyone ever held such views. The nearest thing to such statements which Heckscher does cite are statements maintaining that wealth is a means of power and is important as such, unaccompanied by express acknowledgment that wealth is also important for its own sake. In almost every case he cites, it is possible to cite from the same writer passages which show that wealth was regarded as valuable also for its own sake. The passage of this type which Heckscher most emphasizes is a "passing remark" of Colbert in a letter: "Trade is the source of finance and finance is the vital nerve of war." Heckscher comments that Colbert here "indicates clearly the relationship between means and ends."[12] But argument from silence is notoriously precarious, and if it were to be pressed would work more against than for Heckscher's thesis, since there is a great mass of mercantilist literature in which there is no mention whatsoever, and no overt implication, of considerations of power. Colbert does not here indicate that the relationship was a one-way one. To make a significant point Heckscher would have to show that Colbert would not also have subscribed to the obverse proposition that strength is the vital nerve of trade and trade the source of finance.

Of all the mercantilists Colbert is the most vulnerable, since he carried all the major errors of economic analysis of which

[12] *Mercantilism*, II, 16.

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they were guilty to their most absurd extremes both in verbal exposition and in practical execution, and since, either as expressing his own sentiments or catering to those of his master, Louis XIV, he developed more elaborately than any other author the serviceability to power of economic warfare, the possibilities of using military power to achieve immediate economic ends, and the possibilities of substituting economic warfare for military warfare to attain national ends. Even in his case, however, it is not possible to demonstrate that he ever rejected or regarded as unimportant the desirability for its own sake of a prosperous French people or the desirability of guiding French foreign policy, military and economic, so as to augment this prosperity. In many of his official papers he is obviously catering to Louis XIV's obsession with power and prestige, or perhaps to a conventional fashion of *pretending* that a great monarch would be so obsessed,[13] so that there is no reason to reject as unrepresentative of his genuinely-held views, such passages as the following:

> . . . comme toutes les alliances entre les grands rois ont toujours deux fins principales, l'une leur gloire particulière et quelquefois la jonction de leurs intérests, soit pour conserver, soit pour acquérir . . . et l'autre les avantages de leurs sujets, . . . Et quoyque dans l'ordre de le division, celuy de l'avantage de leurs sujets soit le dernier, il est néanmoins toujours le premier dans les esprits de bons princes . . .
>
> Les avantages de leurs sujets consistent à les maintenir en repos au dedans et à leur procurer par le moyen du commerce, soit plus de facilités de vivre aux nécessiteux, soit plus d'abondance aux riches.[14]

Certain peculiar features of mercantilist economic analysis-features incidentally which modern apologists for mercantilist

[13] Cf. the following passage in his famous "Mémoire au Roi sur les Finances" of 1670: "Il est certain, Sire, que Vostre Majesté . . . a dans son esprit et dans toute sa nature la guerre par préférence à toute autre chose . . . Vostre Majesté pense plus dix fois à la guerre qu'elle ne pense à ses finances." *Lettres Instructions et Mémoires de Colbert*, P. Clément, ed., Paris, 1870, VII, 252. This long memoir is a plea to the king to look to his economic policy, including economic warfare, as an essential instrument for attaining his ends. Even in the case of Louis XIV, himself, it is easy to show from his writings that the prosperity of his people, while no doubt inexcusably underemphasized, was a matter of some concern to him for its own sake.

[14] "Dissertation sur la question quelle des deux alliances de France ou de Hollande peut estre plus avantageuse à l'Angleterre," March, 1669. *Lettres*, VI, 261. A letter of Colbert to Louis XIV in 1681 contains the following passage: "Ce qu'il y a de plus important, et sur quoi il y a plus de réflexions à faire, c'est la misére très-grande des peuples." C. Dareste de la Chavanne, *Histoire de l'Administration en France*, Paris, 1848, II, 258.

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economics such as Lipson seem strangely to avoid discussing—do seem to imply a disregard on the part of mercantilists for economic welfare.[15] What was apparently a phase of scholastic economics, that what is one man's gain is necessarily another man's loss, was taken over by the mercantilists and applied to countries as a whole. They incorporated this with their tendency to identify wealth with money, and with their doctrine that, as far as money was concerned, what mattered was not the absolute quantity but the relative quantity as compared with other countries. Since the quantity of money in the world could be taken as constant, the quantity of wealth in the world was also a constant, and a country could gain only at the expense of other countries. By sheer analogy with the logic of military power, which is in truth a relative matter, and with the aid of the assumption of a close relationship between "balance of power" and "balance of trade," which, however, they failed intelligently to analyze, the mercantilists were easily led to the conclusion that wealth, like power, also was only a relative matter, a matter of proportions between countries, so that a loss inflicted on a rival country was as good as an absolute gain for one's own country. At least one mercantilist carried this doctrine to its logical conclusion that plague, war, famine, harvest failure, in a neighboring country was of economic advantage to your own country.[16] On such doctrine, Adam Smith's trenchant comment is deserved, although he exaggerates its role in mercantilist thought and practice:

> By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the

[15] See Ephraim Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, Vols. II-III, "The Age of Mercantilism," 3rd edition, London, 1943.

[16] Theodor Ludwig Lau, *Aufrichtiger Vorschlag*, 1719, as reported in Walther Focke, *Die Lehrmeinungen der Kameralisten über den Handel*, Erlangen (dissertation), 1926, p. 59.

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> nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of any body but themselves.[17]

Heckscher cites mercantilist doctrine such as Adam Smith here criticizes as evidence that the mercantilists were not interested in economic welfare for its own sake, but subordinated it to considerations of power. Adam Smith's assumption that the exposition of such doctrine was confined to merchants rather than statesmen (or philosophers) is invalid. But in so far as it was expounded by merchants, it is scarcely conceivable that these were so different from merchants at other times that they were governed more by chauvinist patriotism than by rapacity. The significance of such doctrine is not that those who adhered to it placed power before plenty, but that they grossly misunderstood the true means to and nature of plenty. What they were lacking in was not economic motivation but economic understanding.

What then is the correct interpretation of mercantilist doctrine and practice with respect to the roles of power and plenty as ends of national policy? I believe that practically all mercantilists, whatever the period, country, or status of the particular individual, would have subscribed to all of the following propositions: (1) wealth is an absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression; (2) power is essential or valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there is long-run harmony between these ends, although in particular circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices in the interest of military security and therefore also of long-run prosperity.

The omission of any one of these four propositions results in an incorrect interpretation of mercantilist thought, while additions of other propositions would probably involve internal dispute among mercantilists. It is to be noted that no proposition is included as to the relative weight which the mercantilists attached to power and to plenty, respectively. Given the general

[17] *Wealth of Nations*, Cannan, ed., I, 457-58.

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acceptance of the existence of harmony and mutual support between the pusuit of power and the pursuit of plenty, there appears to have been little interest in what must have appeared to them to be an unreal issue. When apparent conflict between these ends did arise, however, differences in attitudes, as between persons and countries, did arise and something will be said on this matter later.

That plenty and power were universally regarded as each valuable for its own sake there is overwhelming evidence, in the contemporary writings of all kinds, and what follows is more or less a random sampling of the available evidence. In the text accompanying and interpreting the Frontispiece of Michael Drayton's poem, *Polyolbion,* 1622, there is the following passage:

> "Through a Triumphant Arch see Albion plac'd,
> In Happy site, in Neptune's arms embrac'd,
> In Power and Plenty, on her Cleevy Throne"

In Barbier d'Aucour's *Au Roy sur le Commerce, Ode,* 1665,[18] an early French equivalent of *Rule Britannia,* appear the following lines:

> "Vos vaisseaux fendant tous les airs,
> Et cinglant sur toutes les Mers,
> Y porteront vostre puissance;
> Et ce Commerce plein d'honneur,
> Fera naistre dans vostre France,
> Un flus et reflus de bon-heur."

Montchrétien opens his book with this passage: "Ceux qui sont appellez au gouvernement des Estats doyvent en avoir la gloire, l'augmentation et l'enrichissement pour leur principal but."[19] Another Frenchman, writing in 1650 says:

> Deux choses sont principalement necessaires pour rendre un Estat florissant; c'est assavoir le Gouvernement, & le Commerce; & comme sans celuy-là il est impossible qu'il puisse longtemps subsister; de mesme sans celuy-cy on le voit manquer de mille sortes de choses im-

[18] The citation from D'Aucour in the text is made from a reprint extracted from J. Carnandet, *Le Trésor des Pièces Rares . . . de la Champagne,* Paris, 1863-1866. D'Aucour was a tutor of Colbert's son. F. C. Palm, *The Economic Policies of Richelieu,* Urbana, 1920, pp. 178-79, quotes from an earlier *Ode à . . . Richelieu,* in much the same vein by Jean de Chapelain (1595-1624), which similarly stresses power and plenty.

[19] *Traicté de l'œconomie politique* [1615], Th. Funck-Brentano ed., Paris, 1889, p. 11.

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portantes à la vie, & il est impossible que les peuples acquierent de grandes richesses.[20]

John Graunt, in 1662, states that "the art of governing, and the true politiques, is how to preserve the subject in peace, and plenty."[21] An anonymous English writer, in 1677, declares that: "The four main interests of a nation are, religion, reputation, peace, and trade . . ."[22] William III, in his declaration of war against France in 1689, gives as one of the reasons that Louis XIV's "forbidding the importation of a great part of the product and manufactures of our Kingdom, and imposing exorbitant customs upon the rest, are sufficient evidence of his design to destroy the trade on which the wealth and safety of this nation so much depends."[23] In the preamble of 3 and 4 Anne, cap. 10, are the following words: "The Royal Navy, and the navigation of England, wherein, under God, the wealth, safety, and strength of this Kingdom is so much concerned, depends on the due supply of stores for the same."[24] An English pamphlet of 1716 on the relations with Russia, after describing the Czar as "a great and enterprizing spirit, and of a genius thoroughly politic" attributes to him and his people "an insatiable desire of opulency, and a boundless thirst for dominion."[25] William Wood, a noted mercantilist writer, refers to the English as "a people . . . who seek no other advantages than such only as may enlarge and secure that, whereby their strength, power, riches and reputation, equally encrease and are preserved . . . "[26] Bernard Mandeville discusses how "politicians can make a people potent, renown'd and flourishing."[27] An anonymous English writer states in 1771 that:

[20] Cited from Ch. Vialart dit St. Paul, *Histoire du Ministère d'Armand . . . Duc de Richelieu*, Paris, 1650, I, 332.

[21] *Natural and Political Observations made upon the Bills of Mortality* [London, 1662], Johns Hopkins University Reprint, Baltimore, 1939, p. 78.

[22] *The Present State of Christendom, and the Interest of England, with a Regard to France* [1677], in *The Harleian Miscellany*, London, 1808, I, 249.

[23] As cited in *Mercator, or Commerce Retrieved*, No. 1, London, May 26, 1713.

[24] Cited in G. S. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America 1783-1820*, Cambridge Mass., 1941, p. 143.

[25] *The Northern Crisis; or Impartial Reflections on the Policies of the Czar* [London, 1716], as reprinted in Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1899, p. 32.

[26] *Survey of Trade*, 2nd ed., London, 1719, Dedication, pp. iv-v.

[27] *The Fable of the Bees* [6th ed., 1732], F. B. Kaye ed., Oxford, 1924, I, 185.

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"Nature, reason and observation all plainly point out to us our true object of national policy, which is commerce; the inexhaustible source of wealth and power to a people."[28] In an undated memoir of Maurepas to Louis XVI, on the commerce of France, occur the following passages: "Le commerce est la source de la félicité, de la force et de la richesse d'un état ... La richesse et la puissance sont les vrais intérêts d'une nation, et il n'y a que le commerce qui puisse procurer l'une et l'autre."[29]

Such evidence as the foregoing that in the age of mercantilism wealth and power were both sought for their own sakes could easily be multiplied many fold. In English literature of the period of all kinds, from poetry to official documents, the phrases "power and plenty," "wealth and strength," "profit and power," "profit and security," "peace and plenty," or their equivalents, recur as a constant refrain. Nor is there any obvious reason, given the economic and political conditions and views of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, why power *and* plenty should not have been the joint objectives of the patriotic citizen of the time, even if he had freed himself from the mercantilist philosophy. Adam Smith, though not a mercantilist, was speaking for mercantilists as well as for himself when he said that "the great object of the political œconomy of every country, is to increase the riches and power of that country."[30]

In all the literature I have examined, I have found only one passage which is seriously embarrassing for my thesis, not because it subordinates in extreme fashion economic to political considerations, but for the reverse reason. The passage, in an anonymous and obscure pamphlet of 1754, whose authorship I have been unable to determine, is as follows:

> You want not, Gentlemen, to be informed by me, that commerce is the nearest and dearest concern of your country. It is what should be the great object of public attention in all national movements, and in every negotiation we enter into with foreign powers. Our neighbours on the continent may, perhaps, wisely scheme or quarrel for an aug-

[28] *Considerations on the Policy, Commerce and Circumstances of the Kingdom,* London, 1771, as quoted in the preface to G. S. Graham, *British Policy and Canada, 1774-1791,* London, 1930.

[29] *Mémoires du Comte de Maurepas,* Paris, 1792, III, 195.

[30] *Wealth of Nations,* Cannan ed., I, 351.

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mentation of dominions; but *Great Britain, of herself, has nothing to fight for, nothing to support, nothing to augment but her commerce.* On our foreign trade, not only our wealth but our mercantile navigation must depend; on that navigation our naval strength, the glory and security of our country.[31]

It is much easier indeed to show that power was not the sole objective of national policy in mercantilist thought than to explain how historians ever came to assert that it was. The evidence they cite in support of this proposition is not only extremely scanty but is generally ambiguous if not wholly irrelevant to their thesis. It would be extremely difficult, I am sure, for them to cite even a single passage which unmistakably rejects wealth as a national objective worth pursuing for its own sake or unconditionally subordinates it to power as an ultimate end. It is only too probable that there has been operating here that intellectual "principle of parsimony" in the identification of causes which, whatever its serviceability in the natural sciences, has in the history of social thought worked only for ill.

Cunningham and Heckscher[32] make much of a passage of Francis Bacon's made famous by modern scholars in which he speaks of King Henry VII "bowing the ancient policy of this estate from consideration of plenty to consideration of power" when in the interest of the navy he ordered that wines from Gascony should be imported only in English bottoms. As a fifteenth century measure, this falls outside the period of present interest, but Bacon, no doubt, put much of his own ideas, perhaps more than of Henry VII's, in his *History of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh.* It is relevant, therefore, that Bacon speaks of Henry VII as conducting war for profit, and attributes to him even over-developed economic objectives. In 1493, Henry VII had declared an embargo on all trade with the Flemish provinces because the pretender, Perkin Warbeck, was being harboured there. The embargo after a time "began to

[31] *Mercator's Letters on Portugal and its Commerce,* London, 1754, p. 5. The italics are not in the original text.

[32] Heckscher refers to this as "a very characteristic passage" (*Mercantilism,* II, 16), but I find it difficult to cite a duplicate, whether from Bacon's writings or in the period generally. See also Heckscher, "Revisions in Economic History, V, Mercantilism," *Economic History Review,* VII (1936), 48: "I think Cunningham was right in stressing the famous saying of Bacon about Henry VII: 'bowing the ancient policy of this Estate from consideration of plenty to consideration of power.'"

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pinch the merchants of both nations very sore, which moved them by all means they could devise to affect and dispose their sovereigns respectively to open the intercourse again." Henry VII, no longer apprehensive about Warbeck, was receptive. "But that that moved him most was, that being a King that loved wealth and treasure, he could not endure to have trade sick, nor any obstruction to continue in the gate-vein, which disperseth that blood," and by the *intercursus magnus* of 1495-96 with the Archduke of Austria he negotiated the end of the trade war.[33]

Not so frequently stated as that power and plenty are properly joint objectives of national policy but undoubtedly a pervasive element in the thought of the period is the proposition that they are also harmonious ends, each reinforcing and promoting the other. The idea is expressed in the maxim attributed to Hobbes: "Wealth is power and power is wealth."[34] There follow some passages in which the idea is spelled out somewhat more fully: "Foreign trade produces riches, riches power, power preserves our trade and religion."[35] "It is evident that this kingdom is wonderfully fitted by the bounty of God almighty, for a great progression in wealth and power; and that the only means to arrive at both, or either of them, is to improve and advance trade . . ."[36] "For as the honesty of all governments is, so shall be their riches; and as their honour, honesty, and riches are, so will be their strength; and as their honour, honesty, riches, and strength are, so will be their trade. These are five sisters that go hand in hand, and must not be parted."[37] "Your fleet, and your trade, have so near a relation, and such mutual influence upon each other, they cannot well be separated; your trade is the mother and nurse of your seamen; your seamen are the life of

[33] See *The Works of Francis Bacon,* James Spedding, ed., London, 1858, VI, 95-96; 172-73. Cf. also *Considerations touching a War with Spain* [1624], in *The Works of Francis Bacon,* Philadelphia, 1852, II, 214, where he says that: "whereas wars are generally causes of poverty or consumption . . . this war with Spain, if it be made by sea, is like to be a lucrative and restorative war. So that, if we go roundly on at the first, the war in continuance will find itself." On the other hand, in his *Essays or Counsels* [2nd ed., 1625], *Works,* London, 1858, VI, 450-51, he makes what appears to be a clear-cut statement that the prestige of power ("grandeur") is more important than plenty.

[34] J. E. Barker, *Rise and Decline of the Netherlands,* London, 1906, p. 194.

[35] Josiah Child, *A Treatise concerning the East India Trade,* London, 1681, p. 29.

[36] *Ibid., A New Discourse of Trade,* 4th ed. (ca. 1690), Preface, p. xliii.

[37] Andrew Yarranton, *England's Improvement by Sea and Land,* London, 1677, p. 6.

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your fleet, and your fleet is the security and protection of your trade, and both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of Britain."[38]

"By trade and commerce we grow a rich and powerful nation, and by their decay we are growing poor and impotent. As trade and commerce enrich, so they fortify, our country."

"The wealth of the nation he [the 'Patriot King'] will most justly esteem to be his wealth, the power his power, the security and the honor, his security and honor; and by the very means by which he promotes the two first, he will wisely preserve the two last."[39]

"De la marine dépendent les colonies, des colonies le commerce, du commerce la faculté pour l'État d'entretenir de nombreuses armées, d'augmenter la population et de fournir aux entreprises les plus glorieuses et les plus utiles."[40]

George L. Beer has commented, with particular reference to the statement from Lord Haversham quoted above, that "The men of the day argued in a circle of sea power, commerce and colonies. Sea power enabled England to expand and to protect her foreign trade, while this increased commerce, in turn, augmented her naval strength."[41] Circular reasoning this may have been, but it was not, logically at least, a "vicious circle," since under the circumstances of the time it was perfectly reasonable to maintain that wealth and power mutually supported each

[38] Lord Haversham in the House of Lords, November 6, 1707, *Parliamentary History of England*, VI, 598. Cf. also James Whiston, *A Discourse of the Decay of Trade*, London, 1693, p. 3:

> "For, since the introduction of the new artillery of powder guns, &c., and the discovery of the wealth of the Indies, &c. war is become rather an expense of money than men, and success attends those that can most and longest spend money: whence it is that prince's armies in Europe are become more proportionable to their purses than to the number of their people; so that it uncontrollably follows that a foreign trade managed to the best advantage, will make our nation so strong and rich, that we may command the trade of the world, the riches of it, and consequently the world itself. . . . Neither will the pursuing these proposals, augment the nation's wealth and power only, but that wealth and power will also preserve our trade and religion, they mutually working for the preservation of each other . . . "

[39] Lord Bolingbroke, "The Idea of a Patriot King," in *Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism*, London, 1752, pp. 204, 211.

[40] Petit, a colleague of the French Foreign Minister, Choiseul, in 1762, as cited by E. Daubigny, *Choiseul et la France d'Outre-Mer après le Traité de Paris*, Paris, 1892, p. 176.

[41] *The Old Colonial System, 1600-1754*, New York, 1912, I, 16.

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other, that they were, or could be made, each a means to the augmentation of the other."[42]

In contending that for the mercantilists power and plenty were regarded as coexisting ends of national policy which were fundamentally harmonious, I do not mean that they were unaware that in specific instances economic sacrifices might have to be made in order to assume national security or victory in an aggressive war. But as a rule, if not invariably, when making this point they showed their belief that such economic sacrifices in the short run would bring economic as well as political gains in the long run. The selfishness from a patriotic point of view of taxpayers resisting wartime impositions for armament or for war was always a problem for statesmen in the age of mercantilism, and sometimes the parsimony of monarchs was also a problem. It was also necessary at times for statesmen to resist the pressure from merchants to pursue petty commercial ends which promised immediate economic gain but at the possible cost of long-run military security and therefore also of long-run national prosperity. The mercantilist, no doubt, would not have denied that if necessity should arise for choosing, all other things would have to give way to considerations of the national safety; but his practice might not rise to the level of his principles, and his doctrine would not lead him to recognize that such choice was likely to face him frequently. It is not without significance that it was an anti-mercantilist economist, Adam Smith, and not the mercantilists, who laid down the maxim that "defence is more important than opulence." A typical mercantilist might well have replied that ordinarily defense is necessary to opulence and opulence to effective defense, even if momentarily the two ends might appear to be in conflict.

[42] Edmond Silberner, *La Guerre dans la Pensée Économique du XVI^e au XVIII^e Siècle*, Paris, 1939, concentrates on the search for attitudes toward war, idealizing or pacific, rather than on the motivations of foreign policy, but it presents a rich collection of extracts from the contemporary literature which in so far as it is pertinent to the present issue is, I believe, wholly confirmatory of my thesis. Cf. also, by the same author, *The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought*, Princeton, 1946, p. 286: "In the protectionist view, there is a reciprocal action between the economic and war: industrialization facilitates the conduct of war, and military victories increase the possibilities of industrialization and of economic prosperity. This point of view recalls that of the mercantilists: wealth increases power, and power augments wealth." The thesis presented in the text above is also supported not only by the title but by the contents, if I understand his Italian aright, of Jacopo Mazzei's article, "Potenza Mezzo di Ricchezza e Ricchezza Mezzo di Potenza nel Pensiero dei Mercantilisti," *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*, XLI (1933), 3-18.

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Queen Elizabeth was notoriously parsimonious and one of her diplomatic agents, Buckhurst, in reasoning with her in 1587 when the safety of England against the menace from Spain appeared to call for rearmament, anticipated Adam Smith's maxim:

> And alwaies when kinges and kingdoms do stand in dout of daunger, their safetie is a thing so far above all price of treasure, as there shold be no sparing to bring them even into certainty of assurans.

He accordingly advised Elizabeth to

> unlock all your cofers and convert your treasure for the advauncing of worthy men and for the arming of ships and men of war, that may defend you, sith princes' treasures serve only to that end and lie they never so fast nor so full in their chests, can no waies so defend them.[43]

Statesmen frequently found it necessary to warn against endangering political ends by unwise pursuit of temporary or petty commercial gains in response to pressure from business interests. This was especially true in connection with the relations between England and France during the Seven Years' War, which to many contemporaries seemed to be conducted with too much attention to economic considerations of minor importance. Just before the outbreak of the conflict, when it was still being debated whether the issue between the two countries should be settled by economic or military means, Lord Granville was reported as "absolutely against meddling with trade—he called it, vexing your neighbours for a little muck."[44] And in the face of the struggle itself, Mirepoix, the French Ambassador to England, is said to have commented "that it was a great pity to cut off so many heads for the sake of a few hats."[45] In the course of controversy over the Newfoundland fisheries after the ending of hostilities, in 1763, Choiseul appealed to Halifax: "mais pour l'amour de Dieu, ne laissons pas des querrelles de pêcheurs dégénérer en querelles de nations."[46]

[43] "Correspondentie van Robert Dudley Graaf van Leycester," Part II, *Werken uitgiven door het Historisch Genootschap*, Utrecht, 3rd Series, No. 57 (1931), pp. 239, 240.

[44] *The Diary of the Late George Bubb Dodington*, new ed., London, 1784, pp. 344-45.

[45] [William Knox], *Helps to a Right Decision*, London, 1787, p. 35; cf. also a slightly different version in *Letters Military and Political from the Italian of Count A. Algorotti*, Dublin, 1784, p. 129. The hats were involved, of course, because beaver skins were the main prize of the American fur trade, and the hair from these skins was the basic raw material for the men's hats of the time.

[46] Cited in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont*, Paris, 1913, p. 655.

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To some extent this point of view may have been a reflection of a certain disdain for trade in general which was beginning to affect the aristocratic class who conducted the foreign relations of the time. It would be a mistake, however, to explain it in terms of basic disregard for economic considerations, rather than as belief that the pursuit of temporary and minor economic benefits should not be permitted to dominate foreign policy. Such is the position of John Mitchell, who makes clear elsewhere that "power and prosperity" are the proper ends of policy:

> It is well known, that our colonies in America are rather more under the tuition and influence of the merchants in Britain, than the government perhaps, and that all public measures relating to them are very much influenced by the opinions of our merchants about them. But the only things that they seem to attend to are the profits of trade . . . This, it is true, is necessary to be considered likewise, but it is not the only thing to be attended to. The great thing to be considered by all states is power and dominion, as well as trade. Without that to support and protect our trade, it must soon be at an end.[47]

While mercantilist doctrine, moreover, put great stress on the importance of national economic interests, it put equally great stress on the possibility of lack of harmony between the special economic interests of the individual merchants or particular business groups or economic classes, on the one hand, and the economic interest of the commonwealth as a whole, on the other. Refusal to give weight to *particular* economic interests, therefore, must never be identified with disregard for the national economic interest as they conceived it, in interpreting the thought of the mercantilists. In human affairs, moreover, there is always room for divergence between dogma and practice, be-

[47] *The Contest in America between Great Britain and France*, London, 1757, Introduction, p. xvii. Cf. also *A Letter to a certain Foreign Minister, in which the grounds of the present war are truly stated*, London, 1745, p. 6: "That we receive great benefits from trade, that trade is a national concern, and that we ought to resent any attempt made to lessen or to injure it, are truths well known and out of dispute, yet sure the British people are not to be treated like a company of merchants, or rather pedlars, who, if they are permitted to sell their goods, are to think themselves well off, whatever treatment they may receive in any other respect. No, surely, the British nation has other great concerns besides their trade, and as she will never sacrifice it, so she will never endure any insult in respect to them, without resenting it as becomes a people jealous of their honour, and punctual in the performance of their engagements."

The occasion for this outburst was a Prussian "rescript" insisting that Britain should not intervene in quarrels between German states, since they had nothing to do with British commerce.

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tween principles and the actual behavior of those who profess them. It is doctrine, and not practice, which is the main concern here. The task of ascertaining how much or how little they corresponded in the age of mercantilism, and what were the forces which caused them to deviate, is the difficult duty of the historian, in whose hands I gladly leave it.

It was the common belief in France, however, that commercial objectives and particular commercial interests played a much greater role in the formulation and administration of British than of French foreign policy, and some Englishmen would have agreed. There was universal agreement, also, that in "Holland" (*i.e.*, the "United Provinces"), where the merchants to a large extent shared directly in government, major political considerations, including the very safety of the country or its success in wars in which it was actually participating, had repeatedly to give way to the cupidity of the merchants and their reluctance to contribute adequately to military finance. Whether in the main the influence of the commercial classes, where they had strength, worked more for peace or for war seems to be an open question, but there appears little ground for doubt that with the merchants, whether they pressed for war or for peace, the major consideration was economic gain, either their private gain, or that of their country, or both.

The material available which touches on these strands of thought is boundless, and there can here be cited only a few passages which give the flavor of contemporary discussion. We will begin with material relating to the influence of the merchant and of commercial considerations on British policy.

Sir Francis Bacon, in reporting a discussion in Parliament, in the fifth year of James I's reign, of the petition of the merchants with regard to their grievances against Spain, makes one of the speakers say that: "although he granted that the wealth and welfare of the merchant was not without a sympathy with the general stock and state ["estate?"] of a nation, especially an island; yet, nevertheless, it was a thing too familiar with the merchant, to make the case of his particular profit, the public case of the kingdom." The troubles of the merchants were partly their own fault: they so mismanaged their affairs abroad that

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"except lieger ambassadors, which are the eyes of kings in foreign parts, should leave their sentinel and become merchants' factors, and solicitors, their causes can hardly prosper." Wars were not to be fought on such minor issues. Another speaker was more sympathetic to the merchants, who were "the convoy of our supplies, the vents of our abundance, Neptune's almsmen, and fortune's adventurers." Nevertheless, the question of war should be dealt with by the King and not by Parliament, presumably because the merchants wielded too much influence there. Members of Parliament were local representatives with local interests; if they took a broader view it was accidental.[48]

Allies or potential allies of England sometimes were troubled by England's supposed obsession with commercial objectives as making her an unreliable ally where other interests were involved. In September, 1704, a minister of the Duke of Savoy issued a memorial which the English representative at that Court reported as holding that England and Holland, "the maritime powers, (an injurious term, I think, which goes into fashion,) were so attentive to their interests of trade and commerce, that, perhaps, they would . . . abandon the common interests of Europe" in the defeat of France in the war then under way.[49] When Pitt declared to Catherine the Great of Russia that no Russian conquest could give offense to England, she was skeptical, and replied: "The acquisition of a foot of territory on the Black Sea will at once excite the jealousy of the English, whose whole attention is given to petty interests and who are first and always traders."[50]

Montesquieu and Quesnay both thought that in England, unlike France and other countries, the interests of commerce predominated over other interests:

> D'autres nations font céder des intérêts de commerce à des intérêts politiques; celle ci [i.e. England] a toujours fait céder ses intérêts politiques aux intérêts de son commerce.[51]
>
> en Angleterre . . . où les lois du commerce maritime ne se prêtent point aux lois de la politique; où les intérêts de la glèbe et de l'État

[48] *The Works of Sir Francis Bacon*, Philadelphia, 1852, II, 193-99.

[49] *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill*, London, 1845, I, 479; see also II, 751.

[50] Cited by Edward Crankshaw, *Russia and Britain*, New York, no date (ca. 1943), pp. 45-46.

[51] Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, Book XX, Ch. 7.

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sont subordonnés aux intérêts des négociants; où le commerce des productions de l'agriculture, la propriété du territoire et l'État meme ne sont regardés que comme des accessoires de la métropole, et la métropole comme formée de négociants.[52]

The history of British policy and practice with respect to enemy and trade with the enemy during war provides abundant and occasionally startling evidence that considerations of plenty did not always automatically give way to considerations of power. There is much in British history, as in the history of Holland, of France, and of Spain, to support the statement of Carl Brinkmann that: "The history of war trade and trade war is a rich mine of interest to the economic and social historian just for the peculiar ways in which the autonomy of business connexions and traditions is seen cutting across even the sternest decrees and tendencies of political *ultima ratio*."[53]

That in Holland commercial interests predominated was taken for granted in both France and England when foreign policy was formulated. Thurloe commented, in 1656, that all proposals "of alliances of common and mutual defence, wherein provision was to be made for the good of the Protestant religion" failed "in respect the United Provinces always found it necessary for them to mingle therewith the consideration of trade . . . The Hollanders had rather His Highness [Oliver Cromwell] be alone in it than that they should lose a tun of sack or a frail of

[52] *Oeuvres Économiques et Philosophiques de F. Quesnay*, Auguste Oncken, ed., Paris, 1888, p. 429. Quesnay is referring here specially to Britain's policy with respect to the trade of the colonies. Adam Smith's comment on the monopolistic aspects of this policy was more acid: "To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers." *Wealth of Nations*, Cannan, ed., II, 114.

[53] *English Historical Review*, CLIII (1924), 287. There is not space here to elaborate on this theme, but reference to one striking instance will serve to bring out the nature of the evidence available. In the 1740's, during the War of the Austrian Succession, English marine insurance companies insured French vessels against capture at sea by the British navy, and Parliament, after protracted debate, refused to make the practice illegal. Cf.: *Parliamentary History* (Cobbett, ed.), XII, 7-26 (for 1741); [Corbyn Morris], *Essay towards Illustrating the Science of Insurance, particularly whether it be Nationally Advantageous to Insure Ships of our Enemies*, London, 1747; Admiral H. W. Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48*, Cambridge, England, 1920, III, 248-250; C. Ernest Fayle, "The Deflection of Strategy by Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," and *ibid.*, "Economic Pressure in the War of 1739-48," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, LXVIII (1923), 281-294, 434-446; Charles Wright and C. Ernest Fayle, *A History of Lloyds*, London, 1928, pp. 80 ff.

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raisins."[54] A French naval officer, writing to Colbert with reference to the failure of the Dutch to provide the fleet which they had promised for the Levant, said that he was not at all surprised: "les Hollandais n'agissent en cette occasion que par leur propre intérêt; et comme ils ont peu ou point de bâtiments en Levant, et qu'en leur pays ils ne regardent qu'au compte des marchands, ils n'ont garde d'envoyer et de faire la dépense d'une escadre de ce côté-là."[55]

In the summary given in Cobbett's *Parliamentary History* of the principal arguments made in Parliament in favor of moderating the peace settlement to be made with France to end the Seven Years' War, a contrast was made as to the policy proper for England and that for a country like Holland. The economic value of the British conquests of French colonies in America was great. Nevertheless it was to be remembered:

> . . . that the value of our conquests thereby ought not to be estimated by the present produce, but by their probable increase. Neither ought the value of any country to be solely tried on its commercial advantages; that extent of territory and a number of subjects, are matters of as much consideration to a state attentive to the sources of real grandeur, as the mere advantages of traffic; that such ideas are rather suitable to a limited and petty commonwealth, like Holland, than to a great, powerful, and warlike nation. That on these principles, having made very large demands in North America, it was necessary to relax in other parts.[56]

There was general agreement that in France economic considerations played a lesser role in foreign policy than in England and Holland. In part, this was to be explained by the lesser importance even economically of foreign trade to France

[54] Cited by F. M. Powicke, "The Economic Motive in Politics," *Economic History Review* XVI (1946), 91.

[55] A. Jal, *Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps*, Paris, 1883, I, 470.

[56] *Parliamentary History of England*, XV (1813), 1271-1272 (for December 9, 1762). For similar views as to the propriety of a country like Holland confining her foreign policy to commercial matters and to defense, without attempting to participate otherwise in *Haute Politique*, see the instructions prepared in 1771 by the French foreign office for the French Ambassador to Holland, *Recueil des Instructions Données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France*, XXIII, Paris, 1924, 308.

For the comments of the Anglophile Prince of Orange in the course of his attempts to keep Holland neutral during the War of the American Revolution, which proved unsuccessful because of both pressure from France and the financial ambitions of the commercial classes in Holland, see *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, 5th Series, F. J. L. Kramer, ed., Leyde, 1910, I, 607 ff., 618, 635 ff., 677 ff., *et passim*.

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and by the lesser role of French merchants in French politics. George Lyttelton, an English observer at the Soissons Congress of 1729, where the question of the maintenance of the alliance with England was at issue, reported to his father:

> Affairs are now almost at a crisis, and there is great reason to expect they will take a happy turn. Mr. Walpole has a surprizing influence over the cardinal [Cardinal Fleury, in charge of French foreign policy]; so that, whether peace or war ensue, we may depend upon our ally. In truth, it is the interest of the French court to be faithful to their engagements, though it may not entirely be the nation's. Emulation of trade might incline the people to wish the bond that ties them to us were broke; but the mercantile interest has at no time been much considered by this court. . . . The supposition, that present advantage is the basis and end of state engagements, and that they are only to be measured by that rule, is the foundation of all our suspicions against the firmness of our French ally. But the maxim is not just. Much is given to future hopes, much obtained by future fears; and security is, upon many occasions, sought preferably to gain.[57]

Frenchmen in the period occasionally professed readiness to yield to Britain predominance in maritime trade if Britain would give France a free hand on the Continent,[58] but it would be a mistake to conclude that this reflected a readiness to concentrate on political objectives alone. Even on the Continent there were economic prizes to be won, though less glittering ones than those naval power could win overseas.

Historians, moreover, may have been too ready to find sharp differences in kind between the role of economic considerations in the making of foreign policy in England and France, respectively, in the age of mercantilism. The differences, though probably substantial, seem in the matters here relevant to have

[57] *The Works of George Lord Lyttelton,* G. E. Ayscough, ed., 3rd ed., London, 1776, III, 243-44.

[58] An instance in point is in a despatch by Louis XIV to his ambassador in London, in 1668: "Si les Anglais voulaient se contenter d'etre les plus grand marchands de l'Europe, et me laisser pour mon partage ce que je pourrais conquérir dans une juste guerre, rien ne serait si aisé que de nous accommoder ensemble." Cited by C.-G. Picavet, *La Diplomatie Française au Temps de Louis XIV,* Paris, 1930, p. 171.

About a century later, in 1772, George III of England, alarmed by the coalition of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to partition Poland, expressed sympathy for the idea of an alliance between Britain and France despite their traditional enmity: "Commerce the foundation of a marine can never flourish in an absolute monarchy; therefore that branch of grandeur ought to be left to England whilst the great army kept by France gives her a natural pre-eminence on the Continent." (Sir John Fortescue, ed., *The Correspondence of King George the Third,* London, 1927, II, 428-429.)

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been differences in degree rather than in kind. In particular, the extent of the influence which commercial interests in France could in one way or another exercise on policy has been seriously underestimated by many historians, and both in theory and in practice absolutist government was not as absolute in power nor as non-commercial in motivation as the school textbooks have taught us. French records have been misleading in this regard because the older generation of historians were not interested in economic issues and tended to leave out of their compilations of documents matter of a markedly economic character, and French historians seem for some time to have been moving toward a reconsideration of the role of economic factors in the formulation of foreign policy under the Ancien Régime.[59]

There may have been monarchs who recognized no moral obligation to serve their people's interests, and there were no doubt ministers of state who had no loyalties except to their careers and perhaps to their royal masters. Frederick the Great is said to have declared, with brutal frankness, that "Je regarde les hommes comme une horde de cerfs dans le parc d'un grand seigneur et qui n'ont d'autre fonction que de peupler et de remplir l'enclos," and there is little in the King's voluminous writings which makes this incredible.[60] Some monarchs were, to modern taste, childish in the weight they gave to the routine symbols of prestige and protocol.[61] The personal idiosyncrasies

[59] For representative contemporary evidence in support of these points, see: *Mémoires de Louis XIV*, Jean Longnon, ed., Paris, 1927, p. 73; a proclamation of Louis XIV reprinted in P. M. Bondois, "Colbert et l'industrie de la dentelle," *Mémoires et Documents pour Servir à l'Histoire du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France*, VI (1921), 263; Vauban, "Description Géographique de l'Élection de Vézeley" [1696], in A. de Boislisle, *Mémoires des Intendants sur l'État des Généralités*, Paris, 1881, I, 738-49; G. Lacour-Goyet, *L'Éducation Politique de Louis XIV*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1923, pp. 341 ff. For reconsiderations of the traditional views by modern historians, see A. Jal, *Abraham du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps*, Paris, 1883, II, 352-53; P. Muret (a book review), *Revue d'Histoire Moderne*, IV(1902-3), 39-43; J. Hitier, "La Doctrine de l'Absolutisme," *Annales de l'Université de Grenoble*, XV(1903), 106-113, 121-31; Charles Normand, *La Bourgeoisie Française au XVII^e Siècle, 1604-1661*, Paris, 1908, pp. 195, 279-287; Henri Hauser, La *Pensée et l'Action Économique du Cardinal de Richelieu*, Paris, 1944, pp. 185 ff.; Philip Dun, "The Right of Taxation in the Political Theory of the French Religious Wars," *Journal of Modern History*, XVII (1945), 289-303.

[60] Frederick the Great did recognize, however, at least in principle and in his better moments, that the economic well-being of his people should be one of the major objectives of a monarch. See his "Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement et sur les Devoirs des Souverains," of which he had printed a few copies only in 1777, *Oeuvres*, IX(1848), 195-210.

[61] To a letter from Louis XIII in 1629 proposing closer commercial relations, Czar Michel Federowitz of Russia replied favorably, but complained about the manner in which he had

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of rulers and, above all, dynastic ambitions, exerted their influence on the course of events. Occasionally religious differences made the course of diplomacy run a little less smoothly by injecting an ideological factor into the range of matters out of which disputes could arise or by which they could be sharpened. But it seems clear that predominantly diplomacy was centered on and governed by considerations of power and plenty throughout the period and for all of Europe, and that religious considerations were more often invoked for propaganda purposes than genuinely operative in fashioning foreign policy. Even the cardinals, who in some degree monopolized the diplomatic profession on the Continent, granted that religious considerations must not be permitted to get in the way of vital national interests, and even genuine missionary enterprises could get seriously entangled with the pursuit of commercial privileges. When Louis XIII in 1626 sent an emissary to Persia with the primary purpose of promoting the Catholic religion, he instructed him at the same time to seek special privileges for French trade as compensation for the diplomatic difficulties with the English and the Dutch which would result from a French attempt to catholicize Persia. "Sa Majesté pensait qu'on ne pouvait éviter cet inconvénient qu'en se rendant maître du commerce du pays, lequel, outre le gain des âmes, qui est celui que sa Majesté recherchait, offrirait encore à son royaume de notables avantages."[62]

been addressed: "Mais nous ne savons à quoi attribuer que notre nom, nos titres et nos qualités aient été oubliés à la lettre que vous nous avez écrit. Tous les potentats de la terre . . . écrivant à notre grande puissance, mettre notre nom sur les lettres et n'oublient ancun des titres et des qualités que nous possédons. Nous ne pouvons approuver votre coutume de vouloir être notre ami, et de nous dénier et ôter les titres que le Dieu tout-puissant nous a donnés et que nous possédons si justement. Que sí, à l'avenir, vous désirez vivre en bonne amitié et parfaite correspondance avec notre grande puissance, en sorte que nos royales personnes et nos empires joint ensemble donnent de la terreur à tout l'univers, il faudra que vous commandiez qu'aux lettres que vous nous récrirez à l'avenir toute la dignité de nostre grande puissance, notre nom, nos titres et nos qualités soient écrits comme elles sont en cette lettre que nous vous envoyons de notre part. Nous vous ferons le semblable en écrivant tous vos titres et toutes vos qualités dans les lettres que nous vous manderons, etant le propre des amis d'augmenter plutôt réciproquement leurs titres et qualités que de les diminuer ou retrancher." *Recueil des Instructions,* VIII (1890), 29.

[62] G. deR. de Flassan, *Histoire Générale et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française,* 2nd ed., Paris, 1811, II, 396.

In 1713 Charles XII of Sweden wrote to Queen Anne demanding that England, in conformity with her treaty obligations, give him assistance in regaining his territories in the Germanic Empire. "It was not possible," he said, "that Anne could allow her mind to be

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The role of the religious factor in Cromwell's foreign policy has been much debated. The literature of historical debate on this question is voluminous, but it is not apparent to the layman that any progress toward a definitive decision has been made, unless it is that Cromwell was a complex personality on whom economic, religious, and power considerations all had their influence, but in varying degrees and combinations at different times. George L. Beer quotes Firth as saying about Cromwell that: "Looked at from one point of view, he seemed as practical as a commercial traveller; from another, a Puritan Don Quixote," and gives as his own verdict that "It was 'the commercial traveller' who acted, and the 'Puritan Don Quixote' who dreamt and spoke."[63] Other historians have given other interpretations.[64]

I have unfortunately not been able to find an orthodox neo-Marxian study dealing with these issues for this period. If there were one such, and if it followed the standard pattern, it would argue that "in the last analysis" the end of foreign policy had

influenced by the sordid interests of trade; the protectress of the Protestant religion could not fail to support the Protestant power of the north," as against Russia. But Russia at the time was seeking admittance into the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, and England, alarmed at the ambitions of both monarchs, made no choice. See Mrs. D'Arcy Collyer, "Notes on the Diplomatic Correspondence between England and Russia in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, New Series, XIV (1900), 146 ff.

[63] Cromwell's Policy in its Economic Aspects," *Political Science Quarterly*, XVII (1902), 46-47.

[64] Cf. John Morley, *Oliver Cromwell*, New York, 1901, p. 434; Guernsey Jones, *The Diplomatic Relations between Cromwell and Charles X. Gustavus of Sweden*, Lincoln, Neb., 1897, pp. 34-35; Frank Strong, "The Causes of Cromwell's West Indian Expedition," *American Historical Review*, IV (1899), 245; M. P. Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Republic*, Oxford, 1934; [Slingsby Bethel], *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell* [1668], in *The Harleian Miscellany*, London, 1810, VII, 356-57.

I have not been able to find any systematic or comprehensive study of the role of the religious factor in power politics. The following references are a fair sample of the material bearing on this which I have come across: Leon Geley, *Fancan et la Politique de Richelieu de 1617 à 1627*, Paris, 1884, pp. 264-290; "Discours sur ce qui peut sembler estre plus expedient, & à moyenner au sujet des guerres entre l'Empereur & le Palatin," [1621], in *Recueil de Quelques Discours Politiques*, no place given, 1632, pp. 314 ff; C. C. Eckhardt, *The Papacy and World Affairs as Reflected in the Secularization of Politics*, Chicago, 1937, p. 89; S. Rojdestvensky and Inna Lubimenko, *Contribution à l'Histoire des Relations Commerciales Franco-Russes au XVIII^e Siècle*, Paris, 1929, p. 4; *Mèmoires de Noailles*, Paris, 1777, I 126; Cheruel, "Le Baron Charles D'Avangour Ambassadeur de France en Suède" (1654-1657, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, III (1889), 529; [Jean Rousset de Missy], *The History of Cardinal Alberoni*, London, 1719, p. 105; W. E. Lingelbach, "The Doctrine and Practice of Intervention in Europe," *Annals of the American Academy*, XVI (1900), 17, note; "Les Principes Généraux de la Guerre," *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, XXVIII (Berlin, 1856), 50; C.-G. Picavet, *La Diplomatic Francaise au Temps de Louis XIV*, Paris, 1930, pp. 8, 160-166; Georges Pagès, *La Monarchie d'Ancien Régime en France*, Paris, 1928, pp. 67 ff.

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been not power, and not power and plenty, but plenty alone, and plenty for the privileged classes only, and it would charge that members of these classes would always be there in every major diplomatic episode, pulling the strings of foreign policy-making for their own special benefit. Writing a few years ago in criticism of this theory as applied to more recent times, I ventured the following comment: "While I suspect that Marx himself would not have hesitated to resort to the 'scandal' theory of imperialism and war when convenient for propaganda purposes, I am sure that he would basically have despised it for its vulgar or unscientific character."[65] I was "righter" than I deserved to be.

Karl Marx studied the British diplomacy of this period, even making use of the unpublished records in the British Foreign Office, and discussed the role played by commercial objectives in British foreign policy. The ruling oligarchy needed political allies at home, and found them in some section or other of the *haute bourgeoisie*.

> As to their *foreign policy*, they wanted to give it the appearance at least of being altogether regulated by the mercantile interest, an appearance the more easily to be produced, as the exclusive interest of one or the other small fraction of that class would, of course, be always identified with this or that Ministerial measure. The interested fraction then raised the commerce and navigation cry, which the nation stupidly re-echoed.

Eighteenth century practice thus "developed on the Cabinet, at least, the *onus* of inventing *mercantile pretexts*, however futile, for their measures of foreign policy." Writing in the 1850's, Marx found that procedure had changed. Palmerston did not bother to find commercial pretexts for his foreign policy measures.

> In our own epoch, British ministers have thrown this burden on foreign nations, leaving to the French, the Germans, etc., the irksome task of discovering the *secret* and *hidden* mercantile springs of their actions. Lord Palmerston, for instance, takes a step apparently the most damaging to the material interests of Great Britain. Up starts a State philosopher, on the other side of the Atlantic, or of the Channel, or in the heart of Germany, who puts his head to the rack to dig out

[65] "International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies," *American Economic Review Supplement*, XXXIV (1944), 324.

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the mysteries of the mercantile Machiavelism of "perfide Albion," of which Palmerston is supposed the unscrupulous and unflinching executor.[66]

Marx, in rejecting the economic explanation of British friendship for Russia, fell back upon an explanation of both a sentimental pro-Russianism in high circles in Britain and an unjustified fear of Russian power. It is a paradox that the father of Marxism should have sponsored a doctrine which now sounds so non-Marxian. I cannot believe, however, that the appeals to economic considerations which played so prominent a part in eighteenth-century British discussions of Anglo-Russian relations were all pretext, and I can find little evidence which makes it credible that friendly sentiment towards foreigners played a significant role in the foreign policy of England in the eighteenth century. Leaving sentiment aside, England's foreign policy towards Russia in the eighteenth century, like English and European foreign policy in general, was governed by joint and harmonized considerations of power and economics. That the economics at least was generally misguided, and that it served to poison international relations, is another matter which, though not relevant *here*, is highly relevant now.

[66] Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, Eleanor Marx Aveling, ed., London, 1899, pp. 55-56. The italics are in the original.

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THE CHRISTIAN PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE

By GABRIEL ALMOND

IT is a cliché of Communist propaganda to describe the opposition to the peaceful and progressive policy of the Soviet Union as consisting of Wall Street, fascists and former collaborationists, the Vatican, and the right-wing Socialist "toadies." The general impression given is one of a monolithic and wholly malevolent alliance of all the reactionary "minorities," bent on driving the innocent and peace-loving masses into a war against the Soviet Union and the "New Democracy." It is hardly a betrayal of confidence to point out that the Communist is not given to making distinctions. But it is possible to disentangle at least one element of truth in this somewhat harsh judgment of the world outside. This is, that the units engaged in the present world struggle are not solely, and perhaps not even primarily, the nation-states. There is, in a sense, an "East" in the "West," and a subdued "West" in the "East." Ideological and political movements, whether regional or world-wide in scope, have become increasingly important bearers of foreign policy. On the most significant issues of foreign policy in the present crisis, the party affiliation of a Western European makes a greater difference than his national affiliation.

The "third power" in Western Europe which American policy aspires to develop, is really the "third force," if we understand by that term the parties of the moderate democratic center in the region as a whole. To the right of the "third force," conservative nationalisms reject the limitations of individual state authority which the "third power" implies. To the left the Communist parties carry out the orders of Moscow and the Cominform.

The major component parts of the "third force" are the Socialist and Christian parties, both of which are international movements. These parties, together with the smaller liberal

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and moderate conservative parties, pursue political aims similar to but not identical with those of the United States. They have a common interest in preventing the further destruction of the values of personal freedom and integrity by the resolute political soldiery of communism. It is to the American interest in both a moral and an expediential sense so to govern its foreign policy as to foster these moderate movements of the center. Their strength is our strength, not in the sense that they can be counted upon as henchmen, but as companions in a common struggle for humane values and institutions.

Of the various political movements which make up the "third force" in Western Europe the "Christian parties" are both the largest and the least well-known in the United States. Many Americans find it difficult to trust a political movement which is based on religious confession, and particularly on Catholicism, which still holds in principle to its universal and exclusive claims, and which has been, and in certain countries, still is identified with anti-democratic movements.[1] In Spain and Portugal the Church and the great majority of the Catholic populations support authoritarian regimes. In Protestant Scandinavia the Catholic movement has no separate organized political existence. In the five countries of greatest population and economic potential the movement has attracted adherents by preaching doctrines which are both democratic and anti-totalitarian. Excepting only France, the Catholic parties in all these countries are in terms of electoral support the strongest of the contenders for power (see Table I).

In the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Austria the Christian parties hold nine out of the nineteen key ministries. They have two out of five prime ministries and two foreign ministries; they hold or share four of the internal policing ministries and one of the ministries of defense. In each of the five countries they hold from one-third to one-half of the Cabinet posts. Their representation in the lower legislative chambers varies from

[1] Distrust of political Catholicism is by no means limited to the radical left which describes Christian democracy as a façade for "clerico-fascism." The Protestant denominations attack the universalism of the Church and its claims to special status and governmental protection, while the followers of the historic liberal tradition are also in many cases strongly "anti-clerical."

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Table I

The Political Position of Christian Democracy in Five Countries of Western Europe (August, 1948)

Country	Cabinet Strength						
	Prime Minister	Foreign Minister	Minister of Interior	Minister of Defense	Per Cent of Cabinet Posts	Per Cent of Seats in Lower House	Per Cent of Popular Vote*
Austria	Yes	Yes	Yes†	‡	47%	52%	50%
Belgium			Yes	Yes	47	46	46
France		Yes			33	27	26
Italy	Yes		Yes		53	53	48
Netherlands			Yes		43	32	31

* At most recent *national* elections.

† In Austria the Ministry of Interior is shared between a Socialist with the rank of Minister and a member of the Catholic People's Party with the rank of Undersecretary but having Cabinet status.

‡ There is no defense ministry in the Austrian Cabinet.

53 per cent in Italy to 27 per cent in France. Their share of the popular vote ranges from 50 per cent in Austria to 26 per cent in France.[2]

The Christian parties of the various German *Laender* are coalitions of Catholic and Protestant elements. They are strongest by far in the primarily Catholic areas such as Bavaria and the Rhineland. In the American Zone they received more than 48 per cent of the votes,[3] in the French Zone over 57 per cent, in the British Zone 37 per cent (more than 40 per cent if the left Catholic *Zentrum* is included), and in the Soviet Zone more than 24 per cent. Their representation in the various legislative assemblies and *Laender* governments corresponds (with important exceptions) to the size of their popular support. In the Bizonal Economic Council the Christian Democrats hold 20 out of 52 seats.

The problem of American confidence in the countries of Western Europe is further complicated by the fact that the gov-

[2] This figure is for the National Assembly election of November, 1946, the last *national* election in France. The losses of the MRP in the municipal elections of October-November, 1947 are discussed at a later point.

[3] A recent local and municipal election in the United States Zone indicates substantial losses in Christian Party strength.

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erning coalitions are not only predominantly Catholic, but that the second most significant element of the "center" coalitions consists of Socialist parties. In the predominantly Protestant and liberal United States stereotyped conceptions of Marxist and Catholic ideology stand in the way of an open-minded understanding of Western European politics. If American influence is to be employed responsibly, our policies will have to take into consideration the differences as well as the similarities between American political conceptions and those represented by the most important non-Communist movements of Western Europe. This is a situation in which a narrow insistence on American values or a misunderstanding of European ones may have serious consequences for our security position in Western Europe.

In this brief survey of the political characteristics of Christian democracy we shall be concerned with the following problems: (1) the political and social composition of the contemporary Christian parties; (2) the international ties of the various parties and their relations with the Church hierarchies and the Vatican; and (3) their relations with other political movements, and the possible roles which these movements may play in the future development of Western European politics.[4]

I

Christian democracy, as the dominant political organization of the Catholic populations of Western Europe, is a new political phenomenon. Before World War II a very large proportion of Western European Catholics were deeply distrustful of democracy if not explicitly anti-democratic. They viewed democracy as the "stirrup-holder" of Bolshevism; and they preferred authoritative regimes such as those of Austria, Portugal, and Spain.[5] The genuinely democratic currents of political Catholi-

[4] A more careful historical and ideological analysis of Christian democracy has been reserved for later separate publication.

[5] D. A. Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, London, Oxford U. Press, 1941, pp. 85ff.; Denis Gwynn, *The Catholic Reaction in France*, New York, Macmillan, 1924, pp. 35ff.; Charles Micaud, *The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-39*, Durham, N. C., Duke U. Press, 1943, pp. 133ff.; Paul Vignaux, *Traditionalisme et Syndicalisme*, New York, Editions de la Maison Française, 1943, pp. 29ff.; F. C. C. Egerton, *Salazar: Rebuilder of Portugal*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1943, pp. 199ff.; Max Stoffel, *Die Österreichische Ständesordnung*, Vienna, 1938, *passim;* Erich Voegelin, *Der Autoritäre Staat*, Vienna, Julius

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cism were minority movements, supported by some of the Catholic trade unionists, some of the urban middle classes, and a few devoted intellectuals and members of the clergy.

The dramatic shift in ideology from a primarily traditional and authoritarian position in the pre-war period to a democratic and partly collectivist one after the war, suggests a number of hypotheses. It may not safely be viewed as a change in mass sentiment. What has occurred has been a shift in "élites" in which two factors have been of importance. First, the "collaborationist" and authoritarian elements in political Catholicism have been discredited (but not destroyed) by virtue of the military defeat of the Axis. At the same time the democratic leadership has acquired prestige because of its "resistance" record and its militant pro-Allied position in the recent war. Secondly, the Vatican and the national hierarchies have thrown the great weight of their influence in the Catholic communities on the side of the successful Christian democratic leadership. This step sealed the electoral victories of the various national parties. The vote received by these groups was far in excess of the most optimistic expectations of their own leaders. The Church, operating through the clergy and the various lay associations, brought the bulk of the believing Catholics, regardless of their political convictions, into the ranks of the Christian democratic parties.

A second hypothesis proposed here is that while the democratic position of the leadership of these parties is undoubtedly based on genuine conviction, the support given to democratic regimes by the Vatican and the hierarchies is *expediential.* Nothing has happened to suggest that the fundamental political principle of the Church has been altered in any way. It supports democratic governments and democratic parties when such a policy will protect or enhance the position of the Church. It will withdraw its support when democratic institutions seem to be seriously threatening Church interests, or when they prove to be too weak a reed on which to rest its fate. These calculations are clearly reflected in a recent issue of a British Catholic journal which discussed the Italian elections of April,

Springer, 1936, pp. 102ff.; Waldemar Gurian, *Hitler and the Christians*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1936, pp. 163 ff.

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1948. "Even today most Christian Democrats to whom I have talked have only a conditional belief in the democratic process; they frankly face the possibility that the most honest election might menace the Common Good. . . . The evolution of the Austrian *Christlich-Soziale* between 1930 and 1934 seems to indicate such a possibility, but taking into consideration the record of Catholic parties elsewhere, such a hardening is not too likely. The conditions of parliamentary activity place a tremendous ethical handicap on Christian statesmanship."[6]

This hypothesis as to the instability of some of the elements of the Christian parties is also supported by evidence of their social and political heterogeneity. They are the only political parties in continental Western Europe which are similar to the American major parties in that they cut across the great interest groupings of the population. The cement which binds these divergent groupings is of two types: religious faith, and expediential considerations which may be of a temporary duration.

Table II gives evidence of the occupational distribution of the leaderships of the three "mass" parties of France before the rise of the Gaullist movement. The most general impression which one gains is that the MRP party élite has the broadest distribution among the major economic groupings of the French population—agriculture, industry, commerce and banking, and the professions. The Socialist party élite is in the majority made up of professional men and government functionaries; while the largest occupational group among the leading Communists are workers and employees in industry. While the Socialist and Communist parties have relatively few owners and managers in industry and commerce (13.1 per cent of the party's candidates for the June, 1946 Constituent Assembly in the case of the Socialists, and 6.2 per cent in the case of the Communists), the MRP recruited over twenty per cent of its candidates from the owning and managerial classes in the population.

A third hypothesis proposed here is that conservatives and authoritarian elements, primarily Catholic but including Protestants in Germany, have taken refuge in these organizations, largely because of the discrediting of the historic political par-

[6] *The Tablet*, March 20, 1948, pp. 177 ff.

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Table II

*Occupations of Candidates of the Three "Mass" Parties of France for the Constituent Assembly of June 1946 (in Percentages)**

	MRP		*Communists*		*Socialists*	
Agriculture	19.9%		21.6%		13.3%	
Farmers		19.9%		18.8%		12.6%
Farm Labor		0.		2.8		0.7
Industry	23.6		37.8		16.3	
Owners		4.2		0.6		2.9
Managers		4.4		1.7		3.2
Manual Labor		9.4		27.4		5.5
Employees		4.4		5.3		3.6
Artisans		1.3		2.8		0.9
Commerce & Banking	16.6		8.1		11.0	
Merchants & Bankers		6.3		2.4		3.6
Managers		5.0		1.5		3.4
Employees		5.2		4.3		3.9
Professions	40.0		32.5		59.3	
Lawyers & Notaries		9.8		0.6		7.1
Physicians		7.0		1.7		5.3
Arts & Letters		4.8		3.0		6.4
Teachers & Education		8.3		15.6		26.2
Other Officials		10.0		11.5		14.3

* Adapted from Raoul Husson, *Elections et Referendums*, Paris, Le Monde, 1946. Based on an analysis of 435 Socialist, 468 Communist, and 458 MRP candidates.

ties of the Right. This was reflected in the large proportion of MRP Constituent Assembly candidates recruited from the upper occupational groups in France. It is also supported by analysis of the regional distribution of the strength of the Christian parties. Thus in France the MRP in the election of November, 1946 received more than forty-five per cent of the votes in eight departments. In the pre-war period all eight of these departments voted for the conservative parties in roughly the same proportion. For these voters the MRP constituted the party of the *moderés* in the postwar political context. The thirteen French departments in which MRP voting support ranged between thirty-five and forty-five per cent in the election of November, 1946 also were historic centers of conservative strength in the pre-war period.[7]

[7] See B. Leger, *Les Opinions Politiques des Provinces Françaises*, Paris, Librarie du Recueil Sirey, 1936, particularly the map facing p. 266; see also Michel Montaquier, "Tableau Politique de la France Metropolitaine," *France-Illustration*, November 3, 1945; François Goguel, "Geographie du Referendum du 13 Octobre et des Elections du 10 Novembre 1946," *Esprit*, February, 1947; *Le Monde*, November 12, 1946.

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A similar electoral shift has occurred in the Western Zones of Germany. Thus in Schleswig-Holstein, where in the pre-war period the Catholic *Zentrum* was an extremely small party, the Christian Democratic Union received more than thirty-seven per cent of the votes. The Nazi and Nationalist parties together had in this area a majority in the election of July, 1932. The Nazis alone averaged forty-four per cent in the four Reichstag elections between September 1930 and March, 1933. Since the only other non-Left party on the ballot in the post-war period, the right-wing Free Democratic Party, received only six per cent of the votes, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the bulk of these former Nazi and nationalist voters in Schleswig-Holstein are now "guests" of the Christian Democrats. Schleswig-Holstein is rather an extreme case; but it is evident that this shift of former Nazis and Nationalists to the Christian parties has taken place throughout Western Germay.[8]

In Italy evidence of the size and importance of the conservative and authoritarian wing of the Christian Democrats is even more striking. In the spring elections of 1948 the great Christian Democratic victory was largely won at the cost of the conservative, monarchist, and neo-fascist parties. This was a kind of victory which aroused among Western liberals almost as much apprehension as it did satisfaction. In his election victory address De Gasperi found it necessary to insist, "We are not reactionaries. Every reform we promised will be made."[9] The *Democristiani* not only include the democratic tendencies among the old *Popolari,* but their former opponents as well, the right-wing Catholic industrialists and landowners. These elements withdrew from the *Popolari* in the crises of the early and middle 1920's and, under the name of the National Center, joined with the Fascists.[10] The democratic Catholics

[8] For pre-war German election statistics see Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany*, New York, Oxford U. Press, 1945, pp. 31 ff.; James K. Pollock, "An Areal Study of the German Electorate," *American Political Science Review,* XXXVIII, 89 ff.; Rudolf Heberle, "Political Movements Among the Rural People of Schleswig-Holstein," *Journal of Politics,* February, May, 1943; Sidney L. W. Mellen, "The German People and the Post-War World," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 601 ff.; for postwar election returns see OMGUS Special Report, *Statistics of Elections in Germany 1946,* March 15, 1947, especially Charts V and VI.

[9] *New York Herald Tribune,* April 22, 1948.

[10] Sturzo, *Italy and Fascismo,* London, Faber and Gwyer, 1926 pp. 129 ff.; Binchey, *op. cit.,* pp. 158 ff.

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were strongest among the small independent farmers and the artisanate of Northern Italy, while the conservative groups were powerful among the Catholic urban upper classes and the large landholders in the south.[11] The conservative south is still one of the most important centers of Christian Democratic strength.

In the case of Austria it is only necessary to point out that in the 1934-37 period political Catholicism was organized in the "Fatherland Front," an authoritarian party in a one-party state. The contemporary Austrian People's Party has roughly the same electorate as that which supported the Christian Social Party of Seipel and the Fatherland Front of Dolfuss. The solid support of the Austrian People's Party lies in the conservative rural and agricultural regions.

It is unnecessary to go into further detail to demonstrate that the constituents of the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe are hardly of a single political coloration. It is probable that the majority of the voters of these parties are not democrats by conviction, but this is not to say that they are convinced anti-democrats. One may distinguish at least five elements in contemporary political Catholicism: (1) the authoritarians, (2) the conservatives, (3) the traditionalist, non-political elements, (4) the "pure" Catholic democrats and moderate collectivists, and (5) the Catholic revolutionaries.

The specifically authoritarian elements of the Christian parties have been reluctant to show their hands in a postwar era marked by the dominance of anti-fascist movements. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that they have regained confidence and are now a force to be reckoned with. It is an historical irony that the greatest antagonist of French collaborationism, De Gaulle, is now supported by many of the survivors of Petainism. The leadership of the Gaullist RPF exhibits three tendencies: (1) the moderate parliamentary tendency led by René Pleven which favors, at least for the short-run, a merger with the "Third Force" under Gaullist leadership; (2) the militant activists of De Gaulle's immediate entourage who are anti-parliamentary but oriented toward a

[11] A. W. Salomone, *Italian Democracy in the Making*, Philadelphia, U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1945, pp. 40 ff.

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"left" social policy; (3) and finally the traditional rightists among whom army officers predominate, and who represent the Catholic authoritarian point of view. The young militant activists of the Gaullist movement are mainly veterans of the French resistance, restless spirits whose young manhood was spent in underground activity and war. Like the "partisan" veterans of the left they are perhaps unadaptable to the return of the "everyday"—the bickerings and "deals" of parliamentarians, the apparent futility of diplomacy and negotiation, and the generally unheroic perspectives of postwar life.[12]

The army officers who constitute the Gaullist leadership in some of the traditional centers of French "rightism" are associated with and supported by many of the clergy in the same areas. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, MRP Minister of Defense, has attacked the Gaullist movement as containing ". . . all the old, down-at-the-heels ghosts of pre-war radicalism . . . all of the white-washed collaborators . . . the renegades, the petty traitors, and the ambitious."[13] It is hardly surprising that the Gaullist movement attracted practically all of the conservative elements of the MRP in the municipal elections of the fall of 1947. Rather than a desertion, this phenomenon may perhaps be more properly described as a return of the conservative and traditional elements to their historic leadership and point of view.

Recent elections in the American Zone of Germany have also shown a right-wing trend, with the Christian Democrats losing to explicitly conservative formations. The significance of these shifts was not lost on General Clay, who referred to the threat of "totalitarian rightism" in recent political developments in Germany. He mentioned specifically the National Democratic

[12] Four of eleven members of the RPF executive committee are in their thirties; five in their forties; and only two are over fifty. Men like Jacques Soustelle, André Malraux, Jacques Baumel, Guillain de Benouville can hardly be said to have ever lived normal adult existences. These young activists in De Gaulle's immediate entourage are the potential totalitarians of the RPF. See "Les Dirigeants du RPF," *Bilans Hebdomadaires,* Supplement to No. 101, April 9, 1948.

[13] *Bilans Hebdomadaires,* No. 101, April 9, 1948, p. 1; see also Jacques Fauvet, "Historical and New Factors in Gaullism," and "The Supporters of the RPF in the Municipal Elections," *Documents,* Ambassade de France, Service de l'Information; Paul Fraisse, "Le Nouveau Gaullisme," *Esprit,* April, 1947; Francois Goguel, "Conjoncture Politique du neo-Gaullisme," *Esprit,* December, 1947; Gelo and Andrea (pseud.), "Charles de Gaulle: A Political Portrait," *Modern Review,* September, 1947.

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Party in Hesse which received 3.4 per cent of the vote although it was only licensed in eight of the forty-one election districts.[16] In Bavaria a "Homeland and Royalist Party" was dissolved by Military Government in 1946. Its membership then adhered to the Christian Social Union, a movement which already contained the authoritarian survivals of the pre-Nazi Catholic *Bayerische Volkspartei.* Subsequently a Bavarian Party, consisting of former CSU "rightists" and "particularists" made substantial inroads on Christian party strength in the local elections of 1948.

In Italy the spring electoral crisis and the all-out campaign of the Church resulted in a right-wing tide *toward* rather than away from the Christian Democrats. The extreme right-wing Catholics deserted the *Qualunque* and the Monarchists, only to strengthen the already powerful conservative sector of the *Democristiani.* The Vatican, Catholic Action, and the Bishops of Southern Italy, as well as the Christian party leadership itself, have all issued statements implying considerable apprehension over the strength of the conservative pressure within the Christian Democratic movement. Their optimistic view that the ". . . old conservatives are finally moving into the dynamism of contemporary history . . ." may be wishful thinking.[17]

The specifically authoritarian wing of political Catholicism is small numerically. Its importance lies in the fact that it is a crisis leadership which will command a large following in the event of a further aggravation of political conflict. Part of this following may come from the specifically conservative and traditional sectors of the Christian movements. The conservative tendency of political Catholicism is also small numerically, but strong in influence within the Church and in the rural areas. The Catholic large landholders and industrialists of Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy constitute the cadres of Catholic conservatism. They are extremely influential among the largest single component of the Christian parties—the traditional Flemish, Bavarian, Italian, and French peasantry—and among certain sectors of the urban Catholic middle classes, groups which are deeply imbued with religious faith,

[16] *New York Times,* April 26, 27, 30, 1948.

[17] See *The Tablet* March 6, 1948 and March 20, 1948; *New York Herald Tribune* April 22, 1948; *New York Times,* April 23, 1948.

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and tend to be politically apathetic and indifferent. The clergy in the agrarian regions are largely recruited from the countryside and are subject to the political control of their bishops and the neighboring landowners. These traditional elements of political Catholicism, while separable from the specifically conservative upper-class Catholics, are nevertheless especially susceptible to the politics of conservatism. They constitute a group in the electorate which, under normal circumstances, can be "delivered" by the Church leadership. Emmanuel Mounier describes the Italian Christian Party as indistinguishable from the Church and Catholic Action. The situation, in his judgment, contrasts sharply with that in France. This dependence, he states, reflects the sentiment of a large part of the Italian population ". . . conservative in temperament, subjected to the influence of the parish priest and a kind of agrarian feudalism, deeply religious, apolitical."[18]

The agrarian and urban sections of conservative and traditional political Catholicism also differ somewhat in their policy tendencies. The urban Catholic middle and upper classes tend to follow the liberal economic position, and have adapted themselves to party politics and parliamentarism. The agrarian elements are more hospitable to traditional authoritarian and paternalistic ideas and practices.[19] Since the clergy and the military professions are recruited in large measures from these social and regional "backwaters" of Western culture, it is to be expected that the élites of Catholic authoritarianism would be recruited from the clergy of the countryside, the military professions, and the latifundia. Catholic conservatism (in the sense of "liberal economics") recruits its leadership more frequently from the urban professional, industrial, and commercial upper classes.

While these three tendencies—authoritarianism, conservatism, and traditionalism—are distinguishable, serious political crises have the effect of subordinating differences, and produc-

[18] Lignes de force d'un personnalisme Italien," *Esprit*, No. 141, January, 1948, pp. 14 ff.

[19] While this generalization is on the whole correct it should not be overlooked that the Communists have been quite successful in mobilizing discontent among the distressed agrarian elements. They have registered remarkable electoral successes in both the Italian and French countryside. In Italy they have mobilized elements which in the pre-fascist era had been organized in the peasant unions of Guido Miglioli, movements which were attacked as "White Bolshevism" by the Catholic conservatives.

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ing unity. Under ordinary conditions these right-wing Catholic tendencies are likely to be sympathetic with the views of the non-Catholic Right. In crises an alliance with the resolute and militant authoritarians and neo-fascists may be preferred. The Vatican and the various national clergies are of great importance in determining the direction of movement of the Catholic Right. For the conservative and authoritarian segments are small "élite" groups, while the potential mass support is largely made up of the traditional non-political elements which are directly amenable to the influence of the Church.

The fourth group consists of the democratic and social-reformist Catholic intellectuals, the left-oriented middle class elements, and a large part of the Catholic trade unionists. The trade unionists provide the largest coherent support for the "pure" Catholic democracy. These movements have expanded rapidly since the end of the war. In Belgium there are 350,000 Catholic trade unionists as compared with 550,000 for the Socialist-controlled trade unions. In France the Christian unions have almost a million members. In Italy the figures cannot be accurately estimated since the Catholic trade unionists have only recently separated from the general labor organization.

Before the war the Catholic trade unions were strong primarily among the employee class, and were quite weak among manual workers. A special effort has since been made in Belgium and France to win the manual workers to Catholicism. The organization of the young Christian workers, the *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne,* was established first in Belgium by Canon Joseph Cardijn, a priest of working class origin. The movement spread rapidly throughout Belgium and France and by 1945 claimed a half million members in France alone. It has greatly strengthened the Catholic trade union movement by providing it with a group of young militants and by broadening its working-class base. In general the JOC and similar movements among agricultural and student youth have been partly responsible for the powerful social reformist and democratic Catholic current in postwar France and Belgium.[20]

[20] See Dominique Auvergne, *Regard Catholiques sur le Monde,* Bruges, DeBrauwer et Cie, 1938, "Chanoine Cardijn"; Claire Huchet Bishop, *France Alive,* New York, McMullen

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The social position of this authentically democratic current of political Catholicism is moderately left. It favors a measure of socialization for monopolistic industry, and for the rest of the economy proposes a mixture of privately owned smaller enterprises, and cooperatively owned larger enterprises. These views have had considerable prominence in the postwar period because the ardent and youthful resistance leadership moved rapidly into leading party positions. But it is doubtful whether their influence extends much beyond the Catholic trade unionists and some of the professional and intellectual elements of the urban middle classes.

It is impossible to describe with any accuracy the numerical size of the various tendencies in Western European political Catholicism. The three right-wing elements so far described probably constitute the majority of the voters in the Christian parties. The more extreme rightist groups among the Catholic populations adhere to the right-wing movements properly speaking, on the order of the Gaullist RPF of France, and the monarchists and *Qualunquists* of Italy. These extreme rightist parties are "clerical" in the sense that they appeal to Church interests with regard to educational, and similar questions.

The French municipal elections of the fall of 1947 resulted in a loss of three-fifths of the MRP voters to the Gaullist RPF. The genuinely Christian democratic group polled far less than half its former strength.[21] With variations from country to country the size of this genuinely democratic and moderately collectivist contingent may be estimated at anywhere from twenty-five to thirty-five per cent of the voting strength of the Christian parties. It is perhaps strongest in France and Belgium. The liberal Catholics, who profit from the support of the Vatican and parts of the clergy, still tend to be influential in the Christian party organizations. They are, however, obviously hampered in enacting their programs by the resistance of their powerful conservative wings.

Although the Christian "radicals" and "revolutionaries" are

Co., 1947, Chapter III *passim;* R. C. Gorman, S. J., "The Vitality of French Catholicism," *The Tablet,* July 12, 1947.

[21] Barbara Barcley Carter, "The Evolution of the MRP," *The Tablet,* March 13, 1948, pp. 162 ff.

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numerically and politically of lesser importance, they represent a phenomenon of considerable interest—believing Catholics who find it possible to reconcile their faith with Marxist ideas. Such groups had existed before the war, notably in France. They were strengthened during the resistance by virtue of the comradeship of the Catholic resistance with Communist and Socialist underground movements.

In 1935 a group of revolutionary French Catholics had joined a Protestant group to found a review and a Christian revolutionary movement. The review was called *Terre Nouvelle* and carried the symbol of the hammer and the sickle on a background of a scarlet cross. The group took the position that Marxism fulfilled the doctrine of the Gospel. This spirit was reflected in its declaration that "The Christian ought to be . . . a revolutionary and the more revolutionary he is, the more Christian."[22] A year after its establishment the Pope condemned the movement, and placed *Terre Nouvelle* on the Index. A pontifical letter appearing in *Osservatore Romano* explained the condemnation by the assertion that Christianity and Bolshevism were irreconcilable and no collaboration between Communists and Catholics was possible.

In the postwar period this Catholic revolutionary movement emerged with greater strength in both France and Italy. A recent *Manifeste des Chrétiens Progressistes* describes the Communist party of France as the ". . . sole means of defending the working class today, and the hope of popular democracy."[23] In Italy the *Sinistra Cristiana* was founded during the resistance period. It accepted Marxism as a method of historical analysis and of revolutionary action but rejected it as a philosophy of life. At the time of the liberation the *Sinistra* was attacked in *Osservatore Romano* and the group was dissolved. Many of its founders entered the Italian Communist Party, the membership statutes of which conveniently state that party affiliation does not signify adherence to any particular system of philosophy.[24] The significance of this symptom and the effectiveness of Communist tactics was reflected in the extraordinary actions of the Vatican and the Italian hierarchy in the

[22] Spire, *op. cit.* p. 46.
[23] Cited in Emmanuel Mounier, "Delivrez Vous," *Esprit,* January, 1948, pp. 133 ff.
[24] Mounier, *Esprit,* January 1948, *loc. cit.* pp. 14 ff.

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spring election of 1948. Cardinal Schuster of Milan ordered his clergy to refuse the sacraments to Catholic adherents of the "Popular Front." The Pope himself intervened and left little doubt in the minds of his flock that voting for the Popular Front was a grievous error, although he did not go so far as to declare it a sin.[25]

A more significant left Catholic tendency is that represented by the *Esprit* group in France and the *Cronache Sociali* in Italy. These Catholic elements are the convinced socialists, strongly influenced by Marxism, but opposed to Communist totalitarianism. They had been strong supporters of the Communist-Socialist "Left-Catholic" alliance in the era of "tripartism." After the dissolution of the coalitions in France and Italy they attacked the anti-Communism of the Socialist and Christian parties. French Catholic intellectuals such as Emmanuel Mounier and Paul Fraisse apparently favor the formation of a new majority based on the "revolutionary working class." Mounier attacks the existing "Third Force" government as a parliamentary instrument of conservatism and social defense. In its place he calls for what would in effect be a new popular front, ". . . a new socialism with a strong and conquering faith . . . a proletarian and popular force which is the basis of the order of the twentieth century; a renovation preparatory to a future rallying of all the revolutionary forces in a climate of liberty and a reciprocal respect."[26] This Catholic group has ties with a movement having similar views within the Socialist party, the *Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire*. There is some speculation that the RDR may attempt to overturn the present leadership of the Socialist party and reestablish a Communist-Socialist coalition. The *Esprit* group and the pro-Communist "Christian Progressives" among the Catholics, the RDR among the Socialists, and a group of pro-Communist, former Radical Socialists (among them Pierre Cot) offer to the French Communists the prospect of establishing a *Union des Gauches* in which the Communists would be the dominant partner.[27]

[25] *The Tablet*, March 20, 1948.

[26] Mounier, *Esprit*, January, 1948, pp. 139 ff.; see also Paul Fraisse, "Après l'échec" *Esprit*, January, 1948, pp. 1 ff.

[27] "Dissidence Socialistes," Supplement No. 96, *Bilans Hebdomadaires*, March 5, 1948; No. 100, April 2, 1948, p. 2; No. 101, April 9, 1948, p. 1.

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While political Catholicism is characterized by these five policy tendencies, the most significant groups within the Christian parties proper are the conservatives, the traditional, non-political elements, and the democratic, moderate left groups. The question of whether the Christian parties are movements of the "right" or of the "center" is impossible to answer with confidence. The answer lies in part with the Vatican and the national hierarchies which are in a position to swing many of the non-political Catholic voters in the direction which they desire. The Church leaders in turn are limited in their discretion by the heterogeneity of the support for these parties. If they should press party policy to the "right" they may effect a splintering of Catholic political strength.

On the basis of the principle of maximization of polical strength the Church is constrained to encourage a center policy. But the Church is limited in its capacity to enforce conformity. At the moment it has proven itself capable of maintaining unity and encouraging "centrism" in Italy. But in both France and Germany there are considerable political differences within the national clergies and the Catholic populations, and the influence of the Vatican is not sufficient to establish and maintain political unity.

II

Popular prejudice attributes to the Vatican a monolithic control over the politics of the Catholic populations. It is, of course, quite clear that the Vatican intervenes frequently and aggressively in political developments, but it would be an exaggeration to view the Christian parties as the mere long arm of the Church. It would also be an exaggeration to view the various national clergies as a unified and disciplined political force under the direct control of the Holy See. Catholicism cannot compare with the Communist movement in regard to discipline and centralized control.

Any sound analysis of the relation of the Vatican to the Christian parties has to distinguish between theory and practice. In a formal sense the Vatican and the hierarchies are concerned with matters of faith and morals.[28] Only where politics

[28] Heinrich Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought*, St. Louis, Herder Book Co., 1945, pp. 580 ff.

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impinges on these questions do the Vatican and the national hierarchies assume the right to intervene. The Catholic definition of faith and morals makes for a rather flexible standard. On the basis of logical development of Church doctrine, as well as historical example, "faith and morals" can be made to include a very great deal indeed. Thus the attack of the Church in the nineteenth century on liberal and socialist political philosophy was justified on the ground that these movements were atheistic and threatened the proper function of the Church as guardian of faith and morals. The Vatican through the *Non-expedit* attempted to enforce a boycott of the Italian government which had deprived the Church of its political authority over the former Papal states. At the present time the Church has prohibited Catholics from becoming affiliated with Communist movements and has warned against the dangers of affiliation with the non-Catholic parties and trade unions.

In political matters affecting faith and morals much depends on the severity of the sanction employed. The Church may proscribe an action as a "sin" of a particular degree, or as an "error"; or it may merely counsel against a particular policy. Interdiction of movements or excommunication of individuals are sanctions rarely employed. Perhaps the Church has found that the authority of the Pope and the bishops is best fostered by an infrequent resort to "compulsive" means. The action of Cardinal Schuster of Milan in the recent Italian elections in ordering his clergy to refuse the sacraments to those who voted for the "Popular Front," was an extraordinary step even in that bitter campaign. Earlier, during the Nazi occupation members of the Dutch clergy had denied the sacraments to members of the Dutch Nazi movement. The intervention of the Pope was somewhat more moderate in the Italian campaign. In his allocution as Bishop of Rome to the parish priests and Lenten preachers, Pius XII drew the attention of the clergy to the extraordinary importance of the election and to the moral responsibility of the voters. "Without doubt the Church intends to remain outside and above the political parties, but how could it be possible to remain indifferent to the composition of a parliament to which the constitution gives the power to legislate in matters which concern so directly the highest

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religious interests. . . . He who abstains, particularly through indolence or from cowardice, commits thereby a grave sin, a mortal offense." Voting instructions in the papal allocution took the following form: "Everyone has to vote according to the dictates of his own conscience. Now it is evident that the voice of conscience imposes on every sincere Catholic the necessity of giving his vote to those candidates, or to those lists of candidates, which offer truly adequate guarantees for the protection of the rights of God and of souls, for the true good of individuals, of families, and of society, according to the laws of God and to Christian moral teaching."[29]

Typically the political influence of the Vatican and the hierarchies takes the form of suggestions and recommendations, a form of pressure which is effective with the great bulk of the faithful. An example of this type of influence was the letter of the Pope to the *Semaine Sociale* of 1946 in which he suggested that France had gone far enough in its program of nationalization, and that it was advisable to pause and digest these reforms. In a letter to the *Semaine Sociale* of 1947 the Pope answered those who had criticized him for entering politics by asserting that he had been speaking on the moral and not the political level, and that he had been expounding the moral doctrine of the Church as it might effect the balance between nationalized enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises. In the same letter the Pope warned against giving too much power over the state to the workers, a step as grave ". . . in this case as in that where the government of the state is given over to the pressure of capital."[30] The Pope was exercising in this instance a prerogative to interpret the divine and natural law as it affects "secular" affairs, a right on which the Church has always insisted. This "interpretative" power . . . "does not mean a power over political and secular matters inasmuch as they are of a political nature, but inasmuch as they are subject to the rule of natural and divine law, of which the Church is the teacher and authoritative interpreter."[31]

There are, indeed, many historical examples of Vatican in-

[29] *The Tablet*, March 6, 1948.
[30] *The Tablet*, August 2, 1947.
[31] Rommen, *op. cit.* p. 576.

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tervention which have had little effect. The effort of Leo XIII to reconcile French Catholicism with the Republic during the 1890's was futile, just as the later interdiction of the *Action Française* failed to dispel right-wing Catholic support for this movement. Catholic democracy in the nineteenth century continued its tenuous existence despite the generally hostile attitude of the Vatican during a great part of the period.

Political intervention on the part of the individual national hierarchies in Western Europe has been occasioned in the main by two factors, the educational question and the susceptibility of some Catholics to Communist propaganda. The question of the status of Church schools has aroused serious political controversy in Belgium, France, and Germany. The Pétain régime had granted subsidies to Catholic institutions of learning. These were terminated by the Provisional Government in the postwar period. An assembly of the Cardinals and Archbishops of France held in June, 1945 issued an appeal that the subsidies be continued. The argument was advanced that the withdrawal of subsidies would place Catholic parents at a disadvantage and deprive them of their freedom of choice in education.[32] More recently a local problem of "freedom of education" arose in connection with the nationalized coal mines. The schools connected with the mines had been run by the Church. The decision of the Assembly to "laicize" these schools aroused a storm of dissent and for the first time produced a parliamentary split on historic prewar lines. The MRP voted with the Right, and the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals voted together à la *Front Populaire*. More than one hundred fifty town mayors of the Vendée called an eight-day administrative strike in protest against this attack on the Catholic schools.

With regard to matters only remotely related to Church interests intervention tends to take on a private and informal character. Thus, during the constitutional controversies in the

[32] *Témoignage Chrétien, July 6, 1945; La Vie Intellectuelle,* August-September, December, 1945, February, 1946.

[33] "Le Débat sur la Nationalisation des Écoles des Houillères," *Bilans Hebdomadaires,* May 21, 1948. In Greater Hesse in the U. S. Zone of Germany the Bishops of Mainz, Fulda, and Limburg criticized the draft of the Hesse constitution, particularly the educational article. See *Darmstädter Echo,* November 28, 1946; *Fuldaer Volkszeitung,* November 26, 1946.

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post-war period the clergy has generally refrained from overt intervention. At the same time their influence has been substantial. In the matter of the disposition of the Italian monarchy a large part of the clergy used its influence over the faithful in favor of the maintenance of the dynasty; and this at a time when the *Democristiani* publicly favored a republic. In France the MRP leadership was only able to swing a small part of its normal voting strength in support of the second version of the French constitution. De Gaulle and the conservative clergy pressed the vast majority of MRP voters into abstention, or opposition. The projected Belgian referendum on the return of Leopold may soon provide us with another illustration of this type of informal intervention.

The effectiveness of these interventions is enhanced by the special place of the clergy in some of the main centers of Christian democratic strength. To the apolitical believing Catholic a word from the parish priest always has the backing of supernatural sanction, even though this may not be invoked in regard to political questions. In the rural areas of Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and Austria the Christian party organization is often indistinguishable from the Church apparatus. One may pass from Church to Catholic Action to Christian party and still be under the same roof and surrounded by the same faces.

Nevertheless, it would be an unfortunate mistake to view the Catholic Church as a monolithic political force. In this complex community the Vatican perhaps should be regarded as an arbiter among conflicting political currents. The vagueness and generality of the Vatican's official communications grow out of its efforts, first, to avoid the impression of too direct intervention in politics, and second, to hold within the fold of the Church all of the heterogeneous political tendencies which animate world Catholicism. There is, of course, a constant struggle between these political factions to gain the support of the Vatican in their interests. There can also be little question that at any given time the particular political biases of the Pope, the Vatican bureaucracy, and the Papal entourage will influence the direction of Vatican pressure. At the same time, within the body of the Church the traditions and social

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composition of particular national clergies result in quite effective resistance to Vatican intervention. Similarly, vigorous Catholic lay movements, Catholic orders, and groups within the clergy have been able to maintain their policies in the face of pressure from the Vatican and from their own hierarchies.

Perhaps the most important device of the Catholic Church in maintaining political control over the laity is "Catholic Action." This movement, which is quite powerful in Western Europe, is defined as a "lay apostolate" and is presumed to have a purely religious and moral functoin. In actual fact Catholic Action provides a meeting ground outside of the Church where political movements may be developed, political policies propagated, and where election instructions may be given to the faithful. Since the clergy participate actively with the laity, the Church gains the advantage of a more or less docile instrument without being continually and overtly involved in politics.

Church influence on the political behavior of Catholics is thus exercised by overt intervention on the grounds that a question of faith and morals is involved, by formal exhortation of the faithful on political questions, and by informal influence in ways indicated. Apart from Church directives, political Catholicism achieves coordination on three levels. First one may consider formal and regular contacts between Christian party leaders of different countries. In February, 1947 the Swiss Conservative Popular Party called a congress of Christian parties at Lucerne. At this meeting the Swiss, Austrians, and Italians favored the formation of a Christian Party International, but the MRP vetoed this proposal. In its place the congress established a *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales,* an unofficial association of party leaders, but not of the parties in the formal sense. The executive committee of the new organization is composed primarily of party vice-chairmen or secretaries. The first formal meeting, held at Liège in May, 1947, discussed the problem of the "integration of the worker in his economic life."[34] To the Second Congress, held in Luxembourg between January 30 and February 1, 1948, both the CDU and the *Zentrum* were invited—an act symbolizing the reintegration of German Catholicism in the European Catholic community. Among the

[34] *The Tablet,* February 14, 1948.

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problems discussed were the German question, and the problem of Catholic workers in the unified trade unions of Germany and Italy. Although the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* is a voluntary, consultative organization, and cannot commit the national parties to particular policies, it provides a regular channel for communication and voluntary coordination to supplement the many informal international contacts of Christian Party leadership.

The Christian trade union "International" has been reestablished in the postwar period and attempts to coordinate the policies of the Catholic trade unions of Western Europe. It is engaged in a campaign at the moment to encourage separate Christian unions in Italy and Germany in order to break the Communist hold over the union movements in those countries. The recent formation of a separate Catholic trade union in Italy may in part be a consequence of this campaign.

A second means of coordination in political Catholicism is the constant flow of communication through Church and Church-influenced channels. Bishops and archbishops and members of the clergy from all areas meet frequently in Rome, receive Catholic literature from the Vatican and other countries and engage in the exchange of periodicals and correspondence with one another. Catholic associations, such as Catholic Action, send delegates to each other's conferences and exchange publications. There is, therefore, a continual political communication within the body of Catholicism (including specialized Catholic news services) which effects coordination between the Vatican and the national churches, on the one hand, and the lay social and political movements on the other.

A third coordinating factor is the body of basic Catholic doctrine relating to political, economic, and social policy, as authoritatively interpreted by the Vatican and the higher clergy of particular countries. In relation to the political problems of today two Papal Encyclicals have assumed the character of basic documents of modern political Catholicism. These are the Encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII, and *Quadragesimo Anno* of Pius XI. As guides to political action they are lacking in clarity and specificity. Spanish and Portuguese authoritarian Catholicism and the liberal Catholic movements alike refer to

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these documents as the sources of their political inspiration and moral authority. Despite their ambiguity these encyclicals provide points of departure for the political programs of the Christian parties.

III

The persistent European ideological antagonists for the past century have been Marxism, liberalism, and the various traditional and authoritarian tendencies of which Catholicism was perhaps the most important contingent in Western Europe. In the postwar period, each of these three traditions has sought to find common ground with the others and has sought to do so more earnestly and more persistently than at any time before the Second World War. This has in part been a tactical accommodation to pressures from left to right, but it would be unfortunate if the accommodations of principle were overlooked. In Socialist-humanism, Marxism has approached liberal democracy and has become a democratic collectivism. In Christian democracy, Catholicism identifies itself with popular government and, in part, with moderate collectivist ideals. At the same time, in the liberal movements tendencies have developed which accept a limited degree of collectivisation, or are tolerant of such experimentation if conducted within a democratic framework.

These ideological accommodations are reflected in the political alliances of the present French, Italian, Austrian, Belgian, and Dutch governments and in some of the governments of the German *Laender*. Léon Blum, in his futile effort to form a government after the fall of the Ramadier cabinet gave the name of the "Third Force" to this political alliance. The slogan was intended to consolidate the moderate democratic elements against the threat of Stalinism on the left and Gaullism on the right. The slogan was taken up in England and other countries and was one of the impulses in the direction of a political and economic unification and invigoration of Western Europe. However, these international third force tendencies do not mean the same thing to their various proponents. Among the Socialists there is a tendency to organize the struggle against totalitarianism on socialist ideological lines. Such a policy if pressed

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by the socialist parties would in all likelihood alienate the moderate right groups.

There are serious conflicts of policy and tactics between the three sectors of the "Third Force." The main conflicts in the present period concern (1) economic policy, (2) the religious question, and (3) problems of nationalism. The conflict over economic policy involves the various programs of economic stabilization and nationalization of industries. The Socialists and left-Catholics have grown increasingly uneasy over the direction of stabilization policies in France and Italy. These problems become acute whenever proposals for the extension of the free market and the elimination of government controls are pressed by the liberals and right-wing Catholics of the governing coalitions. Thus in France the "Mayer Plan," the Reynaud fiscal program, and the anti-inflationary measures of the short-lived second Schuman cabinet collapsed in the face of Socialist and trade union intransigence. In Italy the moderate Socialists have been distrustful of the liberal economic policies supported by their Christian Democratic and Liberal allies.

A longer-run basis of internal third force conflict is the question of nationalization and economic planning. The Socialists and some Catholic elements favor extension of the program of nationalization and the maintenance of economic planning, while the conservative Catholics and the liberals oppose it. As a source of internal dissension this problem is now of immense significance, resulting as it has in the fall of three French cabinets within the space of little more than a month. Ultimately even the left Catholics and Socialists may have to face the issues presented by the differences in their approach to economic reform.

The question of lay versus religious education has not lost its power to embitter and divide political movements in the postwar period. The controversy over the withdrawal of the Vichy subsidies to the Catholic schools has already been discussed. In this matter the MRP followed a moderate course, voting for the maintenance of the subsidies but not carrying the conflict further in inter-party relations. The Catholic bishops of Greater Hesse were so disturbed by the alleged inade-

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quacy of the constitutional provisions relating to religious instruction, that they stopped just short of counselling the Catholic voters to reject the proposed draft in which the Christion Democratic Party leaders had concurred.

More recently in Belgium and France governments have tottered over the educational question. In Belgium, in early May, 1948, Premier Spaak submitted his resignation over a crisis of this sort. The Socialist-Christian Social Party coalition government had agreed to increase the subsidy for Catholic technical high schools by fifteen per cent. The militantly anticlerical socialists attacked Spaak on this issue and insisted that the amount be reduced and that the Catholics abandon their plans for the construction of two hundred and fifty new schools. The socialist attack resulted in provocative demands on the part of the Catholic extremists. Had the issue come to a vote it is possible that Spaak would have failed to get a majority. Spaak tendered his resignation before such a vote was taken and thereby put pressure on the socialist and Catholic party militants to compose their differences.

Later in May, 1948 a similar crisis arose in France in connection with the twenty-six primary schools acquired by the state when the government nationalized the coal mines. These schools had previously been under Church control, and the clergy were anxious to maintain their former privileges. The controversy arrayed the Socialists, Communists, and some of the Radicals against the MRP, PRL and other right-wing groups. Former Premier Schuman's version of the bill was defeated, but he had not put the question of confidence. A similar issue involving subsidies for tuition to poor families wishing to send their children to Catholic private schools almost destroyed Schuman's majority during the crucial Assembly debate on the question of Western Germany.

As one moves to the right in the political spectrum the strength and rigidity of nationalist sentiment increases. Questions pertaining to military budgets and national security, the cession of sovereignty in the interest of international consolidation, the reduction of metropolitan control over colonies, and national prestige and predominance, have typically divided radicals from conservatives. Issues of this kind are constant

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sources of conflict within the Socialist-Catholic-Liberal governments of Western Europe. The strongly nationalist views of General De Gaulle exert a powerful attraction on the right-wing Catholics. In his view the consolidation of Western Europe should take place under French leadership, and the Western German states should adhere as individual units to the new political community. While the Schuman and the Marie governments had been able to maintain their narrow majorities on some of these questions, right-wing nationalism and socialist anti-militarism and "anti-imperialism" continually threaten the stability of the administration and undermine French participation in the various Western European arrangements.

The demands for the return of colonies and the full moral and political rehabilitation of Italy are strongest among the rightist parties, including the right wing of the *Democristiani.* If and when the question of the adherence of Italy to the Western European program arises, serious internal and international conflict may be anticipated. The conservative sector of Italian opinion may press the present moderate coalition into presenting demands for the reestablishment of the Italian colonial position which will be unacceptable to the British. The Italian right will exploit any national resentment resulting from the frustration of these and similar demands in efforts to weaken the existing government.

In Germany the most powerful resistance (exclusive of that of the Communist) to limitations on German sovereignty comes from the conservative Christian democrats and the increasingly articulate right-wing nationalist movements. The reluctance of the moderate groups to accept such measures as the internationalization of the control over the Ruhr turns in great part on their fear that the appeals of the right (and the Communists) to nationalist resentment will undermine their own electoral position.

On the left of the third force, anti-nationalism and anti-militarism play a significant rôle in weakening the present coalitions. Socialist ideological stereotypes render these movements vulnerable to Communist propaganda attacking military budgets, conscription programs, and alliances directed against Soviet infiltration and pressure.

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Thus nationalist and anti-nationalist stereotypes produce serious ambivalences on the right and left flanks of the center governments. Issues of this type, combined with basic disagreements on economic policy and fundamental differences in *Weltanschauung*, render the third force an uneasy coalition. Expectations that the movements participating in these center régimes may actually consolidate into unified parties are unrealistic. The third force is not to be viewed as the germ of a single political movement, but as the currently hard-pressed potential of a democratic party system. Agreement is largely confined to an adherence to democratic methods and to humanitarian welfare policies. Even if there were a prospect of a more substantial unification, its effect would probably weaken rather than strengthen the moderate democratic forces. A combined Socialist-Catholic-liberal party would alienate the doctrinaire electors in each movement. The various elements in the third force are perhaps ready for friendship but not for brotherhood.

In the developing context of Western European politics the Christian parties will prove most sensitive to the tactics of the Communist parties. In France the aggressiveness of the Communist Party and the attraction of the resolute anti-Communism of De Gaulle resulted in a desertion of the MRP by its conservative voters. A renewal of Communist aggression in France may well signal the collapse of moderate government, and the movement of the great bulk of Catholic voters to the Gaullist RPF. Recent local by-elections in France show conclusively that MRP voters (and many Socialist voters as well) will rally around RPF candidates to prevent the election of Communists.

The threat to the survival of the Christian parties as mass movements of the center is obviously greatest in France, where right-wing nationalism has an important asset in the prestige of France's "first resister." Developments in Germany are ominous, but still largely below the surface. In Italy, Austria, Belgium, and Holland the Christian parties, and the moderate coalitions of which they are a part, demonstrate both vigor and stability. At the same time it would be unwise to overlook the danger to Christian democracy as a whole arising from the threat in France. Perhaps the movement is only as strong as

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its weakest link. A collapse of Christian democracy in France, and the rise of an authoritarian Gaullist movement might exacerbate nationalist conflicts in the whole of Western Europe and undermine the program of economic, political, and military consolidation. Were this to occur the opportunities for successful Communist propaganda and agitation would greatly improve. In such an atmosphere as this the Vatican and the clergy might turn to an authoritarian position and mobilize the bulk of the Christian party voters around more resolute action against such a threat to Church interests. Such changes in the international situation may result in a split in political Catholicism. The great majority of believing Catholics might adhere to authoritarian anti-Communist movements, while the smaller group of convinced democrats and moderate collectivists might find themselves isolated and powerless to stem the trend toward extremist solutions.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE INDONESIAN CASE

By RUPERT EMERSON

THE tangled affairs of Indonesia, twice thrust upon the Security Council, have served as an admirable touchstone of the principles, purposes, and effectiveness of the United Nations as well as of the policies of some of its leading members. Fundamental principles of the new postwar order were at stake. The Atlantic Charter had affirmed the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live, and the collapse of empires before the Japanese onslaught led to the widespread conclusion that the old colonial system was dead. These doctrines found sober and modified expression not only in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, but also in the more general assertion of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and of the universal application of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The rights of dependent peoples, the validity of the doctrine of self-determination, and the possibilities for peaceful change all hovered about the Security Council chamber in the course of the debates on the two Indonesian cases.

The open resort to force by the Dutch presented the Security Council with a basic challenge to its essential function of keeping the peace. As the Council speedily adopted its first cease-fire resolution the colonial and quasi-colonial peoples of the world watched with eagerness to see if the powers would actually intervene to check what seemed to many an old-style colonial war in only a slightly new dress. Throughout there was the issue, pregnant with its potentialities as precedent, of the extent to which the successful user of force would be entitled to a preferential position in the ensuing negotiations for peace. Although the longer range problems of political and economic settlement between Indonesia and the Netherlands are still in large part unresolved, there is much to be learned from the record of the Indonesian cases up to the time of the acceptance

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by the Security Council of the report of its Committee of Good Offices in February, 1948.

I

The background of the present Indonesian time of troubles can be briefly sketched.[1] The nationalist movement, which reached its culmination in the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia immediately after V-J day, came into existence early in the present century. It was met over the years by a series of somewhat grudging Dutch concessions which brought the Indonesians into closer association with the government of the Indies but neither satisfied their nationalist demands nor basically changed the nature of the colonial system.

The violent upheaval of the period of Japanese conquest, occupation, and defeat spelled the end of the old order, and gave both impetus and opportunity to the nationalists. Despite the oppressiveness of many aspects of Japanese rule, Indonesians were put in positions of political and economic power well beyond those which had fallen to their lot in the Dutch regime, and were given both military training and equipment. Of perhaps even more fundamental importance was a sense of a revolution upsetting the established foundations of the Indonesian universe.

On August 17, 1945, an assembly gathered at Batavia declared Indonesian independence, thus far outbidding the conciliatory efforts of the Dutch who, since the outbreak of the war, had regularly announced their intention of reshaping the structure of the empire on the basis of an equal collaboration of its parts. It was not until September 29 that the British forces, belatedly substituted for the Americans, arrived at Batavia to take charge of the surrender of the Japanese forces on behalf of the Allies and to liberate Allied prisoners of war and civilians interned by the Japanese. By that time the Republican leaders had been able to establish a working government, notably in Java and Sumatra, and to equip their armed forces primarily from Japanese stores. The British landings went off peaceably, but the appearance of Dutch troops was the signal for immediate trouble. Although the British seem at no time to

[1] For the history of the Republic, see Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story*, New York, John Day, 1948.

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have aimed at anything approaching a general reconquest even of Java, increasingly serious and bloody clashes took place between the Republican and British forces, the latter unhappily aided against the Indonesians by the very Japanese troops whose surrender and disarming they were supposed to be securing. On both sides there were failures to comprehend the actual realities: the Allies markedly underestimated the extent and strength of nationalist sentiment and organization, and the Indonesians at least equally overrated the support which their plea for national liberation would secure from the outside world. In fact, neither the United Nations nor any of its major members, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, made a significant move to aid the newly-risen nation. As far as the United States was concerned, the broad lines of American policy were sketched by the Director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs in a speech on October 20, 1945.[2] It was here stated that while the United States did not question the sovereignty of either the Dutch or the French in Indonesia or in Indo-China, it looked toward and was ready to assist in securing peaceful agreements between the imperial powers and the nationalists. "It is not our intention," Mr. Vincent flatly declared, "to assist or participate in forceful measures for the imposition of control by the territorial sovereigns." Since the United States was obviously the one great arsenal of supply, this was a real blow to the imperial powers. But it must be recognized as at least a minor offset to this admirable declaration of policy that considerable quantities of American arms and supplies were already in the hands of the Dutch and the French. Furthermore, any aid extended to Britain and the Netherlands in Europe inevitably relieved the home pressures and thus enabled the concentration of greater force in the colonial areas.

II

The first Indonesian case, brought before the Security Council on January 21, 1946, arose out of the British-Indonesian clashes, but it succeeded neither in throwing much light on the situation nor in achieving any results. In fact it has been widely surmised that the Ukrainian charge against the British, like that

[2] Department of State *Bulletin*, XIII, No. 330 (Oct. 21, 1945), pp. 644-48.

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brought on the same day by the U. S. S. R. against the British troops in Greece, was intended less to deal with the merits of the problem than to distract attention from the Iranian case and to indicate that the Soviet Union could also make use of the new United Nations machinery for its own purposes. The Ukrainians, although not challenging the presence in Indonesia of British troops for proper Allied purposes, claimed that these troops, with the aid of Japanese forces, were suppressing the Indonesian national movement and intervening in the internal affairs of Indonesia. In due course they introduced a resolution calling on the Council to establish a commission which should carry out an inquiry on the spot, establish peace, and report back to the Security Council.

In view of the disturbed situation in Indonesia, paralleled by the neighboring troubles of Indo-China, it seemed a not unreasonable suggestion that there should be an authoritative inquiry into the facts. Such an inquiry, coming immediately on the heels of the war, would have served to reassure not only the Indonesians but others as well that the admirable Allied war pronouncements and the new peace machinery had meaning not only for the rich and the powerful but also for the poor and the weak. Despite its plausibility, however, the suggestion made little headway, the most effective argument against it being that such an inquiry might serve to disrupt the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations which were beginning under British auspices.

The Dutch and British positions in rebutting the Ukrainian attack were substantially identical: there was no dispute or situation threatening international peace; British troops had not attacked and had shown much restraint in their necessary defensive operations, which were directed not against the legitimate nationalist movement but against uncontrolled "fascist" bands; and, since no one questioned Dutch sovereignty, Dutch-Indonesian relations fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. The Dutch, no doubt with tongue pleasantly in cheek, added that, their own affairs being covered by the domestic jurisdiction principle, they would not block the appointment of a commission of inquiry into British-Indonesian relations if both parties to the discussion agreed to such a plan.

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"What, of course, we have not because we cannot have it," Mr. Van Kleffens added, defining his view of the Council's role, "is the question of the internal conditions prevailing in Java and some other parts of the Netherlands Indies. That is not a matter for this Council." Mr. Vishinsky, less impressed by the claims of sovereignty than Soviet spokesmen have frequently been, was inclined to take a light view of the plea of domestic jurisdiction, contending that the Indonesian situation could properly be seen as a threat to international peace even though formally comprised within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands.

The American role in the proceedings was slight. On December 19, 1945, the State Department, after some internal whittling down, had issued a press release stressing the limited British mandate in Indonesia, expressing concern over recent developments, and urging an amicable settlement between the Netherlands as the territorial sovereign and the Indonesian leaders. This spirit of good will was reflected in the one substantive Council speech of Mr. Stettinius, in which he rejected the proposed commission as endangering the success of the negotiations which were being carried on and as not likely to serve a constructive and forward-looking purpose. It is to be feared that this American reluctance to stand up and be counted in the Indonesian case cast some doubt on the practical significance of the strong concurrent American enthusiasm for the General Assembly resolution which not only expressed keen awareness of the problems and political aspirations of non-self-governing peoples but also pointed out that the Charter recognized the problems of such peoples "as of vital concern to the peace and general welfare of the whole community."

When it came to the final Security Council showdown, no action proved possible. The Ukrainian resolution was defeated, having received the votes of only Poland and the Soviet Union, and alternative proposals fared no better although one secured the added vote of Mexico. The first Indonesian case thus vanished somewhat ignobly from the agenda.

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III

The inconclusive by-play on the world stage of the Security Council threw the Indonesian problem squarely back for local settlement in Batavia as the focal point for pressures coming from Republican territory and from the Hague, London, and Washington. The long and complex series of negotiations finally came to a temporary solution with the initialling on November 15, 1946, of the basic Linggadjati Agreement,[3] but the stormy background of the negotiations and the months which intervened before its official acceptance by the two parties left scant hope that a really peaceful and acceptable solution had been found.

On all sides the situation was difficult and the negotiations were carried on in the midst of continued hostilities between the opposing forces, blockades and reprisals, and a flood of charges, counter-charges and recriminations. The Dutch negotiators in Batavia were harassed by attacks on their liberality by conservatives in the Netherlands; the Indonesian Republic, unable to secure speedy agreement to its claims, was harassed by its own extremists. The British, seeking to get out from under, found their role as occupiers and mediators increasingly thorny, distasteful, and unprofitable. Although the Dutch were able to build up their military forces through the British-held bridgeheads, they were at the same time under considerable pressure to arrive at an amicable settlement.

The general lines of Dutch policy toward Indonesia were elaborated in an official declaration of February 10, 1946, which looked to the establishment of a Commonwealth of Indonesia, composed of units with varying degrees of autonomy, which would take its place as a partner in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although this constituted some advance from earlier Dutch positions, it still appeared to leave the Dutch authorities substantial reserved powers of control and supervision, to imply a continuation of the divide-and-rule policy, and to tie the Indonesians closely to the Netherlands under the style and title of dominion status. By the declaration the Dutch were still

[3] Also known as the Cheribon Agreement. For the text of this Agreement, the Renville Agreement and other key documents, see Department of State *Bulletin*, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), pp. 323-36.

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far from recognizing the Indonesian claim for separate statehood, and thus left a large area for future conflict. There were added many particular complications such as Dutch refusal to negotiate with President Soekarno, labelled as a Japanese collaborator, and disagreement as to whether the Republic was limited to Java and Madura or took in Sumatra as well.

The well-founded Republican suspicions that the Dutch would attempt to whittle Republican territories down to the narrowest possible limits were intensified as the Dutch consolidated their position in the islands other than Java and Sumatra and inaugurated a series of conferences with selected representatives from these islands to lay the foundations for the forthcoming Indonesian federation. Although the precise claims of both sides were somewhat obscured by diplomatic and bargaining verbiage, the issue here posed appears to be a central one for succeeding events. The Dutch tended to regard the nationalists as overreaching themselves when they claimed the whole even of Java and Madura, whereas the Republicans, with a vision of a single Indonesian nation, sought to play at the very least an equal role with the Dutch in the reconstruction of the entire archipelago.

On September 7, 1946 the British announced that their forces would be withdrawn by November 30, regardless of the status of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, and a month later a new and decisive series of negotiations were begun under British chairmanship. From these negotiations there issued not only a truce intended to stop hostilities but also the broad outlines of an over-all settlement contained in the Linggadjati Agreement. This Agreement represented substantial concessions on both sides; but the very generality of its provisions and its evasion of a sharp determination of critical issues made its future success dependent on a deep and abiding sense of mutual tolerance and good will, precisely the qualities which appeared to be most lacking. Its obscurities and the shakiness of its foundations were brought vividly to light by the involved and embittered controversy as to its interpretation which forced a delay of more than four months before its formal signature by Dutch and Indonesian representatives on March 25, 1947. This controversy was settled in a common-sense, but somewhat ominous, fashion

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by agreement to sign merely the original document, leaving each side free to pursue its own interpretation.

From the Dutch standpoint the greatest concession was the decision to face realities and recognize the *de facto* existence of the Republic as then constituted, headed by Soekarno and extending geographically to include all of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. It is surprising in view of the later importance attached by the Dutch to the issue of their over-all sovereignty that there appears in the Agreement no explicit countervailing recognition by the Republic of Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia as a whole, which was left to be inferred from the other provisions. In general accord with earlier Dutch programs, the Agreement looked to the cooperative creation of a United States of Indonesia as a sovereign federation—composed of the Republic, Borneo, and the Great East—which should form a part of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union and also have independent membership in the United Nations. The right was reserved to the people of any territory to decide by democratic processes that it should have a different position in the United States of Indonesia than that called for by the original agreement, thus opening the door to either an indefinite extension of the Republic or a process of further fragmentation. Any territory might also decide not to enter The United States of Indonesia and instead to establish a special relationship to the latter and to the Netherlands. Of outstanding importance to the Dutch was the agreement by the Republic to recognize the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of rights and property within Republican territory, which appeared to make possible the resumption of large-scale economic activity. As a token of their pacific intentions both parties agreed in principle to a reduction of their armed forces and to continue consultation as to the rate and extent of this reduction.

In view of later developments, special attention deserves to be called to a concluding article, thereafter scrupulously ignored by the Dutch, in which the two governments agreed that any dispute arising from the Agreement which their two delegations were unable to resolve by joint consultation should be settled by arbitration. For arbitration proceedings a chairman of another nationality was to be appointed by mutual agreement,

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or, failing agreement, by the President of the International Court of Justice.

The United States, which had earlier given its blessing to Linggadjati as evidencing high statesmanship and promising well for political stabilization and economic rehabilitation, followed the Dutch lead and on April 17, 1947, extended *de facto* recognition to the Republic, as did a number of other states, but without prejudice to the general sovereignty of the Netherlands.

Much had been achieved on paper, but virtually all of it remained to be translated into practice. Sporadic hostilities continued—Premier Sjahrir had warned in a speech following the signature ceremonies that armed forces still confronted each other—and the Dutch continued in effect to blockade the Republic. Any number of questions remained suspended in midair. What constituted the substance of *de facto* recognition? To what extent, if at all, was the Republic entitled to carry on foreign relations of its own? Under what conditions were non-Indonesian properties to be restored, and were the Dutch entitled to share in the policing of Republican territories to ensure that such properties were duly protected? What was the proper attitude to be adopted on both sides toward such political events as the claim of Sundanese leaders to set up a separate Sundanese state in West Java, a movement denounced by the Republic as a Dutch device to create a puppet state and hailed by the Dutch as the true expression of Sundanese national sentiment? Was the creation of the Indonesian federation primarily a matter for the Dutch to prepare and carry through, or were the Dutch essentially outsiders who would have only an advisory voice in this domestic Indonesian problem?

Confronted by these and other problems the Dutch and Indonesian negotiators made only slow and inconclusive progress toward the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement. The beginning of the end of peaceful negotiations came with the dispatch on May 27, 1947 of a virtual ultimatum from the Dutch Commission-General to the Republican delegation. It would be unprofitable to attempt to explore the details of the breakdown. Crisis followed crisis, and it became apparent that the Dutch were preparing to seek a settlement by force unless the Republic unconditionally accepted the Dutch terms. The

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United States, holding out the possibility of financial aid for economic rehabilitation, urged the Republic to cooperate without delay in the immediate formation of an interim federal government of Indonesia; and the Republic moved far, but very slowly, toward an acceptance of the Dutch terms. On the Dutch side there was the sense that the Republicans, politically divided among themselves, were stalling intolerably; and there were certainly the mounting costs of large military forces still not balanced by returns from the estates and other properties to which the Dutch were denied access. On the Republican side there was an over-calculation of strength and of what might be gained by delay, and a growing realization that the victory which they had won in securing *de facto* recognition was far from embodying the substance of Indonesian independence. In essence the real issue appears to have been less the detailed points of the negotiations than a head-on clash between a Republic which saw its visions of national freedom fading and a not wholly regenerate imperial government which was unable to stomach the full implications of national existence for a colonial people.

IV

The long-awaited break finally came on July 20, 1947 when the Dutch declared that patience had ceased to be a virtue and that they were embarking on a "police action"—a euphemistic term which has found surprisingly wide acceptance, in part, perhaps, because it has a certain perverse and piquant charm reminiscent of the "China Incident" of earlier days. In a series of statements the Dutch authorities at home and in the Indies declared their continued adherence to the principles of Linggadjati, now to be accomplished after pacification by military force, and laid full blame at the door of the Republic. The major items which they stressed were: the refusal of the Republic to implement the Agreement and the truce which had preceded it; rejection of ultimate Dutch responsibility for law and order throughout Indonesia; continued Republican action in the sphere of foreign affairs; the lack of a moderate, effective, and responsible authority in the Republic with which they might negotiate, citing among other things the ousting of Sjahrir late

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in June; the holding of hostages; and the failure to work out any economic settlement concerning valuable non-Indonesian assets which were being destroyed within Republican territory. On the score of arbitration, for which the Republic had made a last minute appeal, the Dutch Premier in an address to the Lower House on July 23 ruled out such a possibility because of Indonesian violence in contravention of the Agreement and asserted that at all events the issue of Dutch sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia in the interim period provided for by Linggadjati was not a matter which could be subject to arbitration.

Following notification on July 20 by the Dutch of their decision to resort to military action "in order to create conditions more favorable to the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement," the State Department issued a statement expressing the profound regret of the United States that negotiation had been discarded as the means of reaching a peaceful settlement.[4] From this statement and other evidence it appears that both the United States and Great Britain made strong efforts to prevent the final breach and the resort to force, but unavailingly. On July 21 the Secretary-General of the United Nations was officially informed by the Dutch of their "resort to police measures of a strictly limited character."

Ten highly significant days were lost before the Indonesian conflict was laid before the Security Council by India and Australia on July 30. In these days the Dutch forces, amounting to some 100,000 men, moved forward speedily in Java, their mechanized columns cutting deep into Republican territory but leaving large pockets of enemy forces and resistance groups behind their spearheads. As early as July 26 Acting Governor General van Mook claimed that the Dutch had virtually completed the first phase of their military operations and were turning to political consolidation through the institution of a "regular government." The nature of the type of consolidation to which the Dutch were likely to look was hinted at in the comment of a Dutch spokesman that a number of separate states on an ethnic basis might be established in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, a comment which had an obvious link to the statements in the

[4] Department of State *Bulletin*, XVII, No. 422A (Aug. 3, 1947), p. 230.

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Dutch notes of July 20 to the United States and Great Britain that the Netherlands continued ready to come to terms with the Republic "assuming that the Republic is supported by the majority of the population and by the ethnical elements composing it."

Outclassed in the military sphere by the forces which the Dutch had assembled during the months of negotiation, the Republic appeared to place less reliance on direct military resistance than on a diplomatic offensive which would bring it outside aid. The nationalist leaders could also reasonably rely, in view of their demonstrated success in establishing a working government and their hold on the loyalty of the people, on a longer-range resistance movement of the type of which the Dutch had showed their mastery in their own struggle against the Nazi aggressor. The Republic's diplomatic effort achieved success on July 28 when Nehru, denouncing colonial regimes and the presence of foreign troops in any Asiatic country, announced that India would lay the matter before the Security Council. On the following day the *New York Times* pointedly summed up one aspect of the situation: "It is not to the credit of the United States and other Western democracies that they let India take the first action in the Indonesian situation. Nor will this add to the prestige of the white man in Asia."

The Indian appeal to the Security Council, under Article 35, charged the Dutch with having embarked on large-scale military action against the Indonesian people without warning at a time when the Republican delegation was still negotiating in Batavia. Australia, on the other hand, refrained from accusations in pointing out the existence of hostilities, but for the first time in United Nations history invoked recourse to the Security Council's full powers under Chapter VII, urging the Council to call immediately upon the parties to cease hostilities and to begin arbitration in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement.

Responding to the urgency of the appeals, the Security Council began its deliberations on July 31, and within forty-eight hours it had adopted the first cease-fire resolution of its career, calling upon the parties at the same time to settle their disputes by arbitration or other peaceful means and to keep the Council informed about the progress of the settlement. Reduced to a

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bare skeleton, the sequence of the Council's subsequent actions runs as follows. Confronted by the painful fact that the first cease-fire resolution had produced no significant diminution of the fighting, despite its formal acceptance and the issuance of cease-fire orders by both sides, the Council on August 25 set up a consular commission made up of the career consuls of Security Council members in Indonesia to report on the observance of the resolution. Simultaneously the Council tendered its good offices, and offered, if both parties so requested, to set up a Council Committee consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected. From this resolution there emerged the body—the Good Offices Committee—which has played the largest role in securing implementation of the cease-fire resolution and a hopeful beginning of peaceful negotiation toward a general political and economic settlement. For this committee the Netherlands selected Belgium, the Republic selected Australia, and these two chose the United States as the third member, the designated states naming, respectively, Dr. Paul van Zeeland, Justice Richard C. Kirby, and Dr. Frank P. Graham as their representatives. Following the arrival of the report of the Consular Commission, which further testified to the failure of the cease-fire resolution, the Council on November 1 reiterated its cease-fire intentions in somewhat sharper and more detailed language and asked the Good Offices Committee to put an end to the absurd situation under which the two parties had failed to make even an effort to agree as to the means by which the fighting might be stopped. On January 17, 1948, the labors of the Committee achieved success with the acceptance by both parties of the Renville Agreement, containing a detailed program for a truce and the principles for a future political settlement. The Security Council in substance accepted the terms of this Agreement on February 28 and continued the Committee in existence, requesting it to keep a special eye on political developments in Western Java and Madura—both areas in which Dutch separatist efforts were under attack by the Republic.

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V

Without doing undue violence to the facts it is possible to arrive at two diametrically opposed verdicts on the Security Council's handling of the Indonesian case. (1) The Council, courageously overriding a reasonable Dutch plea of domestic jurisdiction, succeeded in bringing about both a cessation of hostilities and a start toward a lasting settlement through processes of peaceful negotiation. (2) The Council, dominated by the imperialist powers, gave in to the Dutch at every significant point, left the Republic the mutilated victim of successful aggression, and shamefully abused its trust in accepting the report of the Good Offices Committee and the Renville Agreement. A glance at some of the key issues involved in the Council's long deliberations on the case may throw some light on the validity of these two verdicts.

One of the striking features of the record at Lake Success is the general spirit of compromise and good will which prevailed. It is not that there were no extravagant charges and hot and angry exchanges but that there was a readiness to yield to the necessities of the situation. Unlike most of the Council's problems, this was not a case in which there was any necessary disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, although they did in fact cross swords at several points. It is notable that despite strong, and often well taken, Soviet objection to Council procedures and actions, there was no recourse to the veto. If Mr. Gromyko was with some regularity overridden in his efforts to secure more positive action on behalf of the Republic, as, for example, in his attack on the Good Offices Committee report, he did not revert to the precedent of the Syria-Lebanon case where the Soviet used its veto to prevent the adoption of a compromise resolution. Similarly, the British, French, and Belgians voiced frequent objection to Security Council meddling in colonial affairs, but generally either followed the Soviet policy of abstention or reluctantly accepted the best version they could get. France did, however, see fit to flourish one veto on August 25 when it killed a Soviet proposal to establish an eleven-member Council commission to supervise execution of the cease-fire resolution. In contrast, the U.S.S.R.

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merely abstained on the succeeding vote to set up the consular commission on which it had no representation.

It was presumably an essential condition for the continuance of this spirit of sweet reasonableness that the Council was prepared from the outset to ignore the niceties of procedure and Charter interpretation and get down to business to stop the fighting. The record teems with points which leave the legalist suspended in mid-air. The most basic issue of all was the question as to whether the Security Council had jurisdiction to deal with whatever it was that had broken loose in Indonesia: was it a war between states, or was it a police action by a sovereign within his own domestic domain? To this question no definitive answer was ever given. The Netherlands from the outset vigorously protested the taking of jurisdiction by the Council, and received general backing in its stand from the colonial powers. The Council, however, without positively asserting its competence, defeated the efforts of the colonial powers, who were backed by the United States, to submit the question to the International Court for an advisory opinion or to make an explicit reservation that Council action did not decide the juridical question of competence.

In good part, but not wholly, the answer to this question hung upon the status of the Republic as a state, which was a center of controversy from the start.[5] The supporters of the Republic could cite the *de facto* recognition by the Netherlands and other countries, the Linggadjati provision for arbitration, and the Republic's invitation to attend the Havana I.T.O. conference; but the Netherlands fought every inch of the way to assert the domestic jurisdiction principle and to deny the claims of the Republic to international status. When the Council at the very opening of the case invited the Dutch and Indian representatives to take their seats at the table, Australia proposed that a similar invitation be extended to the Republic. Mr. Van Kleffens immediately presented the Dutch objections. He contended that the Republic, "a political weapon founded by the Japanese at Saigon,"[6] was no sovereign state but only

[5] Even though the Republic might be determined not to be a state for United Nations purposes, the Council might still have found the hostilities a threat to the peace.

[6] This verdict is in sharp contrast to the judgment expressed by Lt. Governor-General van Mook at an Indonesian conference on Oct. 1, 1946, when he asserted that the earlier

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the *de facto* government of a part of a potential federation, and that to invite its attendance would be to prejudge the entire issue. On August 12 the Council resolved the issue in favor of the Republic against the votes of the colonial powers, and at the same time refused to seat the representative of East Indonesia and Borneo whose claim was pressed by the Dutch and the colonial powers again supported by the United States. But in this action on the Republic's behalf, as in so many other matters, the Council wisely avoided the legal niceties by failing to specify whether the Republic was invited as a state or in some more humble capacity under the Rules of Procedure.

Similar avoidance of precision and of formulations which would hurt the sensibilities of participants marked virtually every Council action, although in most instances the sensibilities which were guarded were those of the Dutch, or the colonial powers supporting them, and not those of the Indonesians. Thus, although Australia had brought up the case under Chapter VII, the first cease-fire resolution specified no articles of the Charter as the source of its authority.[7] The succeeding Council resolutions were always so worded, despite Soviet and other protests, as to make it clear that the Council was not itself thrusting decisions upon the Dutch but was tendering its good offices for the voluntary acceptance of the parties. Somewhat paradoxically, it was the non-member of the United Nations, the Republic, which pleaded from the outset for strong Council action, whereas the Netherlands, denying United Nations jurisdiction, pressed to hold Council action down to the barest minimum. In accepting the cease-fire resolution the Republic requested the sending of a Council committee to secure its effective implementation; in his first Council appearance Mr. Sjahrir on August 14 sought the appointment of a commission which would arbitrate all points of difference; and following the Good Offices report the Republic asked that the Committee be armed with power to supervise in detail the execution

view of the Republic as a Japanese invention was based on deficient knowledge. "When we now look back into history, it is apparent that in the Republic forces were at work that signified more, and were rooted deeper, than a mere surge of wild terrorism; forces which at the same time resisted the Japanese fascistic warp of the whole."

[7] It is, however, an interesting point of legal speculation as to whether the Council has power to adopt a cease-fire resolution under any other article than Article 40.

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of the program to which the parties had agreed. The pleas of the Republic were not heeded, but it is beyond doubt that the dignity and authority of the Council would have been greater if they had been.

The most striking success for the Dutch, and the most damaging failure for the United Nations, was the series of decisions under which the Dutch, despite the reiterated protests of the Republic, were in substance allowed not only to hold on to their military gains made prior to the coming into effect of the cease-fire order at midnight, August 4-5, 1947, but also very significantly to extend the area over which they had military command. This sequence of events has importance both as a Council precedent and as a demonstration of the problems involved in a cease-fire order under modern conditions. The Council's verdict on this crucial point stands out in disappointing contrast to the immediate demand in the Greco-Bulgarian case of 1925 that the troops of both sides should retire behind their respective frontiers.

The first Council resolution of August 1 merely called upon the parties to cease hostilities without further specifications. That there was no clear line of demarcation between the opposing forces was pointed out in the Republic's reply: Dutch mechanized columns had driven their spearheads far ahead through the Republic's "system of people's defense," leaving Republican forces in many areas claimed by the Dutch.[8] The location of the opposing forces when the cease-fire orders were issued was no more stable and no more suited to become the basis of even a temporary settlement than that which existed after the first few days of the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939. Apart from all questions of good or bad faith, the result was that the fighting continued between two armed groups which, with the best of good will, would have found it difficult to disentangle their locked horns. The Consular Commission at Batavia bore witness in its report at the end of September to the opposing interpretations which reduced the cease-fire orders to impotence, and its report was utilized by the supporters of

[8] The magnitude of the operation may be seen from the report of the Good Offices Committee of May 19, 1948, that some 35,000 members of the Indonesian forces had been moved from Dutch to Republican territory under the truce agreement. See *Second Interim Report of the Committee to the Security Council* (Doc. S/787), p. 21.

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each party to demonstrate the sins of the other. On August 29, 1947 the Dutch had proclaimed the "van Mook line," which in effect connected up all the points of the spearheads, and asserted Dutch control over all territory within the line, embracing the economically most valuable parts of Java and significant parts of Sumatra. In Java the Republic found itself reduced to the western tip of the island and a central core around their capital at Jogjakarta. Within the territory claimed by them the Dutch conducted "mopping-up operations" which the Republican forces not unnaturally resisted to the best of their ability,[9] to the accompaniment of Dutch charges of cease-fire violations, raiding and pillage by uncontrolled bands, and incitement to violence behind the Dutch lines. As late as November the Dutch occupied the whole of Madura, only part of which was included within the "van Mook line."

Only the devoted and persistent labors of the Good Offices Committee succeeded in putting an end to the fighting with the acceptance by both parties of a complex set of truce terms in the Renville Agreement; but that truce was obtained only at the cost of accepting the Dutch position virtually in full. On November 1, 1947 the Council, irked by the failure of its cease-fire efforts, had called upon the parties to consult with each other, directly or through the Good Offices Committee, as to the means to put an end to the fighting, and had interpreted its earlier resolution as meaning that neither party should by hostile action extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947. The Republican negotiators took a strict view of the Council's resolution and proposed that each party could lay claim only to those places which on August 4 were actually occupied by troops, but the Dutch were firm that the "van Mook line" must be accepted in principle as the line of demarcation. The truce agreement of January 17, 1948, ex-

[9] This issue was graphically described in a telegram from the Republican Vice-Premier to the President of the Council, dated Sept. 29, 1947 (Doc. S/568): "As soon as Dutch have succeeded in occupying few towns and few main roads they start claiming that entire area covered by imaginary demarcation lines they draw on map becomes *terra nederlandica*. Subsequently follow inevitable mopping up operations, rounding off actions, clearing up actions, and what not. Not astonishing at all that in such a way fierce fighting continues unabated. Penetration is not occupation. Nor does it confer right to penetrators to regard areas between converging lines of penetration as occupied territory or even patrol the same."

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plicitly accepted the Dutch contention. Denouncing this line as unjust, disappointing, and detrimental to the Republic, the Republican negotiators found themselves forced nonetheless to accept it "as a purely provisional settlement conducive to an early political settlement."[10]

This defeat for the Republic was only a minor phase of a far larger defeat in which, it may be argued, the Security Council shared as well. This concerned the vitally important issue as to whether the Dutch had a rightful claim to control any of the areas taken over by force of arms. In the first two days of debate on the case the Indian and the Soviet representatives had proposed that the Council should call for a withdrawal to the positions held prior to hostilities on grounds both of general principle and of preventing the Dutch from securing a position of undue advantage when the time came for a political settlement. The contention, advanced by the United States among others, that such a move would leave chaos behind it and that the urgent question was to end the fighting carried the day; but the proposition that there should be a withdrawal to the pre-fighting lines recurred, and was rejected, with regularity.[11]

It is of marked interest that the Good Offices Committee at first accepted the withdrawal principle even though the Dutch forced its elimination from the final Agreement. In its Christmas draft message, submitted informally to the parties, the Committee proposed that the truce be based on the "van Mook line," but among the principles which it suggested as a basis for a political settlement it included the following paragraph:

> That on the signing of the political agreement the civil administrations which were functioning on 20 July 1947 be restored within a period of not more than three months and that within a similar period Netherlands armed forces be withdrawn to territories occupied by them on 20 July 1947.

[10] For these negotiations and documents related thereto, see *First Interim Report of the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council* (Doc. S/649).

[11] The withdrawal issue was a central feature of the Council debates during October, 1947. On Oct. 31 a Soviet resolution calling for withdrawal to pre-fighting lines was defeated when it received only the votes of the U.S.S.R., Australia, Colombia, and Poland. It was opposed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, the remainder abstaining.

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In their comments on the Committee's proposals the Republic naturally accepted this paragraph, seeking unavailingly to link it closely to their unwilling acceptance of the "van Mook line" for the truce; the Dutch, without rejecting it flatly, insisted that they were not prepared to change the administration or withdraw the protection of their forces from such areas without the full and free consent of their population. In the Renville Agreement it was again the Dutch position which prevailed.

In the eighteen agreed principles for a political settlement the Republic received one major concession, but also suffered some further losses. In general reaffirming the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement but slanting them toward the Dutch interpretation,[12] these principles contained the stipulation that within not less than six months or more than one year a plebiscite should be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia.[13] If either party so requests, this plebiscite will be conducted under observation by the Committee, which is to continue to aid in working out a general settlement. Both sides agreed not to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations in accord with the principles of Linggadjati, and guaranteed freedom of assembly, speech and publication. Since under the truce agreement the establishment of demilitarized zones, based on the "van Mook line," in no way prejudices the rights, claims or positions of the parties under the Security Council resolutions, the Republic has in principle made only a provisional sacrifice of territory and has full opportunity to regain its losses through the plebiscite procedure. In practice, however, the Republic's situation, as it is well aware, is far

[12] For an analysis of the Renville Agreement stressing this aspect, see Raymond Kennedy, "Truce in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XVII, March 24, 1948.

[13] It was also provided that the parties might agree on another method for ascertaining the popular will in place of a plebiscite. On June 10, 1948, the American and Australian representatives on the Good Offices Committee, noting that no significant progress had been made in the five months since the Renville Agreement, proposed informally to the Dutch and Indonesians that, among other things, a freely and popularly elected Constituent Assembly for the whole of Indonesia should be brought into being. This proposal the Republic accepted and the Dutch vigorously rejected.

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from happy. Despite the explicit provision that territorial changes should be made only with full and free popular consent at a time when security and freedom from coercion have been ensured, it appears inevitable that the plebiscites must be held in territory under the control of a Dutch administration which believes that separatist movements within the Republic's original domain are deserving of full encouragement. Political developments in West Java both before and since the Renville Agreement give every evidence of bearing out the fears of the Republic and its supporters in the Security Council.[14] The only effective guarantee for a really impartial preparation for and administration of plebiscites acceptable to the Republic and to the world at large would be strong and continuous international supervision.

This issue, in the broader form of the general future role of the Good Offices Committee, was a central feature of the Security Council debates in February, 1948, following the presentation of the Committee's report. It was the contention of Justice Kirby that the drastic damage done to the Republic by the Renville Agreement could be justified only if the continuing responsibility of the Council and the Committee for a just settlement was carried through in action. Although there was considerable support for the view that the Committee's hand should be strengthened, the Council's resolution of February 28, aside from the warning as to West Java and Madura, went no further than maintaining the offer of good offices and requesting that both parties and the Committee keep the Council informed as to the progress of the political settlement.

VI

In the eyes of the Soviet Union the failure of the Security Council to demand Dutch withdrawal to pre-fighting lines, the yielding to the Dutch in the truce terms and in the political principles for the establishment of a United States of Indonesia linked to the Netherlands, and the attitude of the United States and the colonial powers throughout damned the Indonesians to colonial enslavement and established the report of

[14] See *The Committee of Good Offices Report on Political Developments in Western Java* (Doc S/729).

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the Good Offices Committee as one of the most shameful documents ever published by the United Nations. Mr. Austin for the United States found that the Good Offices Committee had not only put an end to hostilities but had achieved recognition of the great democratic principles of the Charter and of the free peoples of the earth; orotundly he proclaimed that Dutch-Indonesian cooperation "may signal to peoples everywhere on this troubled earth that mankind is again on the upward climb toward a better day."

It is difficult to ascend either to the optimistic heights of Mr. Austin or descend to the pessimism of Mr. Gromyko. In terms of a harsh *Realpolitik* it is probably a fact that the Security Council saved the Republic of Indonesia from complete extinction. Lacking the principles and the machinery of the United Nations, the powers would almost certainly not have intervened to prevent the Dutch from carrying through their speedy military conquest of the whole of Java and Sumatra and the subsequent establishment of a series of states more pliant to their wishes. Through the labors of the Security Council and its Good Offices Committee peace was established and the principles for a general political settlement laid down; the Netherlands was forced in fact to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations to have a say in what the Netherlands regarded as its own colonial backyard; and the Republic received a significant degree of international recognition and protection for its formal status if not by any means for all of its substantive claims. These items may surely be chalked up to the credit of the Security Council, as must the general demonstration of the Council's ability to act without getting unduly tangled up in legalistic and procedural snarls. On the other side of the ledger must be entered the strong tendency to operate on the basis of the principle: To him who hath shall be given. The Dutch virtually set full acceptance of their terms as the price for voluntary submission to the Council's peacemaking, and this price the Council was prepared to pay. For the Republic the redeeming features of the settlement, aside from the preservation of its truncated life, lie in the future. There is good reason to believe that the Republic can profit from

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them only if the Security Council maintains firm and constant vigilance.

The record of the United States throughout the Indonesian story is not one to be viewed with unmixed pride. Always friendly in words to the Republic and its aspirations, the substance of its actions has more frequently favored the Dutch side. In the Security Council the United States took a middle-of-the-road position, seeking action which would put an end to hostilities but still tending to line up with the Dutch and the colonial powers on many touchy points. In the Good Offices Committee Dr. Graham appears to have played a mediating role between the Belgians and the Australians and to have gone far to win the full confidence of the Indonesians, but it is generally suspected that American influence was decisive in persuading the Republican authorities that they could expect no significant outside aid in opposing the Dutch demands as to the terms to be embodied in the Renville Agreement. The American stand may perhaps be summed up in the proposition that while the United States wanted a peaceful and favorable settlement of the Indonesian claim to self-determination, it was not prepared to back such a claim against the opposition of the Dutch. The decline in the vast faith which the Indonesians at first placed in the United States is clearly reflected in their failure to select the United States as their nominee for the Good Offices Committee and in their rejection of the American offer of good offices in August, 1947. To hold the Dutch, whose defection from the Western ranks is virtually inconceivable under any circumstances, the United States has endangered the friendship of the rising nations of the East.

On February 3, 1948, following the signing of the Renville Agreement, Queen Wilhelmina solemnly proclaimed that "colonialism is dead," and that no relationship between nations can be stable unless it is based on mutual consent and mutual effort. Much remains to be done by the Netherlands and the United Nations to translate these admirable words into effective reality for the less favored peoples of the earth.

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THE BALANCE OF POWER: GROWTH OF AN IDEA

By ALFRED VAGTS

TWICE within 25 years, in 1919 and again in 1944-5, the idea of the balance of power has been pronounced dead, and twice it has arisen from its seeming demise soon after such funereal exercises. Foremost among the obituaries were those of American statesmen, like Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull. When the latter returned from conferences in Moscow in the autumn of 1943, he stated, as if he were the true heir of Wilsonism, that "as the provisions of the four-nations declarations are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security."

Disappointment over the effect and the working of the organizations designed to replace and overcome the balance, and with it the diversity of power, the League of Nations and the United Nations, has made this seemingly discredited, bloodstained image of order among nations widely acceptable once more. But like modern moneys, it has a restricted circulation. To all appearances, it is acceptable west of the "iron curtain" only, west of the Byzantine, the monolithic order of things.

Where this West begins, there is a recognition of individual and specific right and personality, including that of individual states. However much slighted by governments in war, there has remained in the West an awareness of the need for opposition in politics, as well as in the sciences and arts, a willingness to admit a modicum at least of reason to the adversary. The image for this readiness, real or apparent, is the political balance. It has proved most welcome to ages and societies deeply disturbed by the awareness of varying degrees of justification in the opposing camps. Such ages and societies have not been revolutionary, for revolutions and wars—most wars at any rate and battles inevitably—must deny the spirit of concession and

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strive to break the existing balance of forces. As Bonaparte, the military revolutionary, pointed out to Robespierre, the political revolutionary, in May 1794: one's fire must be concentrated against a single point and the attacks not dispersed. "Once the breach is laid, the balance is broken. Everything else becomes useless and the place is captured."

A longing for balance is natural also in the presence of great upheavals, uncertainties and disappointments in the world. This was true of the Renaissance, when the balance of power idea was fashioned, as well as of the present time. Today's uncertainties are provoked by novel difficulties that seem to lie even more in material things and outward conditions than in Man. They make people look for time to consider; too disturbed and undecided for action, for war, they would prefer a state of *Ausgleich,* to borrow a term from Austro-Hungarian history—that settlement of differences in 1867 which avoided such a civil war as had just taken place in the United States and in Germany.

As soon as a dichotomy is stated in any field of thought, political and otherwise, among the western peoples today, the harmonization formula of "balance" is promptly raised. Whenever expenditure is overshooting income, the call for balanced budgets follows. Economists speak of a balance of supply and demand, the upsetting of which, with resultant depression or inflation, is awaited with some eagerness by Soviet economists. Other sciences demand a balanced diet, where there is enough to eat and to choose from, a glandular balance, a balance of age groups in a nation, a balance in nature which seems disturbed if not enough or too many of one species of animals are killed off. According to some of its outstanding practitioners, medical science in the West was for a time misled in the diagnosis of disease by the discovery of bacteria which gave "temporary support to the fallacious causality principle" and thus "vastly retarded progress in scientific medical thinking," although it is now found that for the true diagnosis "the imbalance, the organismic disequilibrium is the real thing" to study.[1]

[1] Dr. Karl A. Menninger discussing causes of high blood pressure before a conference of physicians. On this occasion "primal fear" was indicated as a clue (*New York Times,* April 20, 1948). Should not the historian of diplomacy in a deeper, more searching analysis of the fear of "encirclement" make use of this clue?

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As in medicine, so in military matters—to be a sound whole, the body of it has to be balanced. Mr. James Forrestal, as Secretary of the Navy in 1944, demanded a "balanced fleet," to consist of "battleships and carriers, backed up by the proper number of warships and auxiliaries" (Statement of August 30, 1944). Four years later, as Secretary of Defense, he had to demand a balanced defense for the United States. After a seventy-group air force had been proposed to Congress by Air Force Secretary Symington, Forrestal insisted that this proposal would throw the nation's military establishment "out of balance." "The unbalance would impair the usefulness of the whole military establishment." The "real issue" was to him not the "desirability of a seventy-group Air Force as a military measure but the joint and balanced planning of military programs as required by the Unification Act and the impact of expanded military procurement on the national economy."[2] Anyone who takes political metaphors seriously will wonder what ought to or does balance within a fleet or a total defense force and how battleships balance with carriers or ground and naval forces with air forces; whether it is not more truly the function of a force to be so constituted that it will overbalance the intended enemy forces; and whether the balance in question is not one rather between various schools of officers, each advocating a particular weapon or arm. When these metaphors are strained, they become thin enough to let the outside world detect the strife among the branches of the armed forces for either a larger share of budgets or for supremacy for some strategic concept.

What the Defense Secretary tried to establish among the warring factions of his officers, a psychologist seeks among the conflicting two or more souls in a man's breast or in man's society. "The 'well adjusted' people in our society are those who have struck a sort of balance. They observe the niceties of life but do not go to extremes. They enjoy being 'human.' They know that they cannot be perfect, and do not expect to be . . . Buoyant and fearless, they look forward to their tomorrows because they have learned to accept their yesterdays."[3] For a less cheerful view on balancing, one might invoke George San-

[2] *New York Times*, April 23, 1948.
[3] Walter C. Langer, *Psychology and Human Living*, New York, D. Appleton-Century, 1943.

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tayana, who finds it possible from his cell in Rome "in solitude to love mankind; in the world, for one who knows the world, there can be nothing but secret or open war . . . Perhaps, the universe is nothing but an equilibrium of idiocies."[4] The balance of Santayana recalls that "équilibre des sottises" which cynics of the 18th century like d'Alembert had already found as efficacious as that prevailing among the powers of Europe.[5] To these various signs indicating the popular appeal of the balance concept might be added whisky advertisements about balanced blends, no less than a course announced late in 1945 by the Fine Arts School of Yale University, "dealing with such topics as rhythm, balance, materials, color, light, and unity."[6]

Such a search for harmonies in our own time, including the often expressed wish for the establishment of a balance between East and West, might well be viewed as a mark of affinity felt between ourselves and our own time and the era of the Renaissance when so many of these balancing notions arose, including the idea of the balance of power as the concept to regulate—or veil—the relations between states. The present juxtaposition of West and East, of the remaining democracies with the Russia that never shared in the historical experience of the Renaissance, greatly adds to the poignancy of this conflict. It is as a part of this conflict that the Russians bluntly include the balance of power among the western hypocrisies to be denounced. When Sir Stafford Cripps came as British ambassador to Moscow in the summer of 1940 he asked Stalin about the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the following point: "The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power." Stalin declined to see any such hegemonial intentions on the part of Germany.

[4] Cited in *New York Times*, June 26, 1944. Another expression of skepticism about balancing is the young O. W. Holmes' *Astraea; the Balance of Illusions, a Poem delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Yale College*, Boston, 1850.

[5] Letter of d'Alembert to King Frederick the Second of Prussia, July 30, 1781, citing a *mot* of Fontenelle.

[6] *New York Times*, November 11, 1945.

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The latter's military successes did not menace the Soviet Union "and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were not based on transient circumstances but on the basic national interests of both countries. The so-called European balance of power had hitherto oppressed not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe."[7]

The harmonization notions of the East as regards the coexistence of independent nations, though decidedly contradictory when judged by the successive statements of Joseph Stalin himself, are not those of the West, whatever common ideas may have seemed shared at the time of the founding of the United Nations. At that moment the balance of power ideal was believed ready to disappear once more and a "unity of power," such as Woodrow Wilson and others had hoped to create, was expected to emerge. So near did it seem that this unity was even believed to be organizable, in the United Nations, as if no more balancing were henceforth required. This was the moment when overwhelming military victory of West and East over the two Middles had broken the long-maintained balance of war.[8]

Behind this façade, it soon became clear, Stalinism in international relations looked first to a world rule by the two (or two-and-a-half) great powers remaining, an arrangement somewhat in the nature of the division of markets by international cartels undertaken on occasion by that much-derided finance capitalism which had become far less imperialistic and expansionistic than Moscow-centered Communism. When this partnership in power dissolved the forward movement of Commu-

[7] Question and answer were promptly relayed to the Germans. German ambassador in Moscow to German Foreign Office, July 13, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 1939-1941, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1948, p. 167.

[8] Did the United States and the New World go to war to redress the balance of the Old? It ought not to be considered election year maliciousness to refer for one of the first steps in this direction to statements by Henry Wallace, Democratic candidate for the Vice-Presidency in 1940, during that campaign. He told California audiences at that time that Japan's accession to the Axis meant "that the old balance of power upon which the U. S. relied for safety is now gone. Only if we are speedy and efficient in our defense can we keep aggressor nations, or any combination of them, from coming to this country . . . The old balance of power under which the Monroe Doctrine was easily defended is gone. We must look to our own defenses, relying on ourselves to repel any aggression." UP dispatch from Los Angeles, September, 1940.

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nism was more openly resumed, in the direction of that international order which its ideologues and practitioners think best established through the spread of a "monolithic" Communism, and not by any balance.

Thus the idea of the balance of power has now reached a new way-station in its course through history, which has already lasted half a millenium. The question of how and perhaps why it arose might well be considered once more, if only to learn what it meant, originally and later, to certain societies and groups within them.

Political ideas usually have no single ascertainable point of origin; they have only origins, antedating first formulations in speech, writing, or the pictorial expressions. Great critical historians like Jacob Burckhardt or Johann Gustav Droysen have warned out of their vast experience that origins will generally remain unknown to historians. "Neither does criticism seek nor does interpretation find the origins, in the moral world nothing is abrupt."[9] Ideas are like rivers arising in a swamp or moor region rather than in a mountain spring, and often they see the light of day only after they have run for miles through subterranean caverns.

The problem in the history of the rise and formation of political ideas is further complicated by the circumstances that they very often—decidedly more often than most other kinds of ideas—are produced in fields other than that of politics. As far as their expression and formulation are concerned, they may have been taken over from the natural sciences, religion-mythology, the arts, as if in need of outside authority and confirmation before they become acceptable and convincing in the strife of politics.

The language of politics is rarely as unequivocal as other terminologies, reminding us of the "unlawlike" nature of the social sciences. Political language is formed by the confluence of terms from various other fields—ethics, the arts, philosophy, religion, the sciences, techniques of various kinds—whereas the contribution of politics to the language of these other fields has remained slight by comparison. This semantic state of things

[9] Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik*, Munich and Berlin, 1937, paragraph 37.

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is one to which the Renaissance contributed not a little. It was the world-openness of the Renaissance that made political metaphors so strongly mixed and so ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so.

In the field of foreign affairs the ideas put into play—above all those concerned with the desirable order among states—would seem particularly vague and unoriginal as well as late in appearing.[10] The slowness of mankind to think about international relationships and the relative poverty of such thought is a subject that might well be probed a good deal further than it has been. One fundamental reason would seem to be the fact that interests pursued in the conduct of foreign affairs are apt to be so material, so one-sided, so often crass and alarming, that ideas invoked for their support or refutation are in the nature of things slow to grow and unfold. To make them welcome to those parts of the public not at home in the secrets of diplomacy it is first needful to make their fairness and justness believable. Only a very few images or terms would have such power and appeal.

These few acceptable political terms are given formulation and then endorsement and adoption by the very fact of their derivation from many fields of human thought and activity. The more widely a given term is used, even though with very different meaning and application, the greater its political usefulness. The confluence, largely metaphorical in its nature, helps

[10] As an illustration: Long before publicists wrote of the state system in Europe as the necessary, unavoidable, quasi-lawlike connection and interdependence of the states there was Galileo's *Dialogo dei due massimi sistemi del mondo* (1632). Only around 1700 was the concept 'system' applied to the relationships between states. An anti-French author of the Spanish War of Succession wrote in 1701 *Le partage du lion de la fable. II. partie,* English translation *The Fable of the Lion's Share verified in the pretended partition of the Spanish Monarchy,* 1701, Repr. State Tracts III, 129 ff., addressing himself to the pope by saying that the Holy Father "certainly knew 'the system of Europe' too well not to know that religion played no role in it." A German encyclopedia of about the same time—Johann Hübner's *Reales Staats-, Zeitungs-und Conversationslexicon,* 1st ed. Leipzig, 1704 (I am using the 4th edition of 1709)—does not yet register this new concept which is certainly marking a further step in the secularization of politics, as Galileo had done in another time and place. According to this encyclopedia "Systema is such a book in which a whole doctrine is extensively proposed. In astronomy it means the miraculous composition of the sky and earth." For the further development of the concept of the European state system during the 18th century see Heinrich Doerries, "Russlands Eindringen in Europa in der Epoche Peters des Grossen," *Osteuropäische Forschungen,* N.F., vol. 26 (1939), pp. 19-21.

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(1) to formulate a term and (2) to justify and strengthen it, give it authority, put and keep it in circulation. This was strikingly true of the political balance of power, as image, phrase, and concept. Though the practice would seem to have preceded literary crystallization, by the time it was being formulated and accepted or discussed, in the Renaissance, there was already a broad popular acceptance of balancing in many another field of thought and activity.

Mediaeval political thought about the actual or desirable relations of states and powers was defective in the extreme. It knew no "state system."[11] It was almost completely overshadowed by the constant discussions about the relative position of pope and emperor (two lights, two swords theories). In keeping with the hierarchical notions of the age, their quarrel was one of pre-eminence and precedence under God, while the order between the secular states was usually thought of as one giving the empire theoretical rather than practical pre-eminence with the title majesty.[12] The not very numerous alliances between the secular states were but little supported by ideology, except when directed against non-Christian foes. Least of all did the polemical literature view the position of pope and emperor as one of an equipoising nature. There seems to be no extant written description of the period presenting the relative position of pope and emperor as more or less evenly weighted—a position that, if assessed, must have been actually reached during their power conflict at various times. Nor is there any known mediaeval prescription that calls for such a relation of strength and position in the interest of harmony or peace in the Christian world and as a solution of their struggle.

But what the clerical mind could not see about the pope-emperor relationship, the more naïve artist—whether considered late mediaeval or early Renaissance—did realize and express by way of pictorial image. Obviously it was not a theme lending itself to treatment on the walls of churches and mon-

[11] For the view that a state system had come into existence by the late Middle Ages see Walter Kienast, "Die Anfänge des europäischen Staaten-systems in späteren Mittelalter," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 153 (1936).

[12] R. Holtzmann, "Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke des mittelalterlichen Kaisertums und die Souveränität der europ. Staatensystems," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 159 (1939), pp. 251. ff.

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asteries. It might too easily have been considered contrary to the maxim that *summa ratio est quae pro religione facit,* "the best rule is that which is in the interest of religion." But with the new media of the engraving and, after 1400, the woodcut, a greater freedom of expression resulted. The woodcut allowed the artist a margin of safety and anonymity which the painted image could not grant him, and was easily and cheaply reproduced. With it the skeptical layman's notion of the essential connection between pope and emperor in respect of power, position, and right could appear openly and explicitly.

While the modern political cartoon must be so composed that it can be read and understood at a glance, the older political picture was often extremely complicated, crowded, even overloaded, and remained so down to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution—surely a far from accidental coincidence of production and consumption. Sometimes the early picture could be interpreted in a variety of ways, calling for literate interpreters and lengthy discussion. Contemporary students might have disagreed about their detailed meanings just as present-day historians may differ in the interpretation of the 15th and 16th century prints reproduced here. It is not certain whether the meeting of pope and emperor, depicted in these two prints, took place near 1460 or in 1470, between Pius II (1458-64) or Paul II (1464-71) and Emperor Frederick III. Nor is it certain whether, at the moment alluded to, the competition between Papacy and Empire was less acute than at most previous times. Certainly the pope and the emperor were in temporary agreement as against the Electors during this period.[13] But the impression left by the prints is that, stripped of their pretenses (hence their nakedness) emperor and pope are in a precarious balance—the delicacy of the relationship between them being stressed by their grouping on and around the masthead of the ship of state which is the Empire. The presence of France among the problems of the times is indicated by a *fleur-de-lis* escutcheon, that of Jerusalem and the crusade by a withered tree trunk, from which a second *fleur-de-lis* escutcheon is suspended.

[13] Leopold von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation,* Phaidon ed., Vienna, n. d., pp. 39-40.

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THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE
Anon. German woodcut; Ulm, 1469-73; B. 11,196; S. 1957 (?)
Washington National Gallery of Art

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

The Emperor and the Pope
Anon. German woodcut, 16th century
Munich, State Library

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Putting the scales into the hands of the pope would concede to him a certain arbitral superiority as would also his footing on the masthead, whereas the footing given to the emperor seems rather more insecure. Part of the imperial support is the lion couchant, indicating Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy with whom the Emperor Frederick III broke in 1473, which would give another *terminus ad quem* for the dating of the two 15th century pictures. The broken scepter or spindle in the emperor's hand would give another: it points to the condition of the crown of Bohemia where George Podiebrad had been excommunicated in 1466, after which date pope and emperor favored the competitor, Matthias Corvinus of Hungary, who was warring with Podiebrad until the latter's death in 1471.

The placing of the two contenders for world government at the peculiarly insecure but at the same time farthest visible position imaginable, the head of a ship's mast, would point to Venice as the origin of the cut. This view is borne out by other indications, including perhaps the frank and thoroughly secular realization of the competition for power, with no invocation of heaven except the fearful accidentality of the Comet. Venice was the foremost naval power of the time, and here life was most secular, and most permeated with nautical terms and symbols.

The cartoon must have enjoyed a certain popularity, since it was executed in the two media of engraving and woodcut. And it had an after-life in the next century, being redrawn to suit the politics of a later date and reprinted often during the Reformation as a symbolic representation of the strife between emperor and pope. Copies and variants have been found dated as late as 1576. The retouching hands of artists left some dubious symbols like the sceptor or spindle in the emperor's hand—the later emperor being Charles V. To make it still more popular the inscriptions were rewritten in German. And the tendency becomes frankly anti-papal. "The infernal dragon is his [the pope's] counsellor," it is remarked, the dragon being placed around the neck of the pontifex where the older pictures

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had a snake coiled about the papal neck to indicate the treacherous behavior of the Duke of Milan.[14]

Whether these pictorial representations show the artist as a politician, expressing a widespread conviction and view of politics, or as the draftsman and spokesman of certain groups and group interests, we do not know and probably shall never discover. At any rate, he depicted a political balance in documents preceding all written expressions of the same notion. He did so within the contemporary canons of the arts.

In the music of the period *punctum contra punctum* had become the principle of harmony, while *contrapeso,* counterweight, establishing symmetry, was one of the main elements of Renaissance theory. Leone Battista Alberti (1404-1472) and other theorists and artists[15] brought about a change in images from "the awkward attitude of medieval grace" to the very opposite ideal of "a classical equilibrium."[16] The scales, as the ancient symbol of justice, appeared innumerable times in painting, occasionally, with political import. And Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia* of 1598 which is among other things a guide for artists summing up the standard representations of various symbolic figures, advises the artist to show *Politica* as a female figure holding with the right hand a pair of scales "Perche la politica aggiusta in modo gli stati della Republica, che l'uno par l'altro si solleva, & si sostenta sopra la terra, con quella felicità della quale è capace fra queste miserie l'infirmità, & debole natura nostra."[17] In other words, it is in the very nature of politics to balance.

[14] A large part of the above interpretation follows Arthur Mayger Hind, *A Catalogue of Early Italian Engravings preserved in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum,* London, 1910, text vol., pp. 276 ff., substantially reprinted in his *Early Italian Engraving,* New York London, 1938, text vol., pp. 251 ff. The woodcut is at length described by W. L. Schreiber, *Handbuch der Holz- und Metallschnitte des XV. Jahrhunderts,* Leipzig, 1927, IV, 103. Schreiber is inclined to date the woodcut, which is of South German origin, perhaps from near the Bodensee, earlier than the engraving, while Hind insists on the priority of the latter. The woodcut is from the National Gallery of Art and is printed with their kind permission; knowledge of it I owe to Professor E. Panofsky of Princeton. The 16th century German woodcut is in the Munich State Library and is reproduced in the *Ullstein-Weltgeschichte,* ed. Walter Goetz, Berlin, 1908-1925, vol. IV.

[15] For these art theories see Leone Battista Alberti's *Kleinere kunsttheoretische Schriften,* herausgegeben und übersetzt von H. Janitschek, Vienna, 1877.

[16] Edgar Wind, "Studies in Allegorical Portraiture," *Journal of the Warburg Institute,* I, 159.

[17] *Iconologia overo descrittione di diverse imagini cavate dall' antichità & di propria inventione,* Trovate, & dichiarate da Cesare Ripa, Rome, 1603, p. 411.

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Other fields of activity and thought could not do without the balance as the regulating principle either: the *bilancio* in double-entry bookkeeping, evolved in Italy at the end of the Middle Ages, no longer entered items one below the other, as was done in earlier accounting, but ranged them as income and outgo on opposite pages of the ledger.[18] The fact that of all concepts of modern physics, those of balance, and of the scales as the measuring instrument of the balance, were readily taken into the language of politics might be due to the initial fact that statics was the first field of modern physics to be explored.[19] Medical theory of the Renaissance considered the balance of humors in the harmonic man, and astrology, affecting political forecasting no less than medical wisdom, stressed the seventh constellation of the zodiac, the scales, the classic *libra*.

The mixing of various metaphors, medical and other, for a political purpose may be illustrated by an example from the late Renaissance. The third of Sir Robert Dallington's *Aphorisms civill and militaire, amplified with authorities and exemplified with historie out of Fr. Guicciardini* (2nd ed., London, 1629, runs:

"When the ballast or lading is well stowed in the ship, she maketh good way, and saileth fairly: but being unevenly bestowed, it hindereth her course, and sometimes sinketh her. As also, where is an equal temperature of the humors, there is perfect health, and a good constitution of the body, but where these are distempered, and the maligne are predominant, there the former good habit is turned to some desperate disease. So is it in a State." And among his authorities for this the Englishman quotes Galen: "Natura temperata ad iusticium, non ac pondus: in qua quatuor qualitates ad aequilibrium miscentur. Nature properly tends to justice, not to overbalance; in it four qualities are mixed to form an equilibrium." Then follows immediately a quotation from Guicciardini about how Laurence Medici "kept the State of Italy counterpoised in equal balance."

[18] Raymond de Roover, "La Formation et l'Expansion de la Comptabilité à Parie double," *Annales d'Histoire économique et sociale*, nos. 44-45 (1937), pp. 171 ff.

[19] Pierre Duhem, *Les Origines de la Statique*, Paris, 1905.

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This is not an unusually extreme example of the cocktail language of politics in the Renaissance.

The balance with its beams and scales and moderate and circumscribed gyrations may well be declared the most favored esthetico-political figure of the Renaissance. As to literary usage and approval it leaves far behind such other figures as the square or circle, the *rondo* or *roundelle* in music and poetics, which the Elizabethan author George Puttenham (*The Arte of English Poesie*, 1589) thought, gave "a general resemblance to God, the World, and the Queene," with "a special and particular resemblance of her Majestie to the Roundell."[20]

However prominent in the various fields of Renaissance thought and activity, the idea of the balance made a comparatively late appearance in the arena of practical politics. Then it was the *governo misto*—domestic government provided with checks and balances—which not only preceded the balance of power among states, but also provided apostles for the later concept. Indeed, few balancing theories are more recent than that of the balance of power among states. The balance of trade comes later in connection with the rise of Mercantilism.[21] So, too, does the balance of nature—"La natura va sempre all' equilibrio"—by which various ages have understood diverse things, such as the notion that when you kill too many cats you have too many mice and so disrupt nature's scheme. Generally speaking, these latter ideas were invoked to support *laissez faire*.

The reason for the relative lateness of the balance concept in foreign policy must be looked for in the fact that the circle of those presumed to be concerned with foreign affairs was so narrow. A law unto itself, this élite could promote its own interests without the symbols so necessary to other spheres of public activity. It could dispense with the "spesa superflua,"[22] the unnecessary expense of an ideology, as a Venetian called it, until long after other groups in the Renaissance had found their appropriate theoretical bases.

[20] Cited in Gregory Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, Oxford, 1904, II, 102-3.

[21] Genovesi (1713-69), *Lezioni d'Economia*, n.d. cited in Pribram, "Die Idee des Gleichgewichts in der nationalökonomischen Literatur," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XVII (1908), 3.

[22] Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, Florence, 1839-1863, Ser. I, vol. 2, p. 465.

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Gradually, however, the hierarchical tendencies and ideals of empire and papacy became exhausted[23]—even if a business humanist like Peutinger would still have preferred the re-establishment of the Empire as the large space economy most suitable for the interests of Augsburg capitalism. The time came when diplomats found it necessary to evolve a new ideology, or at least imagery, harmonizing a welter of interests not usually made compatible except at the expense of someone. While admitting the unavoidable coexistence of independent and competing states, they now seized upon the balance of power as a unifying concept. And to identify the new concept they borrowed from astrology the symbol of *libra*, or the scales.

"In un certo modo bilanciata,[24] wrote Machiavelli in 1513, describing the condition of the pentarchy of Italian states before 1494. This was with him a point of realistic historical description. And it was as such and not as a prescriptive rule for the conduct and aim of foreign relations and diplomacy that the balance of power enters Renaissance political thought originally. It is thus a feature in the description, very much in the style of a picture, of a short period in Italian history (1478-1489) during the reign of Lorenzo Magnifico. Already during Lorenzo's lifetime, a Modenese diplomat had called him, in the style of grand flattery, *bilancia di senno*, the balance of sense and wisdom.[25] After Lorenzo's death, and after the collapse of the Italian alliance system, further paeans of praise were unleashed. Though not published before 1494, these necrologies were dedicated equally to Lorenzo and to the good old times; they described Italy as once having been well-balanced.

The original formulations of the balance of power *concetto* in written language are, then, post-catastrophic, following not only the barbarian irruption from the north but also the long-term downward trend of economy in Italy, particularly in Florence where the Medici had begun to socialize their private debts by taking over political power. This process was so well

[23] Leopold von Ranke, *Sämmtliche Werke*, Leipziz, 1868-1890, vols. 53-54, p. 682.
[24] *Il Principe*, c. 20.
[25] Gino Capponi, *Storia della Republica di Firenze*, Sec. ediz. revista, Florence, 1876, II, 428-9.

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manipulated that as Commynes put it—himself a customer of the Medici banking business—"the Florentines hardly minded it when Lorenzo helped himself liberally from the common pence."[26] This would make the balance of power policy as exercised by or ascribed to Lorenzo an ornament embroidered on the stately veil draped over his bankrupt affairs, concealing his unbalanced books.

The characterization of Lorenzo's management came originally, not from what might be called literati, but from representatives of a class much threatened by the changes in Italy before and after 1494. They were *uomini da bene,* members of the propertied class much concerned about the investment of the family fortunes, optimates like Bernardo Rucellai, Francisco Guicciardini, Alessandro de Pazzi. They were rather close to the Medici, without approving all the latter's policies or their trend toward absolutism. Pazzi was a nephew of Lorenzo, while Ruccellai's family was intermarried with the Medici and a daughter of Guicciardini was at one time engaged to Cosimo I.

Both Rucellai and Guicciardini wrote when out of power and without hope of returning to it. This is a situation which has often moved optimates of various ages and lands to turn their thought to writing down the history in which they themselves had figured, suffering at the time of writing from "the sower fortune of many exiles,"[27] from power. They, Guicciardini and Rucellai, stand in a line with ex-statesmen-historians like Clarendon, Bolingbroke, Baron vom Stein and others, not to mention the many memoir writers of this upper societal group.

Since space is lacking for all three first formulations, the one most widely known may be quoted. This is the second oldest, from Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia,* written in the *volgare,* not the Latin of Rucellai, composed towards the end of the 1530's, and published by a nephew of the author in 1561, but circulating in manuscript as early as 1546. According to this story, before 1494 Italy had enjoyed a golden age, prospering in peace and quietude. To use the first English translation, that of 1579,

[26] Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires,* ed. Calmette, Paris, 1924-1925, III, 40 ff.

[27] Thomas Lodge, *Defense of Poetry,* 1579. Cited in Smith, *op. cit.* I, 80, where the misfortune of exiles is called a subject of tragedy.

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"There were many things to entertain" this felicity "and common voice and consent gave no small praise . . . to the industry and virtue of Laurence Medici . . . His name was great through all Italy, and his authority mighty in the deliberations of common affairs. He knew well that it would be a thing prejudicial to the commonwealth of Florence, and no less hurtful to himself, if any one of the great potentates of that nation stretched out farther their power and, therefore, he employed all his devices, means and directions that the things of Italy should be so evenly balanced, that they should not weigh more on one side than on the other. . . . Such was the estate of affairs, such were the foundations of the tranquillity of Italy, disposed and counterpoised . . . when in the month of April 1492 chanced the death of Laurence de Medicis."[28]

Like Guicciardini's, the other characterizations of Lorenzo's balance of power policies, are laudatory throughout, being in the nature of very late obituaries or secular apotheoses of a man and of a time happier than the authors' and their own times. They make the holding of the balance of power between states a grandiose feature in the portrait of the prince. He becomes a hero to whose foresight and *virtù* the balance is due. This picture or portrait motif will appear in the literary image of many a later prince or princess. The first English translator of Guicciardini's *Storia* (1579), dedicates his work to Queen Elizabeth and admonishes her: "God has put into your hands the balance of power and justice, to poise and counterpoise at your will the actions and counsels of all the Christian kings of your time." Bolingbroke has Queen Anne exclaim after the Peace of Utrecht that "it was the glory of the wisest and greatest of my predecessors to hold the balance of Europe." Horace Walpole applied the image to Frederick the Great after the Seven Years War, remarking that he held "in his hands the Balance of Europe." Occasionally a prince would even sketch his own portrait, putting in the balance of power as a feature. In a conversation with an English statesman, William II declared: "The balance of power in Europe am I."[29]

[28] *The History of Guicciardini, containing the Wars of Italy and Partes,* reduced into English by Geffray Fenton, London, 1579.

[29] *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette,* Berlin, 1924, XVII, 28.

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So strong, so convincing and persuasive was the image that only after generations would this holding of the political balance arouse the doubt of politicians and, even later, of politically-minded artists like Daumier. The early satire of a humanist, like Jovianus Pontanus (1426-1503), himself the servant of a prince, querying the predilection of the Florentine burghers for the balance image in politics, had clearly not caught on. Before even Guicciardini and Rucellai had written of the balance, Pontanus describes a traveller who comes to Florence and is at first glad to see that citizens have scales hanging in the halls of their houses; but he soon finds out that in the Signoria a double set of scales is used—with the one the gentlemen measure the conditions of the city, with the other those of Italy.[30] Whoever cared to, might have detected here an early, though mild, protest against double measure, double standard in politics. And it might also be concluded that by that date, before 1503, the balance was already a fairly commonly used metaphor in Florentine politics, for only a wide usage is apt to provoke satire.

As a feature in the obituary of a prince, who was hardly yet a prince, the balance of power thus makes its first fully formulated literary appearance. Next and nearly coeval is its application to the order underlying the relationship of states in Italy—the state system as it came to be called in post-Galilean times, that inevitable connection between states which excludes isolationism. The makers of history, in this view, are the "principal powers" in the Laurentian state system or the Great Powers in the later European state system. Political history, dating *ad inclinatione imperii,* as non-theological history, of which Guicciardini, the bitter enemy of the Roman clergy, was one of the initiators, was told increasingly as the history of the state system, down to the Göttingen 18th-century school, to Ranke and Bishop Stubbs for whom balance of power "is the principle which gives unity to the political plot of European history."[31]

The principal, the immediate danger to the Laurentian state system was presented not by the true Great Powers of Europe

[30] Eberhard Gothein, *Die Renaissance in Süditalien,* Munich & Leipzig, 1924, p. 65.

[31] William Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History,* Oxford, 1886, p. 225.

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which, largely unknown to the Italians, were consolidating their strength before 1494 for a new wave of expansionism, but by the strongest power in Italy itself, Venice. Lorenzo's alliance with Naples-Milan of 1480 was intended, according to Guicciardini, "to keep the Venetians from aggrandizing themselves," from obtaining "the empire over all Italy." But Venetian expansionism, at the same time instigated and weakened by economic decay, ended with the defeat at Agnadello (1510) and the panic and utter dejection to which Venetian diplomacy fell victim.[32]

The state of mind among governors in Venice, as well as the state of economy, remained shaky after that. "Selon le poix branle Venise," wrote Clément Marot, in 1536 during a visit; "Venice trembles in accordance with the weight it is under."[33] In this state of vacillation began the Venetian policy of neutrality, of avoiding war, and accepting conflict only if it was as remote as possible. The Venetians strove for *bilancia,* with its careful diplomatic watch and negotiation, "lest the scales of the balance tended to any one side." This formula of Venetian diplomacy, which could put ever less weight of its own into the scales of European power politics, came into use in the late 1550's, that is to say, slightly ahead of the first publication in book form of Guicciardini's *Storia.*

Whether or not the image of the balance in foreign affairs rose independently in Florence and in Venice, its formation in Florence first and in Venice second would seem quite in keeping and parallel with the flowering of painting first in Tuscany and then in Venice. In both city states the images and the practices to which the image was applied were evolved while the practising and ideology-creating societies were well past the peak of their economic and political prosperity.

Through the superb medium of Venetian diplomacy, the balance of power concept was put, rather slowly on the whole, into European circulation. It became one of the trading formulae for diplomats among themselves. To the uninitiated it was held up as a formula of seeming justice, not justice of the

[32] Heinrich Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig,* Gotha, 1905-1937, III, 598.

[33] "Autre épistre envoyée de venise le dernier jour de juillet, 1536." *Oeuvres,* ed. Guiffrey, Paris, 1875-1931, III, 450.

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abstract and absolute kind hardly obtainable on earth, but one necessary to offer *paroli* to an immoderate conqueror, to demonstrate one's own moderation in war aims and conquests and in diplomatic negotiations generally which were represented as aspiring for nothing beyond a just balance of power among states. Through such appeals a formula, basically aristocratic because it presumes a broad mandate to the conductors of diplomatic business, has found wide democratic approval, more specifically in England and France, less in the United States where its support has had a more esoteric character, and has only now begun to appear more generally acceptable.

From its beginning to today, the idea has shown a remarkable tendency to adhere to the group from which it first arose, the concipient group, an aristocracy entrusted with or desirous of its own nation's foreign business. This was an aristocracy not of birth alone but rather one of "all talents," such as Guicciardini would have preferred for the *governo* in Florence and elsewhere, a non-feudal aristocracy founded in the Renaissance and thence running onward to the English parliamentary parties, to Metternich, whom we know as a reader of Guicciardini, to Guizot, Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey,[34] and perhaps to Anthony Eden. General de Gaulle, with his policy of *grandeur* for France (which reminds one not a little of Venice's later policy of *riputazione*), is of this tradition, as is Field Marshal Smuts, to name a more philosophically-minded statesman of today.

The idea's "house of life," to use a term of astrology, may be called aristocratic. It has belonged, up to the present, to an aristocracy or élite, while conversely, such non-aristocrats as Hitler and Stalin have condemned and excluded it from their own ideological structures. Yet the aristocratic groups which accepted the balance image were essentially those preferring diplomacy to warmaking. Though not averse to wars, they were willing and able to conclude peace, to compromise and to har-

[34] A history *in nuce* of Edward Grey's diplomacy could be written in terms of the balance of power. His diplomacy was guided by that very idea, but the radicals within his own party, the heirs of Cobden and Bright, with their dislike of what went with the phrase balance of power, kept it from appearing in his parliamentary speeches and memoirs, both of which were designed to defend his diplomacy and the after all disastrous entry of England into the war in 1914.

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monize, with the help of this very concept, the balance of power. If this concept now moves into a new "house of life" in our day, welcomed and adopted by other types and groups in societies, it will retain at least this function.

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PSYCHO-CULTURAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT POLITICAL ACTS

By NATHAN LEITES

DURING recent years there has been a noticeable rise in the production of, and interest in, a relatively new kind of analysis of political behavior. Anthropologists had become increasingly concerned with describing and explaining the entire way of life of the non-literate societies they were studying. Some of them came to believe that cultural anthropology should return to home, *i.e.*, that the methods of observation and recording, and also the theories which they had developed on so-called primitive material should be applied to our own society and other large and complex groups. At the same time, psychologists and psychiatrists had become increasingly interested in describing and explaining the entire way of life, subjective and behavioral, of the individuals they were studying. They tended to be particularly interested, on the one hand, in the broad varieties of human nature ("character types" and "defense mechanisms") and, on the other, in the unique structure of each case. But some of them came to be interested in ascertaining the psychological regularities, if any, in large groups. The confluence of these two developments in the human sciences led to the emergence of what we may call psycho-cultural analyses of social events.[1]

As in many other instances of intellectual change, this development provoked both intensely friendly and hostile reactions. While those involved in the discussion tended to be either "for" or "against" the kind of analysis in question, there was often insufficient clarity and agreement about what the specific points of contention were. In view of this situation, I propose to

[1] [EDITOR'S NOTE. Even today the great body of literature on national character traits is largely impressionistic. What distinguishes the analyses with which Mr. Leites is concerned from the works of say W. Dibelius or P. Cohen-Portheim on English national character is the statement of "psychological regularities in large groups" on the basis of observations systematically made and recorded by trained social scientists. Behavioral regularities in the membership of national groups are obviously of prime significance for the study of world politics.—W. T. R. F.]

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examine with some explicitness a number of the general aspects of the psycho-cultural analysis of political acts. I shall do so by recalling particular representative statements without trying to be systematic or exhaustive.

I

One set of relevant propositions are concerned with how culturally typical political acts are related to the past life experiences of those who perform them. They thus correspond, in the formulation of Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris, to the "genetic propositions" in psychoanalysis which indicate "how any condition . . . has grown out of an individual's past."[2] One major general hypothesis in this area runs as follows: if children adopt a certain reaction in certain emotionally important —usually, but not always, familial—situations, they are later on apt to adopt a similar reaction in structurally analogous political situations.[3]

According to Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn,[4] there is a relationship between the American orientation on "effort and optimism"—presumably an important one in American political behavior—and the following fact: the mother in America offers her love to the child on condition of his fulfilling certain performance standards which the child has a good chance of reaching.[5] According to Ruth Benedict "the will to achieve . . . has little place with Rumanians" whose view of the universe attributes a dominant role to "luck." These adult feelings and behaviors—of obvious political relevance—are related to the fact "that the Rumanian child did not have to earn as a youngest child his mother's unconditional pleasure in him; with the birth

[2] Heinz Hartmann and Ernest Kris, "The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* New York, 1945, I, 11.

[3] This is obviously an incomplete hypothesis. Clearly it is not always true (see below), and clearly it is sometimes true. (Hence, stated without qualifications, it is false.) The question is: Under what particular conditions are adults apt to continue (in a way) certain early patterns? This is the type of question which is now beginning to become central (cf. footnote 22 below). The same considerations are applicable to the further types of psycho-cultural hypotheses to be mentioned below.

[4] Clyde and Florence R. Kluckhohn, "American Culture: Generalized Orientations and Class Patterns," *Conference of Philosophy, Science and Religion,* New York 1946, pp. 106-28.

[5] This point was also conveyed by Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry,* New York, 1943.

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of a next child it was . . . lost . . .; his mother punished him according to her own mood of the moment. Rewards, either from the mother or from other persons, were not given for specific approved acts or for achievements . . . even to 'think' praise was supposed to cast the evil eye. The child did not know what he could do to earn approval."[6]

Statements of this kind raise many questions, such as the following:

(1) If one wants to be very "precise," it is necessary to indicate more specifically under what conditions we will choose to say that the "will to achieve" (or the "orientation on effort") have "little" or "much" place in the life of an individual and of a culture. In both cases we are presumably dealing with continua: the intra-individual continuum ranging from "no" to "total" orientation on effort; the inter-individual continuum ranging from the complete absence of "highly" effort-oriented individuals in a culture to a situation in which all members of a culture are so oriented. When we speak of "high" ("low") in either case, we introduce "arbitrary" cuts in these continua. That is, we decide to say that a society is "highly" effort-oriented if more than a specified number of its members (we may add, members in such and such positions of influence) are "highly" effort-oriented; and we may decide to say that an individual is "highly" effort-oriented if more than a specified number of his acts of certain emotional weight are undertaken with some sense of strain and are intended to produce ulterior results. This, of course, leads to further definitions of "act," "emotional weight," "sense of strain," "intended" (consciously and/or unconsciously?), and so forth. All these definitional operations are required if and only if one wants to make the proposition involved capable of full empirical proof or disproof. The "practical" difficulties one encounters are not different from those one meets in making any proposition "operational" which refers at least in part to "subjective" events.

(2) Suppose we had evolved all the definitions which may be required—*i.e.*, suppose we had translated our hypothesis from "theoretical" into "empirical" language—we would then come

[6] *Rumanian Culture and Behavior*, New York, 1943, p. 54. Distributed by the Institute for Intercultural Studies.

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up against the next obstacle: the appropriate observations have been not at all or only insufficiently made and recorded. The "translation" I spoke of would furnish a statement of the *required* evidence. Its very statement would make it plain that the *available* evidence falls far short of it.[7]

In the current discussion of the kind of statements I am concerned with in this paper one can frequently discern an objection against the utterance (particularly in printed form) of statements for which only quite insufficient evidence is available in proper records. (I am talking here not about the researcher's degree of subjective certainty about how the records would look if they existed, but only about whether they exist.) The answer to the question—which statements should or should not be "admitted" as members of the class of "scientific" statements?—is presumably a decision rather than a factual (true or false) statement. This decision need not be the same in the following two cases:

(a) statements for which available evidence is low, and which are presented without an explicit indication of this;

(b) similar statements which do explicitly indicate the gap between required and available evidence.

Presumably many human scientists object to (a) without objecting (with the same intensity) to (b). Many object to the kind of hypotheses dealt with in this paper because they regard them as falling within class (a). Do we really know scientifically that the Rumanian degree of effort-orientation is significantly lower than the American one?[8]

In part, a failure of communication seems to occur here. My guess is that most of the statements involved are meant by those who advance them as statements of class (b). Possibly those who propose them are rather sure about the outcome of an adequate collection of comparative data concerning Rumanian and American effort-orientation (and may therefore not want to spend too much time on collecting them). But they agree, I think, that, while their points are based on already collected

[7] Cf. Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites, "Some Psychological Hypotheses on Nazi Germany," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XXVI (1947), 143.

[8] Propositions about national differences are of course subject to the suspicion of being derivatives from "stereotypes" which in their turn may be connected with "nationalist" reactions.

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data, sufficient data have not yet been collected. In other words, they advance their statements as hypotheses, often with a high expectation-of-full-verification feeling about them. It may be that the expressions of this feeling prevent many critics from perceiving that everybody agrees on the lack of full evidence.

Both critics and advocates of current psycho-cultural hypotheses about social behavior might, I propose, accept the current usefulness of publicly communicating "mere" hypotheses. Such a communication may foster their fuller disproval, or proof, and promote the invention of other hypotheses, with similar consequences. We are at present still hampered by a lack of explanatory hypotheses about social behavior.

(3) Suppose the difficulties mentioned under (2) had also been resolved: *i.e.*, suppose we had fully established the asserted Rumanian-American differences in (a) child-training patterns (b) adult behaviors. What about the relationship between them? The transition from "correlation" to "causation"[9] implies a "universal proposition" of the logical form "if a, then b." What is the particular universal proposition implied in our instances? In the present style of psycho-cultural analysis this premise is often not stated explicitly—another instance of the elliptic mode of expression already discussed under (2). It is some such sentence as this (I am simplifying it for the purposes of this discussion): if a child is rewarded for efforts undertaken, he is (*caeteris paribus*) more likely to show high effort-orientation as an adult than if he is not so rewarded. (This would be a member of the class of statements affirming the transfer of patterns of feeling and behavior "learned" in early intimate relations to adult social relations.)

Hence, the degree of confirmation of a "psycho-cultural" statement such as the one I chose as an example will depend in part on the degree of confirmation of the implied universal proposition. This will usually be one from "dynamic psychology." Frequently, of course, this premise itself is not yet fully proved. However, here again explicitness about what the premises are and what their present scientific status is would fulfill one version of the requirements of "science." In addition, the present status and rate of progress of dynamic psychology

[9] I am not referring to affirmations about a single cause. Cf. points (4) and (5) below.

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are viewed by a number of specialists in a rather favorable light.

According to Geoffrey Gorer[10] and Ruth Benedict[11] Japanese adults issue complicated and heavily sanctioned prescriptions to the child as to how and where he may or may not move around the house (in American terms, they behave as if most of the house were composed of radiators and as if they were set upon punishing the child for having touched hot radiators). This childhood experience has, it is asserted, an adult sequel which has been of considerable military significance in the late war: Japanese are much disoriented if they find themselves without preparation in an unknown environment; hence the intense striving to "learn" new environments one goes into. Available Rorschach performances indicate that "unforeseen situations, *which cannot be handled by rote, are frightening.*"[12]

A statement of this kind raises the three issues already discussed with the aid of our previous example, and others (which were equally present though not discussed) such as these:

(4) It is not implied that the peculiar Japanese treatment of early locomotion is the sole cause of adult Japanese preferences for situations believed to be thoroughly known.[13] Other childhood experiences—such as certain aspects of sphincter training—probably contribute to the same adult trait.

The type of communication failure mentioned under (2) operates here too. Critics of a particular psycho-cultural hypothesis frequently assume that the condition-factor focussed upon is asserted to be the *sole* cause of the phenomenon. Usually this will not have been meant by the researcher who put the hypothesis forward, though he may not have stated this qualification explictly. It is a frequent fallacy in the human sciences to believe that, if somebody at a certain moment talks about the importance of factor A, he is running down the importance of factors B, C. . .[14]

[10] Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, New York 1943, V, 106-24.

[11] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston, 1946.

[12] Ibid., p. 292.

[13] Frequently, similar cultural results are produced by various combinations of various factors.

[14] Most disagreements about "degrees of importance" of various factors are at present undecidable in this research area, as the term "degree of importance" itself usually does not receive a sufficiently precise definition.

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(5) It is not implied that only intimate ("psychological") childhood events determine adult behavior to the exclusion of various wider ("economic," "political," "social," etc.) aspects of the adult environment. On the contrary, the presumption is that any adult act is related to (a) the predisposition of the individual—which in its turn is connected with his previous experiences from birth (at least) to the present moment; (b) the (human and non-human) environment which contains "stimuli" evoking the act involved.[15]

One may expect an adult's reaction to any given social environment to vary with his predisposition. The close and comparative examination of any given act-in-situation will show that other persons (groups) have responded differently to a similar situation, revealing another of the many potentialities of "human nature." The differences in response can often be related to differences in predisposition rather than to nuances in the current environments which almost always leaves "choices" open. If two culturally contrasting groups are faced with overwhelming odds, one may tend recurrently to submit, the other to fight it out. We may find a link between such propensities and the ways in which parents expected their children to behave in fights with other children.

While predispositions are "important," it is equally true that we may expect the reactions of a number of adults with similar predispositions to vary according to the situations in which they find themselves. Thus, it is entirely compatible with the hypothesis stated above to assume that adult Japanese preferences for known routines are (also) related to the tradition and presence of a socio-political order rewarding (on the whole) compliance with very specific and differentiated rules applying to one's status.

(6) While psycho-cultural analysis of adult political behavior thus does not imply that "childhood" is "all-important," it does—as already conveyed by the examples quoted—affirm that it is "important." In doing so, it can—apart from the speci-

[15] This point has been formulated with particular clarity and force by Harold D. Lasswell, *The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach*, London, 1948, pp. 195-234.

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fic evidence of an increasing number of particular propositions—refer to the following general points:[16]

(a) Acts called political begin to occur (in Western culture at least) late in childhood or even later.

(b) It is a fundamental truism much confirmed by 20th century research that act patterns arising as "late" as that in life are very apt to be noticeably influenced by what happened earlier. Thus, the intimate (and to the adult often "trivial") experiences of the child with the few persons who begin his socialization are apt to influence (mostly unconsciously) the adult when he is concerned with local, regional, national, and world politics.

(7) While patterns of child training are regarded as important in the explanation of political behavior, it is not implied that these patterns in their turn are uninfluenced by such behavior.[17] On the contrary, it is assumed that the behavior of adults towards children is influenced not only by the adults' childhood[18] but also by their current life experiences; and these include politics, or politically determined events (in our culture, increasingly so). Thus the stimulation of competition among siblings by parents may derive in part from the competitive acts of the parents outside the family. In the previously mentioned instance, Japanese parents may model their imposition of rules within the home on their own subjection to political rules outside the home. Also, while Japanese parents "exaggerate the dangers of the house [*i.e.*, the danger of the child's spontaneous movements damaging the house], it is true that Japanese houses are so constructed that "when children can walk they can do a lot of mischief."[19]

It is common knowledge that in recent Anglo-American

[16] Cf. Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, Chicago, 1930.

[17] Psycho-cultural analysis in the late 1930's and 1940's has largely taken child training patterns as given, and focussed on the investigation of their consequences. It is to be expected that the 1950's will drop this limitation, and attempt to develop a richer set of propositions about culture change (including zero change).

[18] This is not a logically circular, but factual "feedback" system. Cf. Gregory Bateson, "Morale and National Character," in Goodwin Watson, ed., *Civilian Morale*, Boston, 1942, pp. 71-91.

[19] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, p. 260. This leads to the further question: What factors have determined the choice of such a fragile house structure? Presumably they were not all "environmental." Little systematic speculation (and less research) has as yet been done on questions of this kind, as implied in footnote 17, above.

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inter-personal relations on various civilian and military levels Americans not infrequently exhibited a type of behavior which Britons called "boasting," while Britons frequently impressed Americans as being "arrogant." Many political scientists with appropriate experiences in the late war would probably agree that this was a politically relevant situation. According to Gregory Bateson[20] and Margaret Mead[21] this is related to certain differences in childhood experiences in the two cultures: "In Britain . . . Father . . . exhibits to his children: he is the model for their future behavior. Father does the talking . . . before a very quiet and submissive audience, in accordance with the . . . ethical disapproval of overuse of strength. He underplays his strength, understates his position, speaks with a slight appearance of hesitation in his manner, but with the cool assurance of one who knows . . . At the American breakfast table, it is not Father but Junior who talks, exhibits his successes and skills, and demands parental spectatorship and applause with an insistence that can be clamoring and assertive because . . . he is speaking from weakness to strength." In adulthood "an American spoke . . . as he had learned to speak when he was small . . . a Briton spoke . . . as he had heard his father and other elders speak . . ."[22]

This statement raises the issues (1) through (7) discussed above, and also some others (equally applicable to our previous examples):

(8) It is not implied that all Britons (Americans) exhibit adult understatement (overstatement) to the same high, or to any high, degree at all periods. Nor is it implied that all Americans (Britons) have been equally vocal (silent) at their early

[20] Bateson, *loc. cit.*

[21] Margaret Mead, *op. cit.*, and in "The Application of Anthropological Techniques to Cross-National Communication." *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences,* Series II, IX (1947), No. 4, pp. 133-52.

[22] Margaret Mead, "The Application of Anthropological Techniques to Cross-National Communication," pp. 136-38. In the American case, there is adult continuation of certain childhood behavior patterns; in the British, an assumption of the adult role which one had first perceived (but not adopted) in childhood. What are the conditions making for invariance in the one case, and change in the other? (That is, what are the conditions making for the choice of different "psychological mechanisms"?) Psycho-dynamics and psycho-cultural analysis have during the last fifteen years enriched our inventory of "solutions" which human beings find in given situations. The 1950's will presumably more systematically attempt to enrich knowledge about the conditions fostering or hampering the adoption of any given solution.

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breakfast tables (which stand, of course, in Bateson-Mead's language for a large number of childhood situations). It is implied that these are "typical" patterns; the existence of "idiosyncrasies" is not denied, nor their possibly vast consequences.[23] We are confronted here with one of those statements which may need greater precision in the fashion discussed under (1). I shall not repeat that discussion, but only add some specific points.

(a) When current psycho-cultural hypotheses imply (or state explicitly) that a certain act is "typical" in a certain culture at a certain time, they do not imply (nor do they deny) that this act is equally typical at other times. Psycho-cultural analysis does not "deny history." On the contrary, it is particularly apt to take account of history as it focusses on the causal role of life experiences rather than of hereditary endowment.[24] Presumably Junior talks more and louder at breakfast tables today in this country than, say, three generations ago. Psycho-cultural analysis is interested in whether this is so, why, and what of it.

(b) When it is asserted that a certain behavior is "typical" in a given culture at a given time, it is not implied that it is equally frequent and emphasized in all sub-groups of this culture. (I am not interested in making the definition of "culture" more precise at this point.[25] I am using the term in a sense which allows us to talk about "American culture," "British culture," "French culture," "Great Russian culture.") It is entirely compatible with psycho-cultural analysis to assume considerable differences, in child training patterns and adult experiences, between various "social classes," regions, ideological groups, or any number of other sets of persons who are all members of a given culture.[26] As the pertinent data are at present largely uncollected (cf. (2) above), it is impossible to say how large

[23] Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly, "The Concept of Culture," in Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, New York, 1946, pp. 87-88.

[24] When a probably inexpedient term like "national character" is used by the researchers here discussed, it carries no connotations of national biological peculiarities. Thus Geoffrey Gorer, *loc. cit.* states: ". . . I have assumed . . . that the genetic peculiarities of the Japanese do not involve any . . . psychological differences from other groups of human beings."

[25] Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly, *loc. cit.*

[26] It is highly likely that such differences "cog into each other," e.g., that each "promotes" the other. That is, it is unlikely that they are "mutually irrelevant." Cf. Bateson, *loc. cit.*

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these intracultural differences are in any given case; presumably cultures vary widely in their degree of internal homogeneity. Some researchers have been impressed by the plausibility of the guess that the various Western national cultures have a higher degree of internal homogeneity than was assumed in previous decades under the influence, *e.g.*, of Marxist hypotheses. Sometimes these researchers have been misunderstood to imply that such an assumption—it is no more than that at the present moment—is, as it were, an axiom of psycho-cultural analysis. It is, of course, just a special (though a major) hypothesis to be "processed" like any other hypothesis. It is in this fashion that one might interpret a point of Ruth Benedict's.[27] One's property, she suggests, is felt as very close to the core of one's self in Dutch culture, "whether the individual belongs to court circles or can only say in the words of a proverbial expression: 'If it's only a penny a year, lay it by.'" On the other hand, one's property is felt as remote from the core of the self in Rumanian culture: "An upper class person may be . . . a pensioner of a wealthy man without loss of status or self-confidence; his property, he says, is not 'himself.' And the poor peasant argues that, being poor, it is futile for him to lay anything by . . ."[28]

(c) When it is asserted that certain behaviors are "typical" in a certain culture, it is not denied that certain subgroups of this culture may show substantial similarities with corresponding subgroups in other cultures. One may choose to use the term "national character" to refer to similarities between members of a sub-group of Western culture called a nation. One may also use the term "class character" to refer to similarities between members of a subgroup of Western culture called a class. Thus certain aspects of the life of a *petit bourgeois* in Tours may be referred to in a "national (French) character" proposition; and others (or sometimes the same?) in a "class (lower middle) character" proposition. The question has often

[27] Ruth Benedict, "The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, VIII (1946), No. 8, pp. 274-79.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 277-78. Presumably the position of a culture on this variable has politically relevant consequences, e.g., as to reactions to politically induced property loss. A somewhat fuller explanation of the political impact of, e.g., the agrarian changes in Rumania after the first war may be thus obtained.

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been asked: do people have more in common with other members of their nation or with the members of some trans-national group, e.g., class? To this one may reply that (1) "more in common" has not yet been well defined, operationally; (2) the pertinent data have not been collected; (3) if they were, the answer would presumably be different in different cases; (4) this question does not seem urgent if we want to decide on the next steps in research.

(d) When it is asserted that a certain behavior is "typical" in a certain culture, it is not implied that there is no other culture in which it is, at the same or some other time, equally "typical." What has hitherto turned out to be rather unique is the syndrome of each culture (the ensemble of its regularities), but not each element of this syndrome. The conscious aversion against hitting the fellow who has already fallen down may be typical in both British and American culture; but it is in each of these cultures related to other distinctive reactions towards violence.

II

As stated above, the propositions hitherto examined were largely concerned with the continuation of certain childhood patterns in adult political activities. There are of course many other and more complex interrelations between early private life and later public life. I shall mention some, with the aim of illustrating current work rather than of being systematic and complete.[29] Take the following two points.

According to Geoffrey Gorer, in contemporary America "custom and votes, other things being equal, go to the man who most adequately demonstrates friendly interest." He relates this to the fact that Americans are "insatiable" in their demands for "the signs of friendship, of love." This in turn is related to the fact that "any occasion on which they are withheld raises the . . . doubt that maybe one is not loveable."[30] And this doubt goes back to the "conditional" character of parental love already mentioned above.

[29] A complete and systematic typology would presumably be isomorphic with one of relationships established in dynamic psychology.

[30] *The American People: A Study in National Character*, New York, 1948, pp. 133-34.

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As to destructiveness,[31] according to Geoffrey Gorer,[32] Burmese admire intensely "successful daring and ingenuity" in exploits of violence (p. 61); the dacoit (outlaw) who specializes in such acts is highly esteemed. The aims for which violence is being used are less stressed: "the Burmese dacoit is to be admired for his violence as such"; various violent Burmese movements had "no program" (p. 43); "two Burmese policemen . . . quarrelled about the merits of two . . . *danseuses* . . . the crowd, relishing the absurdity of the thing, backed up the quarrel with such energy . . . that . . . a ward in the infirmary was filled."[33] Further, "the use of violence for long-term ends (such as railroad sabotage to produce a bottleneck twelve months hence) would probably seem nonsensical and repulsive to the Burmese" (p. 60). Violence tends to be accompanied by looting. There is a tendency to use violence also in situations "with no hopes of success." Violence tends to be set off with little premeditation: " . . . accidentally, usually in a crowd, a spark will set off a fight which will sweep like a forest fire through the people present" (p. 41); " . . . folk tales and plays are full of situations in which a character feels a sudden desire to commit some unlawful act . . . and immediately proceeds to commit the act" (p. 38); Burmese quite consciously entertain "the belief that temptation is irresistible" (p. 38). There is a pattern of "running amok." "Drunken Burmese are said to become aggressive" (p. 52). In addition, "Burmese violence is easier to start than stop" (p. 60). As a counterpart to these traits "there are practically no professional criminals" (p. 39). In the case of adult outbursts of criminality "no explanation is apparently given or required" (p. 38).

This adult handling of violence is related to various experiences of the Burmese child. "The preponderant relationship in childhood is between the boy and his mother" (p. 31). There is evidence for "the Burmese woman's unwillingness to bear children" (p. 29). "The nursing situation is unemotional . . .

[31] Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World," *Psychiatry*, X (1947), No. 2, 167-82.

[32] Geoffrey Gorer, *Burmese Personality*, New York, 1945. Distributed by the Institute for Intercultural Studies.

[33] *Ibid.*, quoting Sir James G. Scott, p. 42.

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the mother talking or transacting her other business while the infant suckles" (p. 29). During the first two years of life the Burmese mother, "firm and business-like" (p. 33), gives her child "good-humored, cool, rather impersonal efficient succorance" (p. 32). "Most of the time baby does not get much attention . . . most of the time he will be left alone . . . near to mother" (p. 32). After a long nursing period, the child is weaned, usually at the birth of the next sibling: "The child is apparently just pushed away, perhaps with some verbal admonitions . . . A period of crying and babyish behavior is expected from the weaned baby . . . nothing is done about this; the child is just left to recover" (p. 30). Similarly, as to the frequent temper tantrums of the male child, set off by maternal refusal to accede to the boy's demands: "The mother does nothing in the face of these temper tantrums, waiting for the child to recover its equanimity without action or consoling word . . . the boy will be allowed to kick and scream until he exhausts himself" (p. 32). However, "there are no situations in which it is permissible to answer back at or interrupt . . . [the] parents, much less show any overt aggression" (p. 34).

While, thus, the Burmese mother usually exhibits little affection towards her young child, she will sometimes become "intensely . . . affectionate, playing with the child, tickling it . . . nuzzling it . . . Very often in these bursts of loving the mother will massage the baby all over with oil . . . even playing with the baby's genitals" (p. 32). At other times "she will tease the child . . . " 'making him cry and lose control' " (p. 32). The mother acts as her "whim" suggests it. Transitions between these various rather contrasting behaviors are apt to be sudden and quick; the length of each spell short, irregular, unpredictable.

What are the relationships between these various aspects of Burmese child training and the adult Burmese handling of violence? They are probably manifold and require for their elucidation—in the fashion discussed under (3)—a number of special propositions of dynamic psychology. Space, and the purpose of this paper, preclude a full statement of this matter.

First, the previously illustrated pattern of continuing early reactions is present here too: some aspects of Burmese adult

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violence may be continuations of early temper tantrum behavior. As temper tantrums made no impression on mother, adult tantrums may be gone through "with no hopes of success."

Second, another type of relationship involved here is as follows: adults are apt to react in wider relations in ways in which adults had acted towards them when they were children, in intimate relations. The Burmese mother does not explain the deprivations she inflicts on her child. The Burmese man does not explain acts of violence.

Third, the following relation seems to be involved: adult (political) behavior may in part act out infantile strivings which had been interfered with, or not sufficiently gratified.

The insatiable love demand of the American child may thus be striving for satisfaction when it is desired that "the smallest purchase should be accompanied by a smile . . .[and that] the weightiest business or political conference . . . [should] start with those greetings and anecdotes which demonstrate that the conferers like one another."[34]

The Burmese mother[35] presumably arouses intense rage towards her in her child in a variety of ways. She also promotes intense repression, by the child, of his own rage by her impassivity (invulnerability) and by prohibiting overt aggression against herself (both of these behaviors also contribute to the intensity of the child's rage). At the same time her erratic and (to the child) unloving behavior hampers the development of strong powers of reason and conscience in the child. (The "weak" role of the Burmese father in the family works in the same direction.) Hence, the Burmese adult is able to go through with acts of destructiveness not so much when reason and conscience can be brought to approve them as when these restraints can be put out of action: in a crowd, in a fugue state, under alcohol. The connection between the seizure of somebody else's property (in kleptomania or looting) and rage about unsatisfied early love-demands is well established. The "close shave" reduces anxiety about retaliation (I made it) and alleviates guilt (I exposed myself).

[34] Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People*, p. 133.

[35] I am now adding some specific hypotheses about the interrelations between Burmese childhood and adulthoood to Mr. Gorer's points.

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A fourth type of relationship can be illustrated by the following point. According to Erik Homburger Erikson[36] one of the major aspects of the image of Hitler in Nazi Germany was that of "an adolescent who never gave in." This is related to idiosyncratic aspects of Hitler's life and fantasy; and to typical aspects of life and fantasy in German middle class youth in the first half of the 20th century.

In *Mein Kampf*, "Hitler spends a considerable and heated portion of his first chapter in the description of how 'no power on earth could make an official' out of him . . . This was his father's greatest wish . . ." (p. 477). He did not become a *Beamter*.

In his *Sturm und Drang* phase "the German boy would rather have died than be made aware of the fact that . . . [his rebellion] would . . . lead to exhaustion. The identification with the father which had been . . . established in childhood would come to the fore. In intricate ways *Fate* would . . . make a *Buerger* out of the boy—a 'mere citizen' with an eternally bad conscience . . ." (p. 480).

This represents a type of proposition related to that discussed just before: somebody else's (here a leader's) adult political behavior may in part act out strivings of the self which had been interfered with, or not sufficiently gratified; and this may foster positive reactions towards that other person.

To state a fifth type of relationship, Rudolph M. Loewenstein's discussion of anti-semitism[37] suggests the following sequence (in the terminology of psychoanalysis): the power-relations between the diaspora Jews and their human environment may have reinforced those aspects of Jewish child-training which in their turn induced a Jewish "compulsive character . . . based on . . . the repression of aggressive impulses" (p. 345). The "contemporary German compulsive character . . . based on 'sphincter morals' [*i.e.*, the repression of 'anal' rather than 'sadistic' strivings]" (p. 345) used the Jews as targets for the re-projection, and subsequent destruction, of its superego: "Jews have represented for the Nazis . . . those who repress aggression

[36] "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, V (1942), No. 4, 475-93.

[37] "The Historical and Cultural Roots of Anti-Semitism," in *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, Geza Roheim, ed., New York, 1947, pp. 313-56.

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and, like Christ, suffer for the faults of others. They are the incarnation of the tendency of their own superego to repress aggression" (p. 346).

This represents a type of proposition related to that discussed just before. In contrast to the preceding proposition it is concerned with intercultural rather than intracultural relations; and with the basis of negative rather than positive interpersonal reactions.

III

The propositions discussed hitherto were all, as indicated above, concerned with relationships between the present and an ostensibly remote and irrelevant past. Besides such "genetic" statements there are "dynamic" ones which, in the words of Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris[38] "are concerned with the interaction . . . of forces within the individual and with their reaction to the external world, at any given time or during brief time spans" (p. 11).

Thus, Geoffrey Gorer[39] and Ruth Benedict[40] recall the polarized reactions, in pre-occupation Japan, towards the Emperor (against whom no negative reactions were expressed) and other members of the political elite (against whom such reactions were easily, frequently and intensely expressed). They also recall the Japanese propensity to consider as hostile towards the Emperor behaviors which were ostensibly either slips (*e.g.*, in the ceremonial readings of Imperial rescripts) or unrelated to the Emperor (*e.g.*, a railway man temporarily and without consequences misplaces a signal while the Imperial train is somewhere within the wider area). As to polarized reactions to the political elite apart from the Emperor, these authors mention the coexistence of "fanatic discipline" and gross insubordination towards military authorities.

This entire pattern of submission-revolt is related to the presence of intense, and intensely warded off, hostilities towards authority figures, dealt with by the mechanisms (among others) known in the language of psychonalysis as reaction-formation

[38] Hartmann and Kris, *loc. cit.*

[39] "Themes in Japanese Culture," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, New York, 1943, V, 106-24.

[40] *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, loc. cit.*

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(going to the opposite of an objectionable striving) and decomposition of ambivalence (splitting up the mixed feelings towards a given object between at least two).

A special set of "dynamic" propositions in psycho-cultural analysis indicates those interrelations between culturally typical acts which are in themselves culturally typical. An instance of this was the proposition just mentioned that the Japanese "choice" between available "psychological mechanisms" prefers (though, of course, not exclusively) reaction formation and decomposition of ambivalence.

Another instance would be the previously implied proposition that the Japanese "choice" between available life aspects stresses the continuum submission-revolt (Japanese acts cluster towards both ends of this continuum).[41]

Available "genetic" propositions in psycho-cultural analysis—which formed the bulk of the examples in this paper—almost always deal with the conditions of one or a few culturally typical acts. Similarly, available "dynamic" propositions deal with the interrelations within a very limited set of acts which is usually much smaller than the list of variables we are interested in. (While we may have some hypotheses about the interrelations between Japanese reactions to the Emperor and to the "rascals around the throne," we may not have any hypotheses about the interrelations between these reactions and those, say, of an employer towards his employees.) The advance of psycho-cultural research may furnish more genetic explanations of more complicated dynamically explained syndromes.

[41] Cf. Bateson's, *loc. cit.*, formulation: "We shall not describe varieties of character... in terms of . . . [their] position on a continuum between extreme dominance and extreme submissiveness, but we shall instead try to use . . . some such continua as 'degree of interest in . . . dominance-submission.'"

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REVIEW ARTICLES

THE GERMAN QUESTION

By WALDEMAR GURIAN

Gustav Stolper, *German Realities,* New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948, pp. x, 341. $3.75.

James P. Warburg, *Germany—Bridge or Battleground,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1947, pp. xi, 386. $3.50.

Lewis H. Brown, *Report on Germany,* New York, Farrar Straus, 1947, pp. xv, 247. $3.00.

Hoyt Price and Carl E. Schorske, *The Problem of Germany,* New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, pp. xxv, 161. $2.00.

Wilhelm Röpke, *The Solution of the German Problem,* tr. by E. W. Dickes, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1947, pp. xv, 282. $3.00.

THE extraordinarily difficult, almost exasperating character of the German Question is created by its many various aspects. There is the economic one: what are the relations between German and European, as well as world economies? Would not an economically strong Germany upset foreign markets and make other countries dependent upon her? There is the political issue: what ought to be the position of Germany in Europe? Is Germany able and willing to participate in a balance of power system, or would she invariably try to use her power exclusively for her own advantage? What role will Germany play in the conflict between East and West? There are problems of German internal organizations and frontiers: is a unified Germany not a constant threat to world peace? But does not a dismemberment of Germany create an eternal irredenta? There are moral and intellectual issues: what role has National Socialism played in German history? Will it not come back again, perhaps under another name, as soon as some external restraints are removed? Or is National Socialism, with its aggression and terror, only an accident for which non-Germans are at least as responsible as the Germans themselves? Have we the right to make Germans particularly accountable for a general development which only manifested itself first in Germany, and victimized the German people itself?

These are a few of the most important aspects of the German Question. At the end of World War II, American public opinion tended to take a moral and punitive-defensive attitude towards Germany. To make a new Nazi German aggression impossible was regarded as the most important task. Therefore German political and economic organization had to be re-

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arranged, and those German groups which had made Nazism possible were to be removed from all influential positions. Industrial Germany was to be replaced, as the Morgenthau Plan demanded, by an agricultural country. The Nazis were to be punished for their participation in the crimes ordered by Hitler. But this approach was opposed from the beginning by another which has today become definitely predominant: Germany's prosperity is required not only for her needs but for those of European recovery. The famous arguments first made by Keynes after the Treaty of Versailles reappeared: without German industry no reconstruction of the world, particularly of Europe, can be achieved. The American taxpayer, it is added, cannot be expected to spend huge sums each year in order to keep alive a de-industrialized Germany. And further: rehabilitation of Germany will be a blow against the Communist U.S.S.R. The Soviets will be prevented from taking over a Germany pauperized by the Morgenthau Plan, a Germany which would have aligned itself with them after a bitter disappointment by the West. The punitive demands are opposed by the necessity to forgive and forget, by the stories that other powers after all acted no better than Germany, that the U.S.S.R. is the most ruthless totalitarian state, and that even sinners must be given a chance to redeem themselves—if one can at all regard the Germans, who were Hitler's first victims, as sinners.

The book of Gustav Stolper, *German Realities,* is characteristic of this evolution, whose adherents regard former Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau as a kind of devil. His views are vigorously rejected as having exercised a most nefarious influence. Before 1933 the late Gustav Stolper was a member of the German Reichstag—he played a role in the small democratic group—and a well-known economic editor. He died last year, a few months after having completed his work as advisor to Herbert Hoover on a mission to Germany.

The basic thoughts of his very skillfully written volume run as follows: First, the dilettante view on relations with the Soviet Union which prevailed during World War II permitted Stalin to take over very large parts of Germany in payment only for agreements promising the introduction of democracy and economic unity in Germany—agreements which the Soviets manifestly had no intention of keeping. Secondly, the nature of Nazism was misunderstood. It was simply identified with Germany; it was not recognized as a totalitarian ideology and movement whose first victims were the Germans themselves. Thirdly, a legalistic and bureaucratic approach was applied to economic problems as well as to political issues. Uneconomic concepts concerning the de-industrialization and demilitarization of Germany were predominant. For purposes of disarmament a political control is sufficient in Germany. All industries can be changed easily into war industries, therefore a reduction of the so-called 'war potential' is meaningless. It was overlooked that German de-industrialization would do harm not only to Germany alone. The obsession with the alleged danger from Germany prevented any understanding of the biological

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damage suffered by Germany, which rules her out, even after a recovery, from the rank of a dangerous potential aggressor. Fourthly, but fortunately, even under the vengeful Directive GCS 1067-6, "a disaster involving perhaps a score of a million lives was prevented by the invading allies . . . that within hours or days a minimum of civil order was restored, out of the complete chaos, and life kept going amidst the ruins, for this the German people owe the Western victors a debt of gratitude which has rarely been recognized in the distress and disappointment of the following months and years" (page 67). And since 1947, though perhaps too late, a reasonable attitude prevails which regards German industrial production and general economic recovery as necessary for the recovery of Europe and the world.

Stolper rejects not only a political separation of the Ruhr territory from Germany, but also its being put under international control. Such an international control would not work on account of the negative attitude of the German workers involved, as well as on account of the impossibility of reaching positive agreements among the controlling powers in the long run. Stolper rejects the views which make Prussian militarism and German Big Business responsible for the Nazis. He regards Nazism as an international totalitarian movement which, through a particularly ruthless group and its unscrupulous methods, conquered Germany. He points out that foreign blindness, even sympathies, made the initial successes of Hitler possible, which were the first steps toward war.

Stolper's book will interest even those who will regard some of its views as too much influenced by "special pleading." It is surely true, for instance, that oversimplified accusations are made against German Big Business which allegedly put the Nazis into the saddle. But on the other hand, to say that only Thyssen among business leaders was a Nazi before 1933, is to fall into the opposite simplification. Stolper must have heard, for instance, about such a man as Kirdorf, who had great authority among the Ruhr industrialists and who was a fervent supporter of the Leader. Schacht was no lone wolf in turning to the Nazis before 1933.

It is regrettable that Stolper does not more closely analyze the factors which made the rise of Nazism in Germany possible and permitted many for a long time to believe that German national traditions were indissolubly linked with Hitler and his government. Somewhat in contradiction to his general view which regards Nazism as a kind of accident, Stolper casually mentions that Hitler fulfilled the wishes of groups uprooted after the defeat in 1918, and that the Nazi "coordination" of German life was made easier by the great influence of German governmental agencies in German economic life.

But even those who must disagree with Stolper's attempt to minimize the difference between German and non-German political and social developments will read his book with profit. His chapter on "German Population Development" contains very valuable information which is based on the work of Professor H. Sauermann of Frankfurt-am-Main. True, it must be regretted that the German population development is not com-

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pared with the effects of the German policy of genocide on the development of the population in other countries. Excellent are the descriptions of the policies in the Soviet and French zones. Stolper's general attitude towards economic questions is that of a moderate liberal opposed to bureaucracy, planning, and socialization. On the one hand, Stolper apparently does not believe in the imminence of war with Russia. On the other hand, he does not see any possibility of a compromise with the U.S.S.R. Therefore he assumes that there will be a split between Western and Eastern Germany. It is obvious to him that Western Germany must become a fully integrated part of Western Europe.

Differing from Gustav Stolper, James P. Warburg bases his book, *Germany—Bridge or Battleground,* on some hope that a Soviet understanding with the West may be possible. He emphasizes that a development which would make Germany a factor for conflict between East and West would be fatal. A compromise "must be achieved by direct meetings of the minds without either side seeking to win the support of the Germans against the other, and it must be a compromise which applies to all of Germany" (page 236). It is quite obvious that such reasonable views are at the moment not realistic. But that ought not to prevent the consideration of Warburg's book as a valuable description of the developments in postwar Germany up to 1947. His tone is much more moderate than that of Gustav Stolper, who apparently has always regarded a conflict with the Soviet Union as unavoidable and has little sympathy for the difficulties which face leaders of a wartime coalition. But Warburg too is an opponent of the de-industrialization policy of Morgenthau, and he criticizes the policy accepted for Eastern Germany which permitted mass expulsions and which cut off too much of Germany's territory. He sketches the intellectual and educational backgrounds of German authoritarianism. But these chapters are much too brief, and therefore touch only the surface. On the whole, it is a book which may be used for purposes of introducing general information. In its appendix it reprints many important documents, as does Stolper's book. Warburg has surely not written so brilliant and personal a book as that of the late German economist. On the other hand, though it suffers from a somewhat pedestrian, and journalistic character, it is much more free of passion and prejudice.

Report on Germany, by Louis H. Brown, the well-known chairman of the Johns-Mansville Corporation, deserves attention as an impressive illustration of how the American practical mind turns today to concrete proposals concerning German reconstruction. Its proposals are very simple and direct: reduction of German production capacity must stop; the western zones must be unified; obstacles which prevent direct participation of the German people in their economic recovery must be removed; reparations and denazification policies must be regarded as ended; Germany must be invited to participate in the Marshall Plan Conferences; controls over German economic life ("Schachtism") must be abolished; the United States ought to stay in Berlin and not give in to Russia.

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Brown is inclined to believe that Russia "will not go to war and will wait at least the outcome of the next few years" (page 137). He assumes, too, that a political control will be sufficient for German demilitarization. It may be noted that Brown has not devoted too much attention to German labor problems. He apparently had no contacts with German labor leaders or union representatives. There are some oversimplifying statements in the book. In the chapter "The German Situation Today," written by Mr. William C. Bober, an economic advisor of Mr. Brown, one reads: "We can let elected officials reign. But the best brains of Germany we can find, appointed by Uncle Sam who is destined to foot the bill, should rule under our hand. In such a government the German masses would have confidence" (page 54). Fortunately the book contains many descriptions of the life in Germany which do not justify this kind of primitive advice.

The student of Germany anxious to have a detached analysis of her present situation will obviously prefer the volume edited by the Council on Foreign Relations, *The Problem of Germany,* to the volume of Brown which, despite all good will and praiseworthy intentions, makes a dilettante impression. The study of Hoyt Price on the "Economic Aspects of the German Problem" condenses in a comparatively few pages a great wealth of information; and this information is presented in such a way that the reader is aware that the author has no axe to grind. Price attempts to point out means of combining the recovery of world economics with the regaining of economic health by Germany. Six chapters deal respectively with the "German food problem" (the consequences of the loss of the eastern breadbasket are emphasized); "Raw Materials for German Industry" ("disarmament accomplished by de-industrialization is costly and will damage not only Germany but also European reconstruction"—page 56); "International Control of the Ruhr" (whose prospects are judged rather skeptically); "Rebuilding the German Transportation System"; "The Need for Currency Reform." The second part of the book contains a discussion of the "Social and Cultural Aspects of the German Problem" by Carl E. Schorske. The starting point is the relation between authoritarian nationalism so important in modern German history, and the German middle class. The present intellectual and cultural situation is described, using German sources. Some information on churches and educational policies is given. Correctly emphasized is the role played by various forms of escapism, often very noble ones, and a certain conservatism in some church circles, particularly in Protestant ones. Schorske complains about the isolationism in which German intellectuals continue to live, and the necessity of building up cultural exchanges with Germany, including a flow of literature as well as exchanges of students, professors, etc. The extent to which Germany is kept out of contact with the outside world is shown by Schorske's own study. He mentions titles of German books which he could not obtain, and he uses comparatively few issues of the *Frankfurter Hefte.* He apparently did not have at his disposal the issue

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of the *Frankfurter Hefte* containing the famous letter of Ida Goerres on the church, one of the most important documents about the religious situation in Germany. His study is not very optimistic in its outlook. He emphasizes at the end that only cooperation among the great powers can prevent the rebirth of new anti-democratic forces. The victors ought to renounce attempts to build Germany after their own image, for their own purposes. "The alternative" is the rise of "two undemocratic Germanies" which will be "instruments of our mutual destruction."

Wilhelm Röpke's attempt to present *The Solution of the German Problem* emphasizes, as Schorske does, its cultural-historical basis. German society of 1933 was a sick society, and therefore particularly ready to accept the totalitarian poison which in itself is not specifically German, but can be observed—as Benjamin Constant's analysis of Napoleon's system shows—in all tyrannies. Röpke regards the victory of Prussianism, established by the unification of Germany in Bismarck's Great Prussian Reich, as the fatal event in modern German history. Hitler appears as the heir of Bismarck—an opinion not shared by many Germans. They differentiate between Bismarck who, despite all amoralistic features, belonged to the conservative world, and the nihilist Nazis. In any case, Röpke's book, written with much passion and with many highly personal digressions, is a very able expression of German federalist anti-Bismarckian views, too little known outside Germany, and even inside. Röpke pitilessly takes to task those German intellectuals who either submitted to Hitler or tried to justify his tyranny—but he is as outspoken in his rejection of those non-Germans who, until a world war was unavoidable, misunderstood Hitler's system completely.

What is his solution of the German Problem? A moral regeneration—*return to pre-Bismarckian decentralizing traditions; reestablishment of* political-social units corresponding to the various natural-traditional groups into which the German people is divided and which were submerged by Prussian centralism and by the artificial units created in modern Germany; abolition of unnecessary and unhealthy collectivism; reliance upon individual and group initiative. Röpke, with Hayek, regards socialism as a fatal modern illness leading to serfdom and domination by small ruthless groups. He is for a peace treaty with the various German states, and not with an artificially established central government, though he advises the formation of a German confederation. The anti-socialistic strictures will be most intelligible to the American reader in this book which is full of brilliant sidelights and shrewd observations; but on the other hand, its federalistic, anti-centralistic program may appear to a large part of the American public as a return to medievalism. But that would be a wrong impression—for Röpke is one of the most astute students of modern economic theory, and his book contains a very ingenious discussion of the requirements of a currency reform under present conditions in Germany.

The five books reviewed are written by authors of very different back-

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ground and with most different political philosophies (sometimes presented in a subtle, sometimes in a crude naive form). But all agree: Germany's recovery is necessary for European recovery. They emphasize the necessity of linking up Germany with the western world—though some hope that a break with the U.S.S.R. may be avoided. All are amazed and appalled, in spite of all differences in their interpretations of German history and responsibility, by the bureaucracy to be observed under the occupation. None of them seems to fear that there is or may rise again a material basis for German aggressiveness which has to be destroyed by surgery, by de-industrialization. All complain about the division of Germany into zones, the errors committed in the provisional settlement concerning Germany's eastern frontier, which brought about a mass influx of refugees into western Germany. And all are inclined to regard what has been done in Germany up to now as unsatisfactory, as at best preparing through trial and error better solutions, helpful for Germany as well as for Europe and the world.

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THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF E. H. CARR

By HANS MORGENTHAU

Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939,* London, Macmillan, 1939, pp. xv, 313. $2.50.
Edward Hallett Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. xxiv, 282. $3.00.
Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After,* New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. 76. $1.25.
Edward Hallett Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World,* New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. viii, 113. $2.00.

IF peace and security are the earmarks of a successful foreign policy, the foreign policies pursued since the end of the first World War by the great Western powers were certainly less successful than any pursued by these powers since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. To say this, of course, is only to state the obvious. That the succession of failures is rooted in a marked decline in the political intelligence of the Western world is less obvious. Yet the recognition of that relationship is decisive for the understanding of the disease which holds the modern state system in its grip.

We are in the fortunate position of being able to read that intellectual decline from the testimony of its main representatives on the contemporary scene: Neville Chamberlain in Great Britain, Cordell Hull and James Byrnes in the United States. What strikes the reader of Professor Feiling's biography of Neville Chamberlain and of Messrs. Hull's and Byrnes' accounts of their conduct of American foreign affairs is not that they made mistakes, but that what they advance in defense of their policies convicts them of a fundamental misconception of what foreign policy is all about. In order to feel the whole impact of this difference in the quality of political thought one needs only pause to reflect that it fell to Neville Chamberlain to play in the initial stage of the Second World War a role similar to the one which William Pitt had to perform in the initial phase of the war against Napoleon, and that the historic mission of Hull and Byrnes at the end of the Second World War was not dissimilar to the one which Castlereagh and Canning had to discharge at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Pitt was guilty of great errors of judgment and his strength was in domestic rather than in foreign affairs; Castlereagh was pedestrian and far from brilliant; only Canning's conduct of British foreign policy had the touch of genius. On the other hand, Chamberlain, Hull, and Byrnes were hardly the inferiors of their counterparts of more than a century before in intellectual equipment and domestic achievement. How, then, is one to explain their blindness to the realities of international affairs?

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That blindness is their common possession. It manifests itself in Neville Chamberlain in the conviction that all men will act like businessmen from Birmingham and that international politics is in its essence a series of business transactions among peoples speaking different tongues. In Cordell Hull that blindness takes the form of an unquestioning faith in the simple virtues which all statesmen ought to practice and whose absence in some of them calls for moral indignation and exhortation. To James Byrnes international politics appears as a succession of cloak-room meetings where members of different parties apply the tricks of the parliamentary trade to the business at hand. What gives this decline of political intelligence in international affairs its true perspective is the well-nigh general approval with which policies, inspired by such conceptions, met when they were initiated. It was only when the disasters in which Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy culminated became obvious that public opinion turned against him; when he returned from Munich public opinion greeted him as a second Disraeli. As long as Cordell Hull officiated, he was generally regarded as one of our greatest secretaries of state; it is only the intellectual barrenness and the political primitivity of his memoirs which is raising widespread doubts in the qualities of a foreign policy thus lacking in intellectual penetration. As for Mr. Byrnes, the criticism of his foreign policy has hardly yet reached down to the foundations of his thinking on foreign affairs.

It is from this background of the general decay of political thinking on international affairs that the work of Edward Hallett Carr receives its importance. That importance is great and is so on two counts. Explicitly, Carr's work provides a most lucid and brilliant exposure of the faults of contemporary political thought in the Western world. Implicitly, Carr's work presents a case study in the decline of Western political thought. By exposing the defects of that thought, it exposes its own share in them. In a dual sense, then, Carr's work is significant for the crisis of Western political thought, especially in so far as it concerns international affairs. On the one hand, it analyzes with unsurpassed brilliance the symptoms and some of the causes of the disease. On the other, it points up in its own shortcomings the extent and the import of the disease.

Of the four books which constitute Mr. Carr's major contribution to political thought, one, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* is primarily diagnostic and critical; the three others, *Conditions of Peace, Nationalism and After,* and *The Soviet Impact on the Western World,* are intended to be primarily constructive and to offer a cure for the disease.

The foundation upon which the critical analysis of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is built is the juxtaposition of utopianism and realism. In its period of immaturity, all science goes through a utopian stage "in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyze facts and means weak or non-existent." (page 8) That initial stage is succeeded by a period of realism which is able "to distinguish the analysis of what is from aspiration about what should be." (page 13) Realism "places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes

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and consequences." (page 14) The experiences of the inter-war years revealed the weakness of the utopian approach to international politics and made its realistic analysis both possible and imperative. Yet a mature political science must combine utopian and realistic thought, purpose and analysis, ethics and politics.

According to Mr. Carr, "the exposure by realistic criticism of the hollowness of the utopian edifice is the most urgent task of the moment in international thought." (page 113) "Clearly all popular post-war theories of international politics are reflections, seen in an American mirror, of nineteenth-century liberal thought." (page 37) Mr. Carr finds the utopian element in the belief that "nineteenth century liberal democracy was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and of the countries concerned, but on certain *a priori* rational principles which had only to be applied in other contexts to produce similar results." (page 37)

This writer has no quarrel with Mr. Carr's detailed analysis, in the light of these assumptions, of the main modes of international thought and of the institutional devices which were carried from the domestic scene of the nineteenth century to the international scene of the twentieth. The League of Nations, harmony of interests, collective security, identification of the national interest with the universal good—are indeed classic examples of a utopian rationalism which erects limited experiences and interests into absolute principles and deduces from those principles solutions capable of universal application. "What matters is that these supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interests at a particular time . . . The bankruptcy of utopianism resides not in its failure to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs." (page 111)

Yet while Mr. Carr destroys the nineteenth century legacy of political thought, he knows that realism is not enough. "Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment, and a ground for action." (page 113) "Having demolished the current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new utopia of our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons. The human will will continue to seek an escape from the logical consequences of realism in the vision of an international order which, as soon as it crystallizes itself into concrete political form, becomes tainted with self-interest and hypocrisy, and must once more be attacked with the instruments of realism." (page 118)

Thus Mr. Carr, the realist, sets out in search of a new utopia, and all his subsequent thinking becomes the Odyssey of a mind which has discovered the phenomenon of power and longs to transcend it. That search for principles which can give moral meaning, and set normative limits, to the

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struggle for power on the international scene brings Mr. Carr back to where he started from: to power itself.

That return to power takes on four different aspects in different periods of Mr. Carr's thinking: appeasement of Germany in *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* the postulate of a strong collectivist state in *Conditions of Peace,* the sacrifice of the small nations to the great powers in *Nationalism and After,* fascination by the Soviet Union in *The Soviet Impact on the Western World.*

In *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* the last word of international morality is the demand for self-sacrifice. That demand is addressed particularly to the beneficiaries of the status quo. They must give up some of their advantages, not only to those who seek adjustments within the framework of the existing status quo, but also and primarily to those who challenge the existence and justice of that status quo itself. "The process of give-and-take must apply to challenges to the existing order. Those who profit most by that order can in the long run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least. And the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place as far as possible in an orderly way rests as much on the defenders as on the challengers." (page 215) In consequence, "a successful foreign policy must oscillate between the apparently opposite poles of force and appeasement." (page 284) The Munich settlement of September 29, 1938, then, becomes a modern paradigm of a successful foreign policy thus defined, and Neville Chamberlain, the prototype of a statesman combining the elements of realism and utopianism in his thought and action. "The element of power was present" in that settlement. "The element of morality was also present in the form of the common recognition by the powers . . . of a criterion applicable to the dispute: the principle of self-determination . . . The change in itself was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium of forces and to accepted canons of international morality." (page 282)

The Twenty Years' Crisis was in page proof when the Second World War broke out; *Conditions of Peace* was in the press when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war and Germany and Japan were at the summit of their power. *The Twenty Years' Crisis* attacked the application of the nineteenth century philosophy of liberal democracy to international affairs; *Conditions of Peace* examines that philosophy in all its manifestations and finds it wanting. More determinedly and more seriously than even *The Twenty Years' Crisis, Conditions of Peace* is permeated with the conviction that the twentieth century is fundamentally different from the century that preceded it and that there could be a turning-back to the nineteenth century modes of thought and action only at the risk of catastrophic failure. The democracies were satisfied to defend the domestic and international status quo with the outworn ideas and institutions of the nineteenth century. Thus it fell to Bolshevism and Fascism to offer the world a new political order. "Soviet Russia, soon

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to be followed by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, found in 'planned economy' the new twentieth-century concept which was to replace nineteenth-century liberalism; and having gained the initiative, these countries at length compelled the conservative Powers to follow slowly and reluctantly in their train." (xx) The idealists of the English-speaking world transform themselves into the reactionaries of the twentieth century, "carried away by the last expiring convulsions of a world revolution which set in 150 years ago" and putting themselves "in opposition to the new world revolution which first broke through the crust of the existing order in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917." (page 7) Hitler, the Napoleon of the twentieth century, "has consummated the work, which Marx and Lenin had begun, of overthrowing the nineteenth-century capitalistic system . . . and in this sense his work, like that of Napoleon, cannot and will not be undone." (pages 9, 10)

The revolution of the twentieth century is directed against liberal democracy, national self-determination, and *laissez-faire* economics. The revolutionary challenge to democracy and national self-determination must be met by re-definition and re-interpretation. The challenge to nineteenth century economics must be met by a planned economy. It is here that the foremost task of revolutionary renewal is to be found. Democratic forms and political rights have been rendered illusory by the overriding force of economic power. "Under existing democratic institutions, the will of the unorganised majority is impotent to assert itself against the domination of organised economic power. It has come to be widely believed today, and with much plausibility, that the attitudes and policies of political parties in most democratic countries are determined only in a minor degree by the opinions of the electorate which they purport to represent, and in a major degree by the vested interests which supply the bulk of the party funds. In other words, national policy on vital issues is really settled, as Marx alleged, not by a democratic counting of votes, but by the result of a perpetual struggle for power between rival economic interests . . . " (pages 27-28) "Democracy must be re-defined as a system of government based on political rights valid not merely against military, but against economic, power." (page 23) To make planning possible, we must search for a "moral purpose powerful enough to generate self-sacrifice on the scale requisite to enable civilization to survive." (page 119) Communism, like Christianity, has such a moral purpose. "The cooperation between the Western peoples and Soviet Russia in the war should help to resolve the antithesis, incidental rather than fundamental, between the secular ideals of Christianity and those of Communism." (page 121) In both the domestic and the international spheres, the traditional emphasis upon rights and benefits must be replaced by stress on obligations and services.

These themes are more fully developed in *Nationalism and After,* published at the end of the Second World War, and in *The Soviet Impact on the Western World,* published in 1947 when the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western world had reached unprecedented depths. Mr. Carr

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makes a convincing case for the assertion that twentieth century nationalism differs profoundly from its nineteenth century predecessor. This difference is a result of three factors: "the bringing of new social strata within the effective membership of the nation, the visible reunion of economic with political power, and the increase in the number of nations." (page 18) "The combination of these factors has found expression in two world wars, or two installments of the same world war, in a single generation, and has imparted to them a peculiar quality of embittered exasperation for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in any war in history." (page 27) "The failure to create an international community of nations on the basis of international treaties and international law marks the final bankruptcy of nationalism in the West." (page 32)

Mr. Carr detects a retrogression of unbridled nationalism in certain tendencies which have become visible during the Second World War, such as the widespread collaboration with the German conqueror and the acceptance of a new supra-national order. The nation as the final unit of international organization has been made obsolete by modern military and economic developments. The self-sufficient nation can no longer assure to its members military security or economic well-being. National self-determination, in particular, applied without regard to such military and economic considerations, has become an anarchical force destructive of international order. The solution, according to Mr. Carr, lies in the separation of non-political from political authority. The nation may remain the center of certain types of non-political authority and loyalty. Politically, economically, and militarily the nation must yield to multi-national units of which the *Grossraum* of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are the outstanding examples.

In *The Soviet Impact on the Western World,* the Soviet Union takes the place of the pioneer of the future. As in *Conditions of Peace* Hitler was saluted as the Napoleon of the twentieth century, so now Stalin appears to Mr. Carr as the Wilson of the Second World War. "The missionary role which had been filled in the first World War by American democracy and Woodrow Wilson had passed in the second World War to Soviet democracy and Marshal Stalin." (page 3) What Mr. Carr calls "Soviet democracy" is, according to him, really an offshoot of Western democracy. In the West, political democracy and social democracy became antagonistic after the middle class had achieved its revolutionary objectives against the feudal order. The bourgeoisie of the West led political democracy to victory. The Russian proletariat achieved social democracy. "The challenge which Soviet democracy presents to the Western world is a challenge to complete the unfinished revolution." (page 10) In consequence, Mr. Carr equates the Cromwellian, Jacobin, and Bolshevist dictatorships as instruments for achieving democracy. "There is, therefore, no essential incompatibility between democracy and dictatorship." (page 11) Since in this view the Soviet Union has become the champion of democracy in the mid-twentieth cen-

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tury, it is not surprising to learn that "the cult of the 'common man' now fashionable in English-speaking countries is perhaps a first result of the impact of Soviet democracy." (page 12) "The broad lines of Soviet policy may be dictated from the center. But the Soviet Union has never ignored the human element, or underestimated the extent to which the execution of any policy depends on the enthusiasm and initiative of the individual citizen; and it has shown itself as well aware as the western world of what Sir Ernest Barker has described as a main function of democracy—to 'enlist the effective thought of the whole community in the operation of discussion.' Here at any rate is a challenge of Soviet democracy to western political institutions about which western democrats will be well advised to ponder." (pages 18-19) What is true of the cult of the common man and of public discussion is also true of planning: " . . . Lord Keynes' doctrines found such ready acceptance in Great Britain and elsewhere partly because the ground had already been prepared in the minds of his contemporaries by contemplation of the planned economy of the Soviet Union." (page 34)

In international affairs the Soviet impact has been in the main twofold: the development of propaganda as a normal instrument of the conduct of foreign affairs and the emphasis upon the power factor as over against its ideological disguises, practiced by the Western statesmen of the League of Nations period. Fundamentally, however, the Soviet impact on the Western world is moral. "The gravamen of the Marxist revolution is not that it has exposed the failures and shortcomings of western democracy, but that it has called in question the moral authority of the ideals and principles of western democracy by declaring them to be a reflexion of the interests of a privileged class." (page 94) "The fate of the western world will turn on its ability to meet the Soviet challenge by a successful search for new forms of social and economic action in which what is valid in individualist and democratic tradition can be applied to the problems of mass civilization." (page 113)

There can be no doubt that Mr. Carr's work constitutes a contribution to political thought of the first order. No contemporary thinker, with the exception of Reinhold Niebuhr, has seen more clearly and exposed with more acute brilliance the essential defects of Western political thought. Even in so monumental a failure as *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*—a failure because it confronts Soviet ideology with democratic practice—there is much critical analysis which Western thinkers might well ponder. Yet, as we have seen, it was Mr. Carr's purpose not only to give a critical analysis of the Western tradition of political thought, but also to replace the old and obsolete with a new synthesis of realism and utopianism, theory and practice, ethics and politics, and the main bulk of Mr. Carr's work is dedicated to that purpose. In view of this purpose the overall impression of Mr. Carr's work is one of failure. What are the reasons for the failure of a work undertaken with so singular an equipment of mind, learning, and honest purpose?

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The fundamental reason is a philosophic one. Mr. Carr sets out to discover a new morality in the political world with only the vaguest notion of what morality is. The philosophically untenable equation of utopia, theory, and morality, which is at the foundation of *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* leads of necessity to a relativistic, instrumentalist conception of morality. Morality, then, becomes "an escape from the logical consequences of realism, which, once it is achieved, must once more be attacked with instruments of realism." (*The Twenty Years' Crisis,* page 118) In his most recent contribution to the problem, *The Moral Foundations for World Order (Foundations for World Order,* Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, 1948), Mr. Carr has nothing better to offer than a "compromise between morality and power," and throughout his work he relies heavily upon Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society,* unaware that Mr. Niebuhr has long since given up the juxtaposition which the title indicates.

Consequently, Mr. Carr, philosophically so ill-equipped, has no transcendent point of view from which to survey the political scene and to appraise the phenomenon of power. Thus the political moralist transforms himself into a utopian of power. Whoever holds seeming superiority of power becomes of necessity the repository of superior morality as well. Power thus corrupts not only the actor on the political scene, but even the observer, unfortified by a transcendent standard of ethics. Mr. Carr might have learned that lesson from the fate of the political romantics of whom the outstanding representatives are Adam Müller and Carl Schmitt. It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without *virtù.*

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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

By BRYCE WOOD

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *The Calculated Risk*, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xii, 68. $1.50.
James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, pp. xii, 324. $3.50.
Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U. S. Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper, 1947, pp. 62. $1.00.
X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, no. 4, July, 1947, pp. 566-82.

THESE four publications appeared in the latter half of 1947 but all of them were written near the middle of the year. Three of them deal directly with the policy which the United States should adopt toward the Soviet Union. The concern of Mr. Armstrong at first seems to be limited to "the two main objectives of American foreign policy": "to help Europe live and to strengthen the United Nations." Subsequently, however, although Mr. Armstrong is nowhere explicit on this point, it appears that these are techniques, rather than objectives, for the first would avert the "planned social and economic disintegration" furthered by the Soviet Union, while the second would diminish the effectiveness of Moscow's policy of "indirect aggression." It is, therefore, not unreasonable to include Mr. Armstrong among those offering answers to the question: Where do we go from here in seeking equilibrium and even an accord with the Kremlin?

In contemporary international affairs, more than ever before, the timeliness of policy suggestions is crucial to their validity, and a review of these three tracts and one memoir a year after their appearance runs the risk of having the same flavor as stale coffee, warmed over. That risk may still be run, in view of the eminence of the authors and the present urgency of their subject.

Where were we in mid-1947? The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were on the record; Soviet exception had been taken to the former, and Mr. Molotov had dramatically refused at Paris to compromise the newly-espoused principle of state sovereignty for the sake of matériel from the United States. Soviet-American relations were less amicable than at any time after the fall of Berlin and they were deteriorating. General Zhdanov had gone further than Mr. Molotov, and had declared that the Soviet Union would make every effort to prevent the realization of the Marshall Plan.

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At this juncture a probably official analysis of Soviet-American relations was published under the authorship of Mr. X, who is generally admitted (except by the Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations) to be Mr. George F. Kennan, Director of the Department's Policy Planning Staff. Mr. X offers a justification for the Truman Doctrine, without referring to that policy by name. In his view, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Such containment is to be secured through "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy."

To this line of thought Mr. Armstrong presents no objections, and, indeed, almost entirely ignores the existence of the Truman Doctrine. Mr. Byrnes, writing just before the publication of the article by Mr. X, presents a nearly identical view in saying, on his last page, that "our policy should be one of *firmness* and *patience*."

Mr. Lippmann, however, sharply attacks the thesis of Mr. X. Adopting a technique reminiscent of Rabelais, he pokes fun at the idea of "counter-force" for Soviet containment, asserting that the United States could not do the job with its own troops and that, therefore, the counter-force would "have to be composed of Chinese, Afghans, Iranians, Austrians, of anti-Soviet Poles, Czechoslovaks, Bulgars, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Hungarians, Finns and Germans." This array of allies, which curiously does not include any English, French, Belgians or other no less soldierly types, does not impress Mr. Lippmann, and he proposes a concentration of American forces and policy on the task of inducing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany and Austria, and consequently from Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

The evacuation of Europe, says Mr. Lippmann, is "the settlement which will settle the issue which has arisen out of the war" because then "the power of the Russian Communists and the power of the Russian imperialists to realize their ambitions will have been reduced decisively." Leaving aside the question whether evacuation would be decisive, it is surely dangerous to pin hopes for a settlement on the attainment of this single, determinate objective. Mr. Lippmann does not specify how evacuation would be secured, except by "mounting pressure," nor does he speculate on the permissible magnitude of a *quid pro quo*. If evacuation is not forthcoming, then it appears that he would accept the views of Mr. X, for he states that in such case "American power must be available, not to 'contain' the Russians at scattered points, but to hold the whole Russian military machine in check," and to continue to try to bring about a withdrawal. It does not seem necessary to take up a quibble over the difference between "contain" and "hold in check." Rhetoric and the pounding beat of declaratory prose apart, the differences between Mr. Lippmann and Mr. X do not appear fundamental. Mr. X is dealing in generalities; had he been asked

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whether he would favor American "pressure" to induce a Soviet evacuation, he might well have said that unsuccessful pressure had already been brought to bear by Mr. Byrnes at Paris and New York in 1946 to obtain an Austrian treaty, and that similar pressure would be exerted toward a German treaty, as later became the case. He would undoubtedly have been skeptical about the success of such pressure short of force and would have pointed, as Mr. Lippmann finally points, to the "hold in check" (read: "containment") policy as the necessary recourse.

The development of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations during the past year has not varied greatly from what might almost be called the X-Lippmann line. A second conference was held at London in an effort to draw up a German treaty, and such pressure as the United States felt it advisable to bring to bear was unavailing. Firmness was exemplified by President Truman's declaration of March 17, 1948 of his confidence "that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires." Expansion of the American armed forces and renewed aid to Greece and Turkey reinforced the containment (read: "hold in check") policy. Restraint, if not patience, has been notable in the attitude of United States representatives in Berlin and Seoul in the face of Soviet tactics of a provocative character. The Russians have been contained at such "constantly shifting geographical and political points" as Greece, Ars and Kardahan, Iran, and the Italian elections. The principal exception to this statement is Czechoslovakia, but that country for a long time had both acted and been considered as a Soviet satellite so that, while its *Gleichschaltung* by the Communist Party was a shock to the western democracies, they tended to look upon it as the completion of a process within an area already considered as part of a Soviet zone. That admitted zone has now, like a balloon, been fully inflated; further swelling risks an explosion.

It is not without interest to observe Mr. Lippmann's effort to discredit the Truman Doctrine by calling it "unworkable in Europe," and by suggesting that the European Recovery Program was devised partly to save the United States from "the destructive and exhausting entanglements of the Truman Doctrine." However, the ERP has not supplanted the Truman Doctrine, nor has Congress failed to continue to support it, as Mr. Lippmann mistakenly forecast. His endeavor to make it appear that the ERP is a laudable successor to a deplorable Truman Doctrine gives rise to the impression that Mr. Lippmann is desirous of saddling the President with sole responsibility for the Doctrine, while Secretary Marshall and the Department of State receive credit for rescuing the President from a difficult position by bringing forward the Plan. Inspiring such an impression may be good, long-range party politics, and there are cases, such as the recognition of Israel, in which coordination between the White House and the Department has been less than complete, but it would be surprising indeed if it were shown that the Truman Doctrine had not received at least acquiescent clearance from the officials of the Department. While a phrase about quarantining aggressors could slip into a presidential address

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and shock a Secretary of State, surely non-consultation about the Truman Doctrine would bring about a Secretary's resignation.

With regard to Germany, Mr. Lippmann takes the position that the British, American, and French governments should refrain from setting up a unified (whether unitary or federal) state of Western Germany. He argues that the unification of the three western zones under German rule would almost certainly result in a Soviet-German rapprochement, since Moscow would then be in a position to grant the new German state most of its pre-1939 area through a new partition of Poland, or even by "compensation" in the west. In this view, an indefinite deferment of unity, or even a permanent division of western Germany, supplemented by entry of the new German states in whatever type of European union may be formed, would be preferable to running the double risk of Soviet advantage and German resurgence which would follow on unification. The decentralization of western Germany, and "the Marshall Plan, purged of the Truman Doctrine," are the aims of a German policy Mr. Lippmann would favor.

A quite different course is set forth in *Speaking Frankly,* where Mr. Byrnes proposes the calling of a peace conference to frame a treaty for a unified Germany. If the conference produces a document which is rejected by the Soviet Union and eastern Germany remains occupied, then the situation should be referred to the Security Council. If a Soviet veto blocks the solution desired by the otherwise adequate majority of the Security Council, then, and here Mr. Byrnes can hardly be credited with speaking frankly, "we must be prepared to assume the obligations that then clearly will be ours. If our action is to be effective, we must be clear in our own minds and must make it clear to all that we are willing to adopt these measures of last resort if, for the peace of the world, we are forced to do so." Mr. Byrnes does not make it clear what "these measures" are, nor do his quotations from the preamble and from Article (1) of the Charter add precision to his statement. When charges of "war-mongering," based on this passage, were subsequently made by Mr. Vishinsky, Mr. Byrnes denied that he had in mind the use of atomic weapons against the Soviet Union, but he did not specify just what would constitute the "effective collective measures" which might be applied in order to induce the evacuation of eastern Germany by the Red Army. Neither the counsel of Mr. Byrnes nor that of Mr. Lippmann has been accepted by the governments of the West. Soviet troops show no indication of fulfilling Mr. Byrnes' belief that they will not remain permanently in the eastern zone, and, after the failure of Big Four negotiations on Germany at London in December, no conference on a German treaty has been called, nor has the question been placed on the agenda of the Security Council. On the other hand, the decision has been reached by the western democracies to form a single German state out of the three Allied zones. The fact that the decision on Germany has been taken jointly by the western powers gives rise to the hope that, while in this way the western European economy will be strengthened and its bargaining position with the East improved, adequate measures will con-

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tinue to be taken against a renewal of German military might and against the "satellitization" of western Germany.

In these three closely related lines of policy the United States has been operating outside the machinery of the United Nations. The criticism of the first Greek and Turkish aid program on the ground that it "by-passed" the United Nations was appeased by the otherwise nearly meaningless assurance in Section 5(2) of the act of May 22, 1947 that the programs would not be carried out if the Security Council (the United States harmlessly abstaining) or the General Assembly found that action by the United Nations made the continuance of such programs unnecessary or undesirable. No attempt has been made to obtain a test vote on this issue, and such omission is no reflection on the parliamentary skill of the leaders of the Soviet delegation. The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the discussions on the Marshall Plan; after the invitation was rejected little attention was paid to Soviet complaints that the Economic Commission for Europe had been by-passed as a result of developments subsequent to Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard. Finally, one of the fundamental understandings about the United Nations was that it was not to be burdened with responsibility for making treaties with the Axis states.

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that Mr. X completely ignores the United Nations, official assurances such as that of Mr. Byrnes that "we have pinned our hopes to the banner of the United Nations" should not be regarded as entirely without foundation. American leadership in world affairs, stemming from American strength, gains support at home and abroad in proportion as it is used responsibly and in accord with the principles and procedures of the Charter. The forum of the General Assembly has been incompletely exploited by American delegates in the propaganda battle with the Soviet bloc, but it may be hoped that United States tactics there will become less feebly retaliatory. To the extent to which the United Nations is to be regarded as a means of influencing public opinion, careful study should be given to maximizing the propaganda value of the participation of United States representatives.

Offering a plan designed to promote the strengthening of the United Nations by the United States, Mr. Armstrong is only slightly paradoxical in drawing attention to the resources of Article 51 of the Charter. Frequent employment of the veto has drawn attention recently toward the possibility of exploiting Article 51; Mr. Armstrong, with the encouragement of Senator Vandenberg, suggests that the United States should propose that "a group of United Nations members" draw up a protocol, open to adherence by all Members, by which the signatories would agree to carry out the Charter obligation to resist "armed attack." The agreement would come into operation "1, if two-thirds of the signatories decided that collective action was called for under the Charter; and 2, if the Security Council failed to act." Mr. Armstrong considers that the acceptance of this protocol would both strengthen the United Nations by making some of the issues before it more easily handled, and, more importantly, reduce the fearsome-

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ness of indirect aggression by making direct aggression more improbable or more likely to be cooperatively resisted. To call this proposition a means of strengthening the United Nations seems a mild sort of subterfuge; Mr. Armstrong, while claiming that it could not be considered an unfriendly act by any Member, admits that the Russians would regard it as directed against them. While this proposal has not received official adoption in the form outlined, a move in this general direction is apparently under way with the approval by the Senate of the Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948 and with the reported initiation of discussions for military aid to certain western European governments.

Of these publications, Mr. Byrnes' book will be the most enduring, less for its policy suggestions than for its account of the Secretary's experiences in negotiating with Mr. Molotov. Whatever the facts of authorship, Mr. X's article will be restudied so long as Mr. Kennan is in the Department—even afterwards if a "diplomatic illness" should mark his retirement. It is to be regretted that Mr. Armstrong did not extend into analysis his almost casual consideration of an alliance, within Article 51; if, however, the Vandenberg resolution should be followed up by the present or a succeeding administration, in order to associate the United States with the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, his suggestion may serve to point the way to a formula. The quality of the memorability of Mr. Lippmann's volume, aside from its title, is difficult to judge; he might be grandly right or dismally wrong, depending on future tests of his views and of such a statement as: "Applied to Germany, the policy of containment is a booby trap, constructed by men who do not understand the politics of power."

Where do we go from here? By and large we are moving along tracks laid down by the time these works appeared. The Truman Doctrine, having survived both Mr. Lippmann's thrusts and the harder knocks of experience, is very much alive; it represents the minimum action required to circumscribe Communist military adventures. Its continuance may be justified whether or not the hopes of Mr. X for a mellowing of the Soviet regime are as firmly held as ever. Since mid-1947, its strategy of containment as a strictly defensive policy has been supplemented by the development of ERP and the financing of the Economic Cooperation Administration. In conjunction with the Brussels Treaty and the Vandenberg resolution these politico-economic strokes bid fair to develop in Europe a "third force" capable not only of participating effectively in containment but perhaps of holding its own against westerly pressure by the Red Army or the Cominform. For the present bipartisan, these policies continue to signal the way we are going in mid-1948.

Signalling the way, however, does not clear the track. The triple policy of containment (including western German unity), remobilization, and peacetime lend-lease is just beginning to go into effect. If the existing delicate equilibrium can be maintained for a year or two, the West may be so strong that Soviet hopes for expansion will have to be indefinitely deferred, despite the assurances of Marxist theoreticians. There is great

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danger that, since time in the proximate future is on the side of the United States, the Soviet Union might risk a general conflict in the immediate future.

If the taking of that risk results in war, the United States will be more fully prepared with each passing day; if war is avoided the whole western community will be gradually more capable of resisting aggression, direct or indirect. Totalitarianism thrives best, like the plague, on chaos, privation and conflict; there remain some grounds for hope that, given time, its withering on both sides of the iron curtain can be engendered by a resolute policy of containment combined with the growth of peace and plenty in the West. Extraordinarily difficult choices of timing, emphasis and pace will continue to confront American statesmen, but the main lines of policy are becoming clearer, and the prospect of their receiving the unified support of the American people is heartening when it is recalled that the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the repeal of the neutrality legislation is not due to be celebrated for another year.

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RESEARCH NOTES

THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By FREDERICK S. DUNN

FOUR able and penetrating writers have recently given us their considered views on the nature and scope of international relations as a branch of higher learning.* While each of them starts from a somewhat different intellectual viewpoint, they display a striking similarity of conception of the general place of international relations (hereafter referred to as IR) in the spectrum of human knowledge. I propose here, not to subject these writings to critical scrutiny, but to use them as a starting point for a brief inspection of the scope of international relations as it now seems to be taking form in the work of the leading scholars in the field.

It is necessary to note in the beginning that "scope" is a dangerously ambiguous word. It suggests that the subject matter under inquiry has clearly discernible limits, and that all one has to do in defining its scope is to trace out these boundaries in much the manner of a surveyor marking out the bounds of a piece of real property. Actually, it is nothing of the sort. A field of knowledge does not possess a fixed extension in space but is a constantly changing focus of data and methods that happen at the moment to be useful in answering an identifiable set of questions. It presents at any given time different aspects to different observers, depending on their point of view and purpose. The boundaries that supposedly divide one field of knowledge from another are not fixed walls between separate cells of truth but are convenient devices for arranging known facts and methods in manageable segments for instruction and practice. But the foci of interest are constantly shifting and these divisions tend to change with them, although more slowly because mental habits alter slowly and the vested interests of the intellectual world are as resistant to change as those of the social world.

If one keeps this in mind, it is not difficult to answer the hotly debated question whether IR should be regarded as a separate branch of learning or as just a miscellany of materials and methods drawn from existing subjects. The answer seems to depend entirely on considerations of utility.

* Grayson, Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947; Klaus Knorr, "Economics and International Relations: A Problem in Teaching," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXII, no. 4, December, 1947, pp. 552-68; E. L. Woodward, *The Study of International Relations at a University*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1945; Waldemar Gurian, "On the Study of International Relations," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 8, no. 3, July, 1946, pp. 275-82.

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New subjects of learning have always in the past grown out of new bodies of questions that have insistently called for answers by some means other than consulting the stars or tossing coins. Invariably, such subjects were originally attached to existing divisions of knowledge and appeared as mere extensions of them. Eventually, as the complexities of the newly observed body of questions began to mount and the inadequacies of offhand answers became apparent, some adventurous minds put in a good deal of time and effort finding aids to better solutions. Their labors led to the building up of a special body of knowledge which everyone who wanted to become expert in answering questions in the field had to master. As soon as this became a full-time occupation and a proper label was found, a new branch of knowledge was born.

The questions which arise out of the relations among nations are certainly important and difficult. They likewise possess their own coherence and uniqueness since they arise out of relations in a special kind of community, namely, one made up of autonomous units without a central authority having a monopoly of power. Pulling together the scattered fragments of knowledge about them obviously serves to focus attention on them and to encourage the development of more intelligent ways of handling them. Recent events have reinforced the growing conviction that the questions of international relations are too complex and dangerous to be dealt with any longer as sidelines of existing disciplines.

Granting all this, it is also true that IR is still in an early stage of development and that much of what is talked about under the label scarcely deserves recognition as a legitimate subject of academic concern. It is in the nature of international questions that they can be discussed on a wide variety of intellectual levels, from the most amateur to the most highly professional, and the public is not very aware of the distinctions between them. There is still a wide difference of opinion even among the professionals as to what should be included in the subject when conceived of as a separate body of knowledge.

What I shall do here is merely to state certain propositions about the nature and scope of IR which seem to represent the present views of some mature scholars in the field. In setting these forth I do not mean to imply that they incorporate the correct or final form of the subject. In my own view, the present basic divisions of the field are far from satisfactory from the standpoint of creative scholarship and the next few years are apt to witness the development of more imaginative classifications. But in the early stages of any subject it is the wisest course to make use of existing terms and categories. To try to invent a set of new ones at the start usually results in an inability to communicate with anyone else.

The following statements are dogmatically phrased for the reason that sufficient space is not available to express all the possible qualifications. For the same reason, no attempt has been made to squeeze out the last drop of ambiguity from them.

1. IR may be looked upon as the actual relations that take place across

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national boundaries, or as the body of knowledge which we have of those relations at any given time.

The latter is always more restricted in extent than the former, and its contents will depend, among other things, upon the intellectual trends of the times and the point of view and purpose of the observer.

2. As a branch of learning, IR consists of both a subject-matter and a set of techniques and methods of analysis for dealing with new questions.

The subject-matter consists of whatever knowledge, from any sources, may be of assistance in meeting new international problems or understanding old ones. It includes both general knowledge about the behavior of political groups or individuals and particular information about events or policy questions.

In the case of questions of general knowledge, the techniques and methods of analysis include the logical devices for arriving at hypotheses and for testing and verifying or rejecting them. In the case of practical questions they include the devices for revealing the issues involved, classifying the value objectives, indicating the alternative courses of action available and their probable consequences, and selecting the one most likely to lead to the desired end.

3. The distinguishing characteristic of IR as a separate branch of learning is found in the nature of the questions with which it deals.

IR is concerned with the questions that arise in the relations between autonomous political groups in a world system in which power is not centered at one point.

4. An IR analyst is one who purports to have some skill in dealing with the questions that arise out of the relations of nations.

The core of his interest lies in the conflict, adjustment and agreement of national policies. When he concerns himself with related subjects, such as demography, anthropology and sociology, it is to the extent that these throw light on international questions. This distinguishes his interest in these fields from that of the professional demographer, anthropologist or sociologist.

5. The technical knowledge of IR is not merely the extension to a wider geographical scale of knowledge of social relations inside the national community, but has unique elements of its own.

Thus international politics is concerned with the special kind of power relationships that exist in a community lacking an overriding authority; international economics deals with trade relations across national boundaries that are complicated by the uncontrolled actions of sovereign states; and international law is law that is based on voluntary acceptance by independent nations.

6. Since the questions with which IR deals arise primarily out of social conflicts and adjustments, its approach is in large part instrumental and normative in character.

IR is concerned primarily with knowledge that is relevant to the control and improvement of a particular set of social conditions. Its goal is not

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merely knowledge for its own sake but knowledge for the purpose of molding practical events in desired directions. In this sense it is a policy science. As such it does not differ from traditional politics, economics, jurisprudence, and similar social disciplines, all of which had their origin in a desire to improve a particular segment of social relations.

7. The normative character of IR refers to the kinds of questions dealt with and does not imply that the subject-matter is associated with any particular ideal conception of the international community.

The study of IR has been inspired from the beginning by a deep interest in how wars may be avoided. The early students of IR tended to conceive of ideal social systems in which wars did not exist and then to evaluate existing practices in the light of these ideal conceptions. The present tendency among scholars is to give primary attention to the ascertainable facts of international life and the forces and conditions that influence behavior among nations, as well as the ways in which these can be used for desired ends.

8. Foreign policies can only be understood in the light of knowledge of internal conditions of the states involved.

For many purposes it is possible to talk about the relations of states as if they were relations between solid bodies with wills of their own apart from human wills. Thus it is possible to discuss the operation of the balancing process among sovereign states, the relative value of different power positions, and, to some extent, the legal rights and duties of nations, without looking beneath the surface of the state.

In general, however, it is not possible to understand the course of international events without a careful study of the local factors and influences that enter into the formation of national policies.

9. All international relations can be described in terms of decision-making by identifiable individuals or groups of individuals.

This reveals the fact that the study of IR is basically the study of human behavior in a particular social setting.

10. By focusing on decision-making it is possible to devise ways of improving the chances of getting more intelligent decisions.

The study of decision-making reveals the specific kinds of skills and talents needed in staffing the government service. It indicates the kinds of training that should be undertaken by those who intend to follow professional careers in the field. In addition, it helps us to understand the extent to which the personality and predispositions of the decision-maker enter into his choices of action.

11. It is equally important to study the processes of decision-making in other countries.

Decision-making in IR generally involves the interaction of the officials of two or more states. Agreement is facilitated by a knowledge of the factors and considerations that influence the policy-makers of other countries.

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12. The average decision-maker tends to operate on the basis of a speculative model of the general type of decision-makers from other communities he expects to meet in international negotiations. The accuracy of this model determines in large degree his success in achieving his objectives.

In the past such models have tended to follow two extreme types: the "Machiavellian" character whose sole aim was the enhancement of his own power or that of his nation and who used any means, however immoral, for these ends; and the "statesman" who paid little attention to power considerations but sought the settlement of issues solely on the basis of law and justice and the good of the greatest number.

Neither of these speculative models has been of much use in calculating action, since only a few policy-makers met in actual life resemble them to any extent. The study of decision-making should greatly improve the mental pictures which negotiators have of those whom they are likely to encounter in their negotiations.

13. The question "What is the scope of IR as a body of knowledge?" is different from the question "What is the proper scope of an educational program in the subject?"

The kind of a program to be offered by any particular institution should depend primarily on whether its aim is to offer IR as a cultural subject, or to train professionals, or both.

14. As a cultural subject, the aim should not be to turn out skilled decision-makers but to introduce the students to the general field and the methods available for analyzing its problems.

The subject-matter of IR has high cultural value both in teaching the ways of effective thinking and in enabling the student to come to terms with an important part of his environment. As a citizen in a democracy he is constantly faced with the necessity of arriving at sensible opinions on questions of foreign affairs.

15. As professional training for those who intend to follow careers in the field, IR contains an essential core of five subjects: international politics, international economics, international law and organization, diplomatic history, and political geography. In addition, it calls for some knowledge of the socio-psychological subjects—sociology, anthropology, psychology and social psychology, and ethics.

The IR analyst must acquire enough knowledge of the core subjects to enable him to move freely across the boundaries that separate them and to be able to think effectively about whole questions. In addition, he should have mastered at least one of the accepted disciplines so that he may become familiar with the basic intellectual virtues. Only after such training will he become sensitive to the need for maintaining the highest standards of rigorous scholarship if IR is to earn its place as a useful branch of higher learning.

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